The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 455 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 455.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

विज्ञातोऽपीतरैरर्थः प्रत्यक्षेणान्यथा भवेत् ।
प्रत्यक्षेणावरुद्धे तु नेतरोत्पत्तिसंभवः ॥ ४५५ ॥

vijñāto'pītarairarthaḥ pratyakṣeṇānyathā bhavet |
pratyakṣeṇāvaruddhe tu netarotpattisaṃbhavaḥ || 455 ||

“A thing, though cognised by other means of cognition, could be accepted as otherwise, if so apprehended by sense-perception; when however a thing is already taken up by sense-perception, there can be no appearance of any other means of cognition (to the contrary).”—(455)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

The following argument has been urged against Kumārila’s position:—In the case of an object cognised through Inference,—such as the inference of the dark complexion of the child (from the fact of its being born of a dark woman),—it is sometimes found that it is subsequently set aside by direct Perception (when the child is actually seen to be fair-complexioned);—in the same manner, in the case in question, even though the permanence of Things might be cognised through Recognition, yet it may be that at some later time, the successive (fluctuating) character ofngs may be proved through Inference based upon the fact of the effects of the thing being successive; and the said permanence vouched for by Recognition may thus be set aside by this subsequent Inference. Under the circumstances, how can the doctrine of ‘Perpetual Flux’ be held to be discarded (by Recognition)?

This is answered (from Kumārila’s point of view) in the following:—[see verse 455 above]

Other means of Cognition’—i.e. Inference and the rest; such as ‘The child must be dark-complexioned because he is the son of so and so’ and so forth.

Could be accepted as otherwise’,—through the instrumentality of Sense -perception;—‘otherwise’,—i.e. of a form other than that apprehended through Inference, etc.

Already taken up’,—i.e. apprehended.

There can be no appearance, etc.’;—Means of Cognition other than Sense-perception,—i.e. Inference and the rest—cannot set aside Sense-perception.—(455)

Why so?

Answer:—[see verse 456 next]

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