Verse 458

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

अनन्यत्वेऽपि सत्त्वस्य कथं पूर्वधियाऽगतम् ।
तस्यागतौ हि वस्त्वेव नोपलब्धं प्रसज्यते ॥ ४५८ ॥

ananyatve'pi sattvasya kathaṃ pūrvadhiyā'gatam |
tasyāgatau hi vastveva nopalabdhaṃ prasajyate || 458 ||

If the present existence is not-different (from the previous existence),—then how is it that it is ‘not included in the previous cognition’? In fact, if it were not included therein, then it would come to this that the thing itself was not apprehended at all.—(458)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

If the ‘present existence’ is something different from the ‘previous existence’, then, how could it have been not-included in the previous Cognition,—on account of which you have asserted (under Text 452) that ‘it is not included in the previous Cognition’?

The following might be urged—“The momentary character of Sound and other things, though not anything different from these things, is said to be not-apprehended when the things are apprehended; the same may be true in the case in question also.”

This is not right. It is not true that while the object, Sound, is apprehended, its momentary character, though not-different from it, is held to be not apprehended; what is held is that, though the momentary character is apprehended, yet its apprehension is not definitely certain, on account of the ground for certainty not being there; because mere apprehension does not bring about certain Cognition; the certainty is dependent upon the needs of the apprehender and the soundness of the repetition of the apprehension.—This explanation is not available for you; because for you, even the previous perception is determinate (certain) in character; and when the form of the thing has been definitely cognised with certainty, through that previous Perception, then its present existence also, which is non-different from the previous form, must also have been definitely ascertained with certainty by that same Perception; if this latter were not definitely certain, the form of the thing also,—as non-different from this present existence,—would have to be regarded as not definitely ascertained.

Some people have held that—“The validity of the Recognition is based upon the definite ascertainment of the Thing that has been in doubt.”—This also becomes rejected by our above reasoning. Nor, in the present case, is there any ascertainment of a Thing in doubt;—because in the case of Hairs, even though different hairs come out one after the other, there is Recognition; so that the doubt would remain (even after Recognition, which has been found to be fallible in the case of Hairs).—(458)