Tattvasangraha [with commentary]
by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588
This page contains verse 347 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 347.
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Verse 347
Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:
अर्थक्रियासु शक्तिश्च विद्यमानत्वलक्षणम् ।
क्षणिकेष्वेव नियता तथाऽवाच्ये न वस्तुता ॥ ३४७ ॥arthakriyāsu śaktiśca vidyamānatvalakṣaṇam |
kṣaṇikeṣveva niyatā tathā'vācye na vastutā || 347 ||Capacity for effective action is the differentia of the existence (of a thing); and such capacity is restricted to momentary entities only; hence if anything is ‘incapable of being spoken of (as momentary)’, it cannot be an existent entity.—(347)
Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):
The Pudgala is a non-entity, not only on account of its being ‘incapable of being spoken of as different or non-diñerent from Colour etc.’, as explained above,—but it is a non-entity for the following reason also, on account of its being ‘incapable of being spoken of as non-eternal’;—this is what is explained in the following:—[see verse 347 above]
What characterises ‘Existence’, the nature of an ‘Entity,’ is Capacity for effective action;—as a matter of fact, a non-entity is characterised by the absence of all Capacity; which implies that Capacity for effective action is the only characteristic of an Entity. This Capacity is restricted to momentary Entities only;—that is, it is invariably concomitant with momentariness; specially as any effective action would be impossible for an Eternal Entity, whose activities could not be either successive or simultaneous. So that, if the Pudgala is ‘incapable of being spoken of as momentary’,—then it cannot have the nature of an ‘Entity as the more extensive character of ‘momentariness’ is absent in it;—just as the absence of the character of ‘Tree’ means the absence of the character of the ‘Śiṃśapā’ (a particular tree). This is what has been thus declared:—‘That which is incapable of being spoken of as non-eternal cannot be the cause of anything.’
The following might be urged:—“If the Pudgala were eternal, then Effective Activity would be incompatible as, being neither successive nor simultaneous;—but as a matter of fact, it is as ‘incapable of being spoken of’ as non-eternal as it is of being spoken of as eternal; so that effective action cannot be incompatible with it.”
This is not right; there can be no entity with a specific individuality which is devoid of both these characters (of eternality and non-eternality); as ‘eternal’ and ‘non-eternal’ are mutually exclusive (and contradictory) terms; so that in any entity, the absence or presence of one of these must mean the presence or absence (respectively) of the other.
We are not objecting to the application of the term ‘incapable of being spoken of’, to the Pudgala; because the applying of names to things depends entirely upon the wish of the speaker, and as such, cannot be objected to by anyone. What we are doing however is to examine the nature of the ‘Entity’,—is tins nature always present in the thing called ‘Pudgala’, or not? If it is present, then theng must be eternal, because ‘eternality’ consists in nothing else except that character which is always present and is never destroyed;—and it is only a thing having this character that is called ‘Eternal as has been declared in the words—‘The learned call that thing Eternal which, in its own form, is never destroyed’.—If, on the other hand, the other view be held, that the said nature is not always present in the Pudgala,—then the Pudgala must be non-eternal; as the only characteristic of the non-eternal thing is that it should not be lasting (permanent).—Thus then there being no other alternative apart from being ‘momentary’ (non-eternal) or ‘non-momentary’ (eternal),—and effective activity—either successive or simultaneous—being incompatible for the non-momentary (Eternal) Entity, the Existence of a thing must be invariably concomitant with ‘momentariness so that if ‘momentariness’ is absent in the Pudgala, ‘Existence’ also must be absent,—and it becomes established that it is non-existent.—(347)
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