Verse 392-394

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

तथाहि सन्तो ये नाम ते सर्वे क्षणभङ्गिनः ।
तद्यथासंस्कृता भावास्तथासिद्धा अनन्तरम् ॥ ३९२ ॥
सन्तश्चामी त्वयेष्यन्ते व्योमकालेश्वरादयः ।
क्षणिकत्ववियोगे तु न सत्तेषां प्रसज्यते ॥ ३९३ ॥
क्रमेण युगपच्चापि यस्मादर्थक्रियाकृतः ।
न भवन्ति स्थिरा भावा निःसत्वास्ते ततो मताः ॥ ३९४ ॥

tathāhi santo ye nāma te sarve kṣaṇabhaṅginaḥ |
tadyathāsaṃskṛtā bhāvāstathāsiddhā anantaram || 392 ||
santaścāmī tvayeṣyante vyomakāleśvarādayaḥ |
kṣaṇikatvaviyoge tu na satteṣāṃ prasajyate || 393 ||
krameṇa yugapaccāpi yasmādarthakriyākṛtaḥ |
na bhavanti sthirā bhāvā niḥsatvāste tato matāḥ || 394 ||

For instance, whatever things are existent are all in a state of perpetual flux,—just as all created things have just been shown to be;—these things, ākāśa, time, god, and the rest are held by you to be existent;—these could never have an existence if they were devoid op momentariness;—because permanent things cannot have any fruitful activity, either successively or simultaneously,—therefore they are held to be non-existent.—(392-394)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

The reasoning may be thus formulated:—What is existent must be momentary,—like the things just shown to be momentary;—Ākāśa and other (uncreated)ngs are held by you to be existent; this is therefore a natural reason (for regarding them as momentary).

‘As have been shown to be’;—i.e. as momentary.

This shows that the Corroborative Instance is not devoid of the Probandum, as its presence has been already established.

‘Held by you’;—this is meant to indicate that the reasoning here put forward is an indirect one, in the form of a Reductio ad absurdum. Otherwise the Reason cited would be one that is not admitted by one or the other of the two parties.

Question—“In what way is the invariable concomitance of the Reason (with the Probandum) established?”

Answer:—‘If they were devoid of momentariness, etc.’; the ‘existence’ that is meant to be the Reason here is that which consists in ‘capacity for fruitful action’; and this ‘existence’ must be absent, if ‘momentariness’ is absent; because when things perform a fruitful act, they do it either successively and simultaneously,—there is no other way of acting except successively and simultaneously; as these two are mutually exclusive, as is clearly perceived; for instance, the Jar is not perceived, at one and the same time, to perform the successive functions of containing wine, water and other liquids as apart from one another,—and also the simultaneous functions of bringing about its own cognition and also containing water, at one and the same time now those various acts that the Jar is seen to perform successively,—or the Potter is seen to make the Jar, the plates and other objects,—all those it or he is not able to do or make simultaneously. When too the Jar is found to produce its own cognition and other things at one and the same time, it is not, at that same time, found to produce those same successively also. All this is clearly established by direct Perception. Thus succession being excluded by simultaneity, and vice versa, the cognition that precludes both these functions (the successive as well as the simultaneous) naturally precludes the object also to which those functions belong,—and it also indicates that there can be no third kind of functioning; thus then there is mutual exclusion—‘contradiction’—between these two—succession and simultaneity—of that particular kind in which the presence of one implies the absence of the other. Thus no third kind of activity being possible, all fruitful activity of things must be either successive or simultaneous; and when such activity is precluded in Permanent things by the absence of the more extensive character, it precludes its characteristic in the shape of ‘existence’ also. In this way the necessary invariable concomitance becomes secured.

It cannot be argued, in answer to this that—“The succession and simultaneity of the things themselves have not yet been proved, inasmuch as Time is not postulated by us as a distinct entity.”—It will not be right to-argue thus, because we do not say that the ‘succession’ and ‘simultaneity’ of things are due to a distinct category in the shape of Time; what we mean is that it is due to their coming into existence in those ways. For instance, when it so happens that when one comes into existence, the others also-come into existence similarly, then they form the basis of the notion of ‘non-succession’ or ‘simultaneity’; as is found in the case of several sprouts coming out from similar causal conditions;—when, on the other hand, things appear in a different manner, they are spoken of as ‘successive’; e.g., suchngs as the sprout, the stem, the leaves, and so forth.—All these are clearly recognised by direct perception, and are spoken of as such by people. The functioning of Causes also towards the bringing about of such things is similarly spoken of as ‘successive’ or ‘simultaneous Thus the objection that has been urged cannot be rightly urged against us.

Says the opponent:—“In case the Thing were proved to be permanent, the preclusion of succession and simultaneity might not imply the preclusion of fruitful activity; e.g. when the existence of the ‘Tree’ becomes precluded in regard to a certain place, it precludes the particular tree ‘Śiṃśapā’; otherwise, if the place itself were unknown where could the absence of the shimshapā be cognised? As a matter of fact, the permanent thing itself does not exist (for you, the Buddhist), as this is what you wish to deny. If, however, you do admit that such a permanent thing does exists then it cannot be right to deny it; since you admit its existence as the substratum (of the two kinds of activity). Thus your reason—‘because it has existence’,—becomes ‘inconclusive’, as it is found to be present also in the contrary of your Probandum (‘Momentary’).”

It is not so, we reply. When we urge the non-perception of the more extensive character as proving our negative conclusion, we do not urge it as an independent valid cognition; we put it forward only in the form of a Beductio ad absurdum against the opponent; the sense being—if you accept the permanence of the thing, then, you cannot admit its fruitful activity,—as ‘succession’ and ‘simultaneity’,—which are of larger extension, and with which the said ‘succession’ and ‘simultaneity’ are invariably concomitant,—cannot be present in it; because when the wider thing is not there, the narrower thing cannot be there; otherwise the two could not be related as being of ‘larger’ and ‘narrower’ extension. Hence on the preclusion of the capacity for fruitful activity, the presence of existence also cannot be accepted; as the said capacity constitutes the characteristic of ‘existence.’

By this method, the non-existence of things becomes established.

Nor is it necessary that the Corroborative Instance per Dissimilarity must always be a real entity; as all that is meant to be shown by such instance is that the absence of the Probandum means the absence of the Probans. And this is proved by the mere assertion,—without admitting the real existence of any object,—that when the widerng is absent the narrower thing also must be absent,—after it has been recognised in a general way that between the two things there lies the relation that one has a wider extension than the other and as such there is invariable concomitance between them; e.g., the assertion ‘when the Tree is absent, the Śiṃśapā cannot be there’,—This has been thus declared:—‘In the case of the Corroborative Instance per dissimilarity, it is not necessary that the existence of the objective substratum should be admitted; as what is intended follows from the mere assertion that on the absence of one, the other also cannot be there’.—(393-394)