Verse 330-331

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

तेषामल्पापराधं तु दर्शनं नित्यतोक्तितः ।
रूपशब्दादिविज्ञानां(ने?) व्यक्तं भेदोपलक्षणात् ॥ ३३० ॥
एकज्ञानात्मकत्वे तु रूपशब्दरसादयः ।
सकृद्वेद्याः प्रसज्यन्ते नित्येऽवस्थान्तरं न च ॥ ३३१ ॥

teṣāmalpāparādhaṃ tu darśanaṃ nityatoktitaḥ |
rūpaśabdādivijñānāṃ(ne?) vyaktaṃ bhedopalakṣaṇāt || 330 ||
ekajñānātmakatve tu rūpaśabdarasādayaḥ |
sakṛdvedyāḥ prasajyante nitye'vasthāntaraṃ na ca || 331 ||

The error in the view of these philosophers is a slight one,—due only to the assertion of eternality (of cognition); as diversity is clearly perceived in the cognitions of colour, sound and other things.—If all these cognitions were one, then, colour, sound, taste and other things would be cognisable all at once; as in an eternal entity there can be no different states.—(330-331)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

‘The error is a slight one’;—as they postulate only Cognition (Consciousness, as the only entity), which is quite reasonable.

“If that is so, then what is even the ‘slight error’ in their view?”

It is due to the assertion of ‘eternality’,

“But why should not the acceptance of ‘eternality’ be reasonable?”

Answer—Diversity is clearly perceived etc. etc.;—‘Eternality’ connotes remaining in the same state always, and ‘non-eternality’ connotes not remaining in the same state always; and as a matter of fact, the Cognition that manifests (apprehends) Colour, Sound and other things is not found to be in one and the same state always;—actually it appears at one time as manifesting Colour and at another time, as manifesting Sound and other things, in a certain order of sequence. Under the circumstances, if all these things, Sound and the rest, were manifested by a single Eternal Cognition, then all of them would appear (be Cognised) simultaneously, like the bedspread of variegated colours; as the Cognition manifesting them would (ex hypothesi) be always there.

It may be held that “the Cognition of Sound and other things are different ‘states’ of it appearing one after the other,—so that the apprehension of Sound etc. could not be simultaneous”.

The answer to this is—‘In an Eternal Entity there can be no different states’;—because the ‘states’ are not different from the Entity to which they belong; so that the Entity to which the states belong would be liable to ‘production and destruction’,—appearance and disappearance,—in the same way as the States are liable; or, conversely, the states also would be eternal, like the Entity to which they belong.—If, on the other hand, the states are different from the entity to which they belong, then there can be no idea of the states belonging to this entity; as there is no benefit conferred by the one on the other; and this alternative (of the states being different from the Cognitions) would also be contrary to the doctrine that the eternal Cognition is the only one Entity.—(330-331)

Further, if the Eternal Cognition existed, it could be known either through Perception or through Inference; that it cannot be known through Perception is shown in the following—[see verse 332 next]