Verse 397-399

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

साध्वेतत्किंतु ते तस्य भवन्ति सहकारिणः ।
किं योग्यरूपहेतुत्वादेकार्थकरणेन वा ॥ ३९७ ॥
योग्यरूपस्य हेतुत्वे स भावस्तैः कृतो भवेत् ।
स चाशक्यक्रियो यस्मात्तत्स्वरूपं तदा स्थितम् ॥ ३९८ ॥
कृतौ वा तत्स्वरूपस्य नित्यताऽस्यावहीयते ।
विभिन्नोऽतिशयस्तस्माद्यद्यसौ कारकः कथम् ॥ ३९९ ॥

sādhvetatkiṃtu te tasya bhavanti sahakāriṇaḥ |
kiṃ yogyarūpahetutvādekārthakaraṇena vā || 397 ||
yogyarūpasya hetutve sa bhāvastaiḥ kṛto bhavet |
sa cāśakyakriyo yasmāttatsvarūpaṃ tadā sthitam || 398 ||
kṛtau vā tatsvarūpasya nityatā'syāvahīyate |
vibhinno'tiśayastasmādyadyasau kārakaḥ katham || 399 ||

This is all very well; but when those other things become its ‘auxiliaries’, is it because they are the cause of the causal efficiency (of the permanent thing)? Or because they also serve the same purpose?—If they are the cause of the causal efficiency (of the permanent thing),—then this thing itself would be produced by them; and yet this is incapable of being produced, as it is always there (being permanent). Or, if the very form of the permanent thing were held to be produced (by the auxiliaries), then its eternality (permanence) disappears. If the ‘peculiarity’ (produced in the permanent thing) be regarded as something distinct from the thing itself, then,—how can this (thing) be regarded as the ‘cause’?—(397-399)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

As a matter of fact, it is not possible for the Permanent Thing to have any auxiliary. Because (a) would that be an ‘auxiliary’ by virtue of creating peculiar conditions in the thing—as the Earth, Water and other things become auxiliaries of the seed through producing in it such conditions as swelling and the like? Or (b) would it by virtue of their serving the same purpose as the thing—as Colour etc. become auxiliaries to the Eye in producing the visual perception of Colour, by mere appearance?—The former view cannot be maintained; because the ‘peculiar condition’ that is produced in the Thing, by the auxiliary—would that condition be non-different or different from the form of the thing itself?—or would it be neither different nor non-different? Or would it be both different and non-different?—as held by the Ājīvakas. These are the four alternatives. The first of these alternatives is not tenable; as in this case, the condition, being non-different from the thing, would be, like it, always there, and what is always there cannot be produced,—or if it be produced, the thing itself also might be produced in the same way; and that would deprive it of its permanence.—If the second alternative be accepted, in that case, the effect being produced by the condition in question, the Thing itself would cease to be the Cause.

The term ‘asau’ (in the fourth line of the Text) stands for the Permanent Thing.—(397-399)

The same argument is further clarified in the following—[see verse 400 next]