Verse 538-539

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

कृतनाशो भवेदेवं कांर्य न जनयेद्यदि ।
हेतुरिष्टं न चैवं यत्प्रबन्धे नास्ति हेतुता ॥ ५३८ ॥
अकृताभ्यागमोऽपि स्याद्यदि येन विना क्वचित् ।
जायेत हेतुना कांर्य नैतन्नियतशक्तितः ॥ ५३९ ॥

kṛtanāśo bhavedevaṃ kāṃrya na janayedyadi |
heturiṣṭaṃ na caivaṃ yatprabandhe nāsti hetutā || 538 ||
akṛtābhyāgamo'pi syādyadi yena vinā kvacit |
jāyeta hetunā kāṃrya naitanniyataśaktitaḥ || 539 ||

There would be ‘waste of what is done’, only if the cause did not produce an effect no such view however is held by us, whereby there could be no ‘causal character’.—The ‘befalling of what is not done’ also would be there if an effect were produced without a cause; this also is not held by us; as the production of the effect is always dependent upon the potency of a particular cause.—(538-539)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

Having thus established the existence of the ‘Means of Right Cognition’ apprehending the Relation of Cause and Effect, the Author now proceeds to meet the objection that his theory involves the anomaly of ‘the waste of what is done and the befalling of what is not done’:—[see verses 538-539 above]

If it load been held by us that there is really a Doer and Experiences then the doctrine of the ‘Perpetual Flux’ might have involved the anomaly of ‘the waste of what is done and the befalling of what is not done’;—as a matter of fact however, the view held by us is that the Universe is a mere Idea, and there is nothing that is done or experienced by anyone. How then could the said anomaly of ‘the waste of what is done, etc.’ be urged against us?

It is possible that the anomaly of ‘(a) the Waste of what is done and (b) the befalling of what is not done’ is urged against ns on the ground that our view involves the production of Results from a Cause (a) which has lost that capacity to bring about desirable and undesirable results which is concurrent with a pre-existing Intelligence,—and (b) which has acquired that capacity which is not concurrent with the preceding act.—But this cannot be right; because there is no incompatibility between the doctrine of ‘No-Soul’ and the presence of the capacity due to previous acts. For instance, just like the Seeds soaked in red dye, the particular potentialities due to previous acts do actually continue in the ‘chain’, and it is through these as subsequently developed that the desirable or undesirable result appears. Nor do we hold that the Result proceeds from a ‘chain’ not set up by previous acts; thus how could our view involve the anomaly of ‘the befalling of what has not been done’?

Uddyotakara has argued that “the Mind being a fleeting entity, there is no possibility of its being affected (impressed) by Actions”.—This is not right; as a matter of fact, there can be no affecting of the permanent thing which has not renounced its previous form; as for the ‘impermanent (fleeting)’ thing, its being ‘affected’ consists in the very fact of the coming about of a new character. When the Scriptures speak of ‘the Permanent Entity as affected’, it is with reference to the permanence of the ‘Chain’; that ‘Chain’ which is liable to be snapped cannot serve as the ‘Cause’, as it cannot be present at the time of the birth of the Result at a long interval; hence it would be clearly wrong to regard such a ‘Chain’ as the substratum of the ‘impression’ leading bo such a result. This is what is meant.—Thus what has been urged by Uddyotakara is based upon his ignorance of the doctrines of the other party and deserves to be ignored.—(538-539)