Verse 363-364

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

भावाभावात्मको नाशः प्रध्वंसापरसंज्ञकः ।
क्रियते चेन्न तस्यापि करणं युक्तिसंगतम् ॥ ३६३ ॥
अभावस्य च कार्यत्वे वस्तुतैवाङ्कुरादिवत् ।
प्रसक्ताजन्यरूपस्य हेतुशक्त्या समुद्भवात् ॥ ३६४ ॥

bhāvābhāvātmako nāśaḥ pradhvaṃsāparasaṃjñakaḥ |
kriyate cenna tasyāpi karaṇaṃ yuktisaṃgatam || 363 ||
abhāvasya ca kāryatve vastutaivāṅkurādivat |
prasaktājanyarūpasya hetuśaktyā samudbhavāt || 364 ||

If it be held that—“the ‘destruction’ (‘nāśa’) brought about is of the nature of the ‘negation of entity otherwise called ‘disruption’ (pradhvaṃsa’),—there can be no reasonable cause for that also.—If negation were an effect, then it would be an entity, like the sprout and other effects; because while there is possibility of its being regarded as something ‘not-produced’, it is found to come about through the potency of a cause.—(363-364)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

The following Text proceeds to show that the ‘Destruction’ of a thing cannot be of the nature of a non-entity:—[see verses 363-364 above]

What is brought about, produced, is always an entity, not a non-entity, because of the latter, which is of the nature of the absence of positive character that could be predicated of it, there is no form that could be produced. Hence what is of the nature of the negation of entity, i.e. what consists of the denial of existence,—cannot be brought about by anything,—simply because it is a non-entity,—like the ‘Hare’s Horns’, Otherwise (if it were something produced) then it would be an ‘effect’, and as such an entity,—like the sprout and other effects. This argument may be formulated as follows:—What is an effect must be an entity, as the sprout and other things,—and Destruction is an effect (ex hypothesi), hence this is a natural reason (for regarding it as an effect).

The author states the ‘invariable concomitance’ (Premiss) of this reasoning—Because it is found to come about through the potency of a Cause. As a matter of fact, that alone is said to be an ‘effect’ which acquires an accretion to its nature through the potency of a Cause; and it is only an entity that can acquire such accretion to its nature.

This point is not disputed even by the Naiyāyika and others: As these people also declare the character of the ‘effect’ to be either ‘inherence in Being’ or ‘inherence in a Cause’; and Destruction cannot inhere either in Being or in its Cause; for, if it did, then, like Substance and otherngs, it would have to be regarded as a substratum of ‘existence’ (i.e. an entity).—(363-364)

Says the opponent—“If that is so, let the Destruction be an entity, what is the harm in that?”

Answer:—[see verse 365 next]