Verse 556

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

तदारब्धस्त्ववयवी गुणावयवभेदवान् ।
नैवोपलभ्यते तेन न सिध्यत्यप्रमाणकः ॥ ५५६ ॥

tadārabdhastvavayavī guṇāvayavabhedavān |
naivopalabhyate tena na sidhyatyapramāṇakaḥ || 556 ||

The composite substance made up of atoms,—as distinct from qualities and components,—is never apprehended; hence, there being no evidence for it, it cannot be admitted.—(556)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

Having thus denied the Substance in the form of Cause (Atoms), the Author next proceeds to deny it in the form of Products (Things composed of Atoms):—[see verse 556 above]

‘Qualities’—Colour, etc.;—‘Components’—Yarns, etc.;—that which is something different from these;—such a Composite, distinct from Qualities and Components, is never apprehended. As a matter of fact, any such composite substance as the ‘Cloth’, complete in itself, and entirely different from qualities like Whiteness, and from components, in the shape of the Yarns (composing it)—never appears in any visual or other kinds of Cognition.—From this non-perception of the Substance as distinct from Qualities, it also follows that there is no basis for the idea that Substance and Quality are distinct categories;—and from the non-perception of the Composite as distinct from the Components, it follows that the idea of Component and Composite (Part and Whole) is groundless.—This argument may be formulated as follow:—When a perceptible thing is not perceived, it does not exist,—just as the Jar, not being perceived at a certain place, is regarded as non-existent;—and no ‘Qualified Substance’, apart from the Qualities and Components,—which is held to be perceptible,—is ever perceived as occupying the same place;—nor is any ‘Composite’ ever perceived apart from the Components;—hence this is a natural reason (for regarding such Composite Substance as non-existent).—The Reason adduced here cannot be said to be ‘not admitted’; because there is the distinct declaration of Kaṇāda to the effect that ‘In a gross substance, there is perception due to its containing several substances and to qualities’ (Vaiśeṣika-sūtra), which clearly shows that the. Quality and the Components are regarded as perceptible.—(556)