The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 494-495 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 494-495.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

सादृश्यात्प्रत्यभिज्ञानं भिन्ने केशादिके भवेत् ।
ज्ञातुरेकस्य सद्भावाद्द्विभेदे त्वनिबन्धनम् ॥ ४९४ ॥
प्रतिसन्धानकारी च यद्येकोऽर्थो न विद्यते ।
रूपे दृष्टेऽभिलाषादिस्तत्कथं स्याद्रसादिषु ॥ ४९५ ॥

sādṛśyātpratyabhijñānaṃ bhinne keśādike bhavet |
jñāturekasya sadbhāvāddvibhede tvanibandhanam || 494 ||
pratisandhānakārī ca yadyeko'rtho na vidyate |
rūpe dṛṣṭe'bhilāṣādistatkathaṃ syādrasādiṣu || 495 ||

“In the case of the hairs and other things, where there is difference, recognition may be due to similarity, because the perceiver is one and the same. when however there is difference of both, there would be no basis for recognition. if there is no single entity who could have the comprehensive notion, then how is it that, on seeing colour, there appears a longing for the taste and other qualities (of the thing seen)?”.—(494-495)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

The Buddhist may argue that—As in the case of the hair and nails that have been cut and have grown again, though there is difference (between what has been cut and what has grown again), yet there is ‘recognition’ on account of similarity,—so would it be in all cases of Recognition,—This is answered in the following—[see verses 494-495 above]

If there were a single cogniser, then there could be Recognition based upon similarity, even when there is difference between the two things concorned,—such Recognition being due to the common Cogniser. When however there is difference of both,—i.e. when the cognisers as well as the cognised things in the two cases are different, there would be no basis for the Recognition,—Then again, if there were no single cogniser correlating the two cognitions,—then how could there be such phenomenon as that when one sees the colour of the citron-fruit, he remembers the taste concomitant with that colour and evinces a desire for experiencing that taste and undertakes activity towards securing it? Certainly no one could have a longing, etc. for what has been seen by another person.—(494-495)

The mention of ‘one person’ is only by way of illustration; it is also to be understood that the object also which has been seen by one person cannot be ‘recognised’ by another person.—(493)

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