The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 578 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 578.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

अन्यधर्मसमावेशे प्राप्ता तत्र च धर्मिता ।
द्रव्यादेरपि धर्मित्वमस्मादेव च संमतम् ॥ ५७८ ॥

anyadharmasamāveśe prāptā tatra ca dharmitā |
dravyāderapi dharmitvamasmādeva ca saṃmatam || 578 ||

Thus in all these ‘existences’, the character of ‘being with property’ would be due to the presence therein of another property; and in the case of substance and the rest also, the character of ‘being with property’ has been accepted on the same basis.—(578)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

Says the Opponent:—“When it is found necessary and desirable, ‘Infinite Regress’ cannot be a defect that can justify the rejection of the Premiss”.

The answer to this is as follows:—[see verse 578 above]

In each one of these Existences (ad infinitum), the character of ‘being with property’ would be due to the presence therein of the properties coming one after the other; and under the circumstances, the assertion that ‘these Six Categories alone are with property’ would not be correct; as there would be many otherngs also (in the shape of the Existences), apart from the Six Categories, which would be with property. Such is the sense of the argument.

It might be argued that—“what are said to be six only are those things that are always with property only [while others are with property and also are themselves property]”.

But there is nothing in this explanation. As, under this explanation, Quality, Action, Universal, Individuality and Inherence could not be mentioned therein, as these are not always with property only, they are of the nature of property also,—as all these subsist in the Substance.

On the same basis’;—i.e. because of the presence of other properties.

The Opponent says:—“The existence of the Six Categories consists in their Cognisability by the Means of Cognising existing things; and this Cognisability is in the form of the Cognition which has the Six Categories for its object; as it is only when this Cognition is present that they are regarded as ‘existent’. Thus ‘cognisability’ is produced by Cognition and ‘predicability’ is produced by Predication; so that the use of the Genitive Ending—based upon difference,—becomes quite possible. Nor is there an Infinite, Regress; nor the contingency of Categories other than the six (postulated by us).”

This also is a mere figment of the Opponent’s imagination. If the things in question are in their essence of the nature of a Category (Thing) capable of effective action, then, as being capable of effective action, they must be Categories (Things); this being conceded, if they are spoken of by words with case-endings connoting difference,—in such expressions as ‘the existence of these’,—only to meet the enquiry as to their being other forms of Categories,—then what is the dispute between us? Because though its character is really not-different, yet having withdrawn that character from it, if the speaker were to speak of it as if it were different,—then there would be no dispute; because the use of words depends entirely upon the speaker’s whim,—as is found in the case of characters created in concocted stories, where extreme degrees of beauty and other qualities are assumed and described.—(578)

Like what you read? Consider supporting this website: