Verse 412-413

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

तत्सम्बद्धस्वभावस्य भावे तेषामपि स्थितेः ।
अन्यच्चेद्विकलं रूपमेकत्वमवहीयते ॥ ४१२ ॥
व्यपेक्षयाऽप्यतश्चैवं न कार्याणां क्रमोदयः ।
यौगपद्यं च नैवेष्टं तत्कार्याणां क्रमेक्षणात् ॥ ४१३ ॥

tatsambaddhasvabhāvasya bhāve teṣāmapi sthiteḥ |
anyaccedvikalaṃ rūpamekatvamavahīyate || 412 ||
vyapekṣayā'pyataścaivaṃ na kāryāṇāṃ kramodayaḥ |
yaugapadyaṃ ca naiveṣṭaṃ tatkāryāṇāṃ kramekṣaṇāt || 413 ||

Because they must exist while that thing exists whose character is connected with them.—If, on the other hand, the incomplete form be held to be different (from the complete form), then the unity of the thing becomes lost.—Thus the successive appearance of effects is not possible, even when the cause is dependent (upon auxiliaries).—(412-413)

As for simultaneity, that is not favoured (by the other party at all); as the effects are actually found to appear in succession.—(413)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

The term ‘tatsambaddha, etc.’ is to be expounded as ‘that whose character is connected with them,’—i.e. the Auxiliaries.

‘They must exist’—i.e. the Auxiliaries must exist.—Just as when a man tied to a chain is dragged, the chain also becomes dragged,—the auxiliaries must follow the Permanentng with which they are connected. Thus alone does the Thing become saved from renouncing its previous character. If it does not renounce its character which is connected with the auxiliaries, then on account of the non-relinquishment of the character connected with the auxiliaries, the implication is that it does not relinquish the auxiliaries also; because the ‘connection’ is always dependent upon the connected factor. Otherwise the character of the thing would not be the same as the previous one.

If it be held that the incomplete form of the thing (i.e. without the auxiliaries) is different from that of the complete form (along with the auxiliaries), then the answer is as follows; If the form of the thing as without the auxiliaries be held to be different from its form as with the auxiliaries, then it loses its permanence; as the form is nothing different from the thing itself.

Thus, even if the action of the cause be dependent upon auxiliaries, it is not possible for the Permanent Thing to have any successive fruitful activity.—(412-413a)

The following Text shows that even simultaneous action is not possible:—[see verse 413b above]

Even the other party do not favour the idea of the effects of the Permanent Thing being simultaneous. For instance, the following are described as the effects of Permanent Things: (a) Pleasure, Pain and the Rest,—of the Soul; (b) Sound—of Ākāśa; (c) the successive cognitions—of the Mind; (d) the gross substances, from the Diad onwards,—of the Atoms; (e) all products—of Time, Space, God and so forth. And in the case of all these effects it is clearly perceived that they appear in succession.—(413)

What is meant is that the theory of simultaneity is contrary to perceived facts, and also contrary to the opponent’s own doctrines.

The author now proceeds to show that it is contrary to Inference also:—[see verse 414 next]