Verse 547-548

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

जात्यादेर्निःस्वभावत्वमयुक्तं प्राक्प्रकाशितम् ।
द्रव्यादयः षडर्था ये विद्यन्ते पारमार्थिकाः ॥ ५४७ ॥
इत्याक्षपादकाणादाः प्राहुरागममात्रकाः ।
द्रव्यादिप्रतिषेधोऽयं सङ्क्षेपेण तदुच्यते ॥ ५४८ ॥

jātyāderniḥsvabhāvatvamayuktaṃ prākprakāśitam |
dravyādayaḥ ṣaḍarthā ye vidyante pāramārthikāḥ || 547 ||
ityākṣapādakāṇādāḥ prāhurāgamamātrakāḥ |
dravyādipratiṣedho'yaṃ saṅkṣepeṇa taducyate || 548 ||

The followers of Akṣapāda (Gautama, naiyāyikas) and of Kaṇāda (vaiśeṣikas) have asserted, solely on the strength of verbal authority, that—“the theory of the universal and such things being formless, set forth previously—cannot be right; because the six categories of ‘sub stance’ and the rest do really exist”.—Hence the refutation of these, substance and the rest, is briefly set forth here.—(547-548)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

The Introductory verses have spoken of the Doctrine of ‘Intervolved Chain of Causation’ as ‘free from such limiting conditions as those of Quality, Substance, Action, Universal, Inherence and so forth In support of this the Author proceeds to examine the ‘six categories’ (of the Vaiśeṣikas); tills examination is what is introduced in the following:—[see verses 547-548 above]

“In one of the earlier chapters, that on the ‘Permanence of Things’ (Chapter VIII), it has been asserted (by the Buddhist) that ‘the Universal and such concepts being formless, the momentary character is not attributed to them’ (Text 740).—This cannot be right; because the six categories of Substance, Quality, Action, Universal, Ultimate Individuality and Inherence do really exist”;—so say the followers of Akṣapāda and others. Naiyāyikas have been called ‘Ākṣapāda’ because they are the disciples, followers, of Akṣapāda; and similarly the followers of Kaṇāda, the Vaiśeṣikas, have been called ‘Kāṇāda’.

‘Solely on the strength of verbal authority’;—i.e. they are dependent upon Verbal Authority only, totally devoid of reason.—(547-548)