The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 459 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 459.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

प्रत्यक्षेण च बाधायामनुमानादिगोचरे ।
नानुमानादिमानं स्याद्बाधातस्तैमिरादिवत् ॥ ४५९ ॥

pratyakṣeṇa ca bādhāyāmanumānādigocare |
nānumānādimānaṃ syādbādhātastaimirādivat || 459 ||

If what has been cognised through inference and the other means of cognition were annulled by sense-perception, then inference and the rest could not be regarded as means of right cognition,—because they are annulled,—like cognitions through defective vision.—(459)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

It has been argued (under Text 455) that—“what has been cognised by other Means of Cognition could be accepted as otherwise, if so apprehended by Sense-perception”.—This is answered in the following—[see verse 459 above]

If the subject-matter of an Inference,—such as ‘because it is your child [it must be dark-complexioned]’,—could be annulled by Sense-perception,—then that Inference cannot be a Means of Right Cognition at all; because on account of its subject-matter being annulled, there can be no agreement with the real state of things, and hence it would be like the perception obtained through defective vision.—Hence the assertion that—“What has been cognised through other Means of Cognition could be accepted as otherwise, on the strength of Sense-perception”—is irrelevant, being entirely impossible.—(459)

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