by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588
This page contains verse 337 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 337.
Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:
स्कन्धेभ्यः पुद्गलो नान्यस्तीर्थदृष्टिप्रसङ्गतः ।
नानन्योऽनेकताद्याप्तेः साध्वी तस्मादवाच्यता ॥ ३३७ ॥
skandhebhyaḥ pudgalo nānyastīrthadṛṣṭiprasaṅgataḥ |
nānanyo'nekatādyāpteḥ sādhvī tasmādavācyatā || 337 ||
The ‘pudgala’ cannot be spoken of as ‘different’ from the thought-phases,—as in that case this doctrine would be the same as those of the ‘tairthika philosophers’;—nor can it be spoken of as the ‘same’ (non-different); as, in that case, it would have to be regarded as ‘more than one’ (many) and so forth;—hence it is best to regard it as ‘incapable of being spoken of’ (as either the one or the other).—(337)
Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):
Question:—What is the reason for regarding the Pudgala as ‘incapable of being spoken of’ (either as the same as, or as different from, the Thought-phases)?
The answer is given in the following:—[see verse 337 above]
If the Pudgala were held to be different from the Thought-phases,—then it would come to be the view of the ‘Soul’ propounded by the Tairthika Philosophers,—which would mean the acceptance of the doctrine of the Eternal ‘Soul and it is not possible (as shown above) for the Eternal Soul to be the doer and the enjoyer, because it is always undifferentiated, like Ākāśa; and the Blessed Lord also has denied the Eternal Soul; whose words—‘all entities are devoid of the Soul’—would thus become contradicted.
“In that case, the Pudgala may be regarded as non-different from the Thought-phases
Nor can it be spoken of as ‘non-different’ from the Thought-phases.—If the Thought-phases, Colour and the rest, were the Pudgala, then, as it would be non-different from many Thought-phases, the Pudgala itself would have to be regarded as many,—like the various forms of the Thought-phases; and the Pudgala is held to be one; as has been asserted in the sentence—‘The Pudgala is one, and is born in the world as one; and so also the Tgthāgata’.—The phrase ‘and so forth’ is meant to include ‘non-enternality’ and such other characters.—Under the circumstances, the Pudgala would be something liable to destruction, like the Thought-phases; which would mean that there is ‘destruction of what has been done’ [i.e. there would be no accruing of the fruit of one’s deeds to the man, who would be disappearing every moment]; and the Blessed Lord has rejected the doctrine of the absolute destruction of things.—From all this it follows that the Pudgala is ‘incapable of being spoken of’ (either as the same as, or as different from, the Thought-phases).—(337)