The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 591-592 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 591-592.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

एतावत्तु भवेदत्र कथमेषां न निश्चये ।
नीलादिपरमाणूनामाकार इति गम्यते ॥ ५९१ ॥
तदप्यकारणं यस्मान्नैव ज्ञानमगोचरम् ।
नचैकस्थूलविषयं स्थौल्यैकत्वविरोधतः ॥ ५९२ ॥

etāvattu bhavedatra kathameṣāṃ na niścaye |
nīlādiparamāṇūnāmākāra iti gamyate || 591 ||
tadapyakāraṇaṃ yasmānnaiva jñānamagocaram |
nacaikasthūlaviṣayaṃ sthaulyaikatvavirodhataḥ || 592 ||

All, that can be urged is—“on the definite cognition of these (atoms), how is it that it is not realised that what is perceived as blue is the form of the atoms?”—But that also cannot be the cause; because the cognition in question cannot be without an object; and yet it cannot have for its object a single gross object, as there is incompatibility between grossness and one-ness.—(591-592)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

Question:—“If then, the Atoms are not perceived as distinct from one another, how do they become perceptible?”

Answer:—[see verses 591-592 above]

These’—i.e. of the Atoms.

That also cannot be the Cause etc., etc.’;—i.e. the fact of the Atoms being perceived as differentiated from one another cannot be the cause of the fact that the Blue colour is not perceived as belonging to the Atoms; because the certainty regarding this can be got at from other sources. For instance, the upholder of the ‘External Thing’ cannot hold a Cognition to be devoid of an object; if he did admit it, then his view would come to be the view of pure ‘Idealism’.

Under the circumstances, the Colour, etc. which form the objects of the Cognition, and appear therein in the gross form,—is it one or many? If one, is it composed of the components, or not so composed? In either of these two forms, it cannot be one, as that would be incompatible with Perception.—(591-592)

Question:—“What is that ‘incompatibility (with Perception)?”

Answer—[see verses 593-594 next]

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