The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 356 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 356.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

अनपेक्षोऽपि यद्येष देशकालान्तरे भवेत् ।
तदपेक्षतया नैष निरपेक्षः प्रसज्यते ॥ ३५६ ॥

anapekṣo'pi yadyeṣa deśakālāntare bhavet |
tadapekṣatayā naiṣa nirapekṣaḥ prasajyate || 356 ||

Even though independent, if the destruction were to come at another place and time,—then, on account op its being dependent upon those, the thing could not be regarded as ‘independent’.—(356)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

Says the Opponent:—“The Reason put forward is Inconclusive; Even thoughngs are independent regarding their destruction, yet it is quite possible that the destruction of ang may come about at some other time and at some other place; so that it cannot prove the immediate destruction of the thing, which is what is desired by the upholder of the ‘Perpetual Flux’, the doctrine of all things being ‘momentary’,”

The answer to this is provided in the following—[see verse 356 above]

Eṣa’—i.e. the Destruction.

On account of its being dependent upon those’—i.e. dependent upon the other time and place.

If a certain thing being independent in regard to a certain condition, were to be in this condition only at a certain time and place,—then, as dependent upon that time and place, it would not be ‘independent’ at all. How then is there any ‘inconclusiveness’ in our Reason? For instance, if a certain condition were to be present only at a certain time and place,—and never apart from these,—then, how could it be regarded as ‘independent’? As such existence itself would constitute its ‘dependence which term cannot stand for ‘desire’, for the simple reason that the thing is devoid of all ‘intention’,—(356)

“If then what is meant to be the reason is the fact of its being entirely independent,—then such a Reason is ‘not proven’, ‘not admitted’; for instance, some things are dependent, for their destruction, upon such causes as the stroke of a Bludgeon—as in the case of things like the Jar. Even thosengs which,—like Cognition, Words, and the like,—are known to be ‘independent’,—though they do not depend, for their destruction, on any such cause as the stroke of a Bludgeon, yet they do depend upon the peculiarities of time and place. Thus the Reason, as put forward by the Buddhist, is entirely ‘unproven

The answer to this is provided in the following—[see verse 357 next]

Like what you read? Consider supporting this website: