The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page describes verse 533-535 of the Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita (8th century), including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: both dealing with philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattva-sangraha (aka Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 verses.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

भावाभावाविमौ सिद्धौ प्रत्यक्षानुपलम्भतः ।
यदि साकारविज्ञानविज्ञेयं वस्तु चेन्मतम् ॥ ५३३ ॥
यदाऽनाकारधीवेद्यं वस्तु युष्माभिरिष्यते ।
तत्क्षणत्वादिपक्षेऽपि समानमुपलभ्यते ॥ ५३४ ॥
पूर्वकेभ्यः स्वहेतुभ्यो विज्ञानं सर्वमेव हि ।
समांशकालरूपादि बोधरूपं प्रजायते ॥ ५३५ ॥

bhāvābhāvāvimau siddhau pratyakṣānupalambhataḥ |
yadi sākāravijñānavijñeyaṃ vastu cenmatam || 533 ||
yadā'nākāradhīvedyaṃ vastu yuṣmābhiriṣyate |
tatkṣaṇatvādipakṣe'pi samānamupalabhyate || 534 ||
pūrvakebhyaḥ svahetubhyo vijñānaṃ sarvameva hi |
samāṃśakālarūpādi bodharūpaṃ prajāyate || 535 ||

As a matter of fact, the existence and non-existence (of things) are always known through perception and non-apprehension (respectively),—if the view held is that the things are apprehended by cognitions with forms.—If, on the other hand, you hold that the thing is apprehended by a cognition which is formless,—then the same is found to be the case under the doctrine of things being momentary. Because whenever cognition is produced by its antecedent causes, it is always in the form of an apprehension having the same colour, etc. that happen to appear at the time.—(533-535)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

Thus it has been shown that even under the doctrine of things being momentary, the Relation of Cause and Effect is quite possible. The Author next proceeds to show the possibility of the ‘Means of the Cognition’ of the said Relation:—[see verses 533-535 above]

Just as the apprehension of the Permanent Thing would come about for you, so also would that of the Momentary also come about.

For instance, when the apprehension of a Thing appears, it comes about either through a Cognition with a form, or through a formless Cognition. If it comes through the Cognition with a form, then the apprehension of the form of the Cognition would be the same as the apprehension of the Thing concerned;—and this would be equally possible under both views—ofngs being permanent or momentary. If on the other hand, it is through formless Cognition, that also makes no difference in the two views. Because, as a matter of fact, the Cognition is produced in such a form by antecedent Causes that what it apprehends is the same Colour, etc. that happen to be present at the same time,—and no other Colour, etc.; because it is produced in the form of the apprehension of these same.—Thus then, it being admitted that Cognition is of the nature of the apprehension of the Colour, etc. appearing at the same time,—there is no difference in the character of the Thing itself as concerned under the two views of Permanence and Momentariness. You will have to admit the presence of the character of ‘Cognition’ in the apprehension of each particular Colour, etc. appearing at the same time; by virtue of which, even though the character of appearing at the same time is equally present in all, yet what distinguishes the Cognition is the Colour, etc., and not the Sense-organ concerned. And this explanation holds good under the doctrine of the Momentariness of things also. So it is of no significance at all.—(533-535)