Verse 422-424

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

निःशेषशक्तिशून्यं तु यद्वन्ध्यासुतसन्निभम् ।
सर्वज्ञचेतसोऽप्येति हेतुत्वं न कदाचन ॥ ४२२ ॥
क्रियते तत्र नैवेदं कार्यरूपाद्यदृष्टितः ।
निर्निबन्धनमस्तित्वव्यवस्थानं विचक्षणैः ॥ ४२३ ॥
न तस्मिन्साधितेनार्थः क्षणिकत्वेन कश्चन ।
तत्र पर्यनुयोगश्च क्रियमाणोऽपि निष्फलः ॥ ४२४ ॥

niḥśeṣaśaktiśūnyaṃ tu yadvandhyāsutasannibham |
sarvajñacetaso'pyeti hetutvaṃ na kadācana || 422 ||
kriyate tatra naivedaṃ kāryarūpādyadṛṣṭitaḥ |
nirnibandhanamastitvavyavasthānaṃ vicakṣaṇaiḥ || 423 ||
na tasminsādhitenārthaḥ kṣaṇikatvena kaścana |
tatra paryanuyogaśca kriyamāṇo'pi niṣphalaḥ || 424 ||

That which is devoid of all capacity, and is like ‘the son of the barren woman’, never becomes a cause (basis) even for the mind of the omniscient person. and as in such a thing, intelligent men do not perceive an effect or character and so forth, they do not seek to establish its existence; as any such attempt would be absolutely baseless. there can be no useful purpose served by proving the momentariness of such a thing. so that any objection taken to this is also absolutely futile.—(422-424)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

‘Even for the mind, etc.’;—the term ‘even’ is meant to indicate that it is so, not only in regard to the ‘moments’ of the same ‘series’ as the said kind, but also in regard to such other purposes as the holding of water and the rest (in the case of the Jar).

‘Do not perceive the effect or character and so forth’;—the term ‘kārya ‘effect’, stands for the fruit, result;—the term ‘rūpa’ for nature, character,—and ‘so forth’ includes the particular time, place and condition;—what is meant is that such a thing does not differ in any way from absolute nonentities like the ‘Hare’s Horns’,

Nor is there any useful purpose to be served for the person seeking to accomplish a purpose, by proving the ‘momentariness’ of such ang; because the perception or non-perception of such a character in it would not help in accomplishing any good, nor in avoiding an evil. This has been thus declared—‘For one seeking to accomplish a useful purpose, what would be the use in discussing a thing which is incapable of accomplishing a useful purpose? What need has the young woman of discussing whether the man wanting in virility is handsome or ugly?’

For these reasons, when the disputant raises such questions as—“How is it known that it is momentary?”—it is entirely futile; because his opponent does not wish to prove the momentariness of suchngs.—(422-424)