The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 588 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 588.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

अकल्पनाक्षगम्येऽपि निरंशेऽर्थस्य लक्षणे ।
यद्भेदव्यवसायेऽस्ति कारणं स प्रतीयते ॥ ५८८ ॥

akalpanākṣagamye'pi niraṃśe'rthasya lakṣaṇe |
yadbhedavyavasāye'sti kāraṇaṃ sa pratīyate || 588 ||

Even though, the thing being impartite, its character is apprehensible only by indeterminate perception, yet there is definite (certain) cognition of its differentiation (from other things); and it is this definite cognition that is understood to be the cause (of certainty).—(588)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

Says the Opponent:—“Inasmuch as things are impartite,—and everything is actually perceived in its complete form,—why should there be no certainty regarding the whole Thing?”

Answer:—[see verse 588 above]

Ākṣa’ is that which pertains to the senses; i.e. perceptional cognition;—and this is qualified by the term ‘akalpana’, ‘indeterminate’;—though it is apprehensible by indeterminate Sense-perception, yet etc., etc.

There is definite (certain) cognition of its differentiation’;—i.e. certainty as regards its being different;—the cause of this consists in Repetition, Close Proximity, vividness of conviction of difference, and so forth. As a matter of fact, mere Apprehension by itself does not bring about certainty, which is brought about with the help of repetition, etc. also. Hence the meaning is that there is certainty where all these conditions are present.

All this we have said on the supposition (for the sake of argument) that Atoms exist and also the external object is actually cognised by Perception; as a matter of fact however, for the Idealist, there is no external object, in the shape of Blue and the like, cognised by Perception; because in dreams and other such conditions, there is perception of such things as the Blue, even though such things have no existence at the time; and this fact makes the ordinary perception of such things also at least doubtful; specially as the form of the ‘Blue’ being devoid of the nature of one or many, its cognition must be of the nature of an illusory appearance.—Nor are the Atoms admitted as existent; because they exist in sequential succession,—and as they vary in regard to the point of space occupied by them, they cannot be regarded as one. Under the circumstances, in view of such an Atom, how can it be asserted that Atoms are perceptible as having the Blue Colour, and that the sequence has no significance, being imposed upon it from outside—through illusion?—(588)

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