Verse 307-310

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

पारार्थ्यं चक्षुरादीनां यत्पुनः प्रतिपाद्यते ।
शय्याशनादिवत्तेन संघातत्वेन हेतुना ॥ ३०७ ॥
आधेयातिशयार्थत्वं यद्येषामुपपाद्यते ।
इष्टसिद्धिर्यदिष्टास्तेऽस्माभिर्ज्ञानोपकारिणः ॥ ३०८ ॥
अविकार्युपकारित्वसाधने साध्यशून्यता ।
दृष्टान्तस्य चलस्यैव युक्तास्तेऽप्युपकारिणः ॥ ३०९ ॥
सामान्येन तु पारार्थ्यं यद्येषां संप्रसाध्यते ।
तथाऽपि साधनं व्यर्थं सिद्धाश्चित्तोपयोगिनः ॥ ३१० ॥

pārārthyaṃ cakṣurādīnāṃ yatpunaḥ pratipādyate |
śayyāśanādivattena saṃghātatvena hetunā || 307 ||
ādheyātiśayārthatvaṃ yadyeṣāmupapādyate |
iṣṭasiddhiryadiṣṭāste'smābhirjñānopakāriṇaḥ || 308 ||
avikāryupakāritvasādhane sādhyaśūnyatā |
dṛṣṭāntasya calasyaiva yuktāste'pyupakāriṇaḥ || 309 ||
sāmānyena tu pārārthyaṃ yadyeṣāṃ saṃprasādhyate |
tathā'pi sādhanaṃ vyarthaṃ siddhāścittopayoginaḥ || 310 ||

The fact of the eye etc. being for ‘another’s use’ is asserted (by the sāṃkhya), on the ground of their being ‘composite things’, like the bed, seat and such things.—If it is meant by this to prove that they serve the purpose of something else which is capable of having additional properties produced in it,—then what is sought to be proved is already admitted; inasmuch as the said eye etc. are admitted by us to be helpful to cognition. On the other hand, if it is meant to prove that they are helpful to something that is unmodifiable,—then the reasoning is open to the fallacy of the corroborative instance being devoid of the probandum; as the things cited as the instance are also helpful only to what is mobile (perishable).—Lastly, if what is meant to be proved is merely the vague general fact of their being helpful to ‘another’,—even so, the reason would be superfluous; as they are already admitted to be helpful to the mind.—(307-310)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

Another argument put forward by the Sāṃkkya (in Kārikā 17) is that all composite things are found to be for another’s use”.—The author proceeds to examine who this ‘another’ is:—[see verses 307-310 above]

The ‘another’ that is meant,—(a) is it one capable of having additional properties produced in it?—or (b) one incapable of having such additional properties produced, and hence unmodifiable?—or (c) what is meant to be proved is the mere vague fact of ‘being for another’s purpose’, which is pleasing enough so long as it is not examined?—These are the three alternatives possible.

Under the first alternative (a), the reasoning proves what is already admitted; as we also admit that the Eye etc. are helpful to Cognition; as is clear from the statement that ‘That Cognition which originates from the Eye and the Colours is Visual Perception, and that Cognition which originates from the whole body and the touchable things is Bodily (Tactile) perception?

Under the second alternative (b), the Reason is’ contradictory’; this is what is shown in the text 309. If the Eye, etc. are meant to be proved as helpful to something that is unmodifiable (eternal), then as the Reason is found, in the instance cited, to be concomitant with the contrary of the Probandum, it becomes ‘Contradictory’; because the Bed and other things (cited as instances) are actually found to be helpful to what is mobile, i.e., non-eternal; in as much as it is impossible to add to the properties of what is unmodifiable.

(c) Lastly if these alternatives are excluded, and what is meant to be proved is merely the vague general fact of ‘being for another’s purpose’, even so it would be proving what is already admitted; as the Eye and the rest are actually admitted (by us) to be helpful to the Mind. If the Mind also is included in the Probandum (along with the Eye etc.), as held by the Naiyāyikas, even so, what you desire is not proved; as you do not hold the Spirit to be other than the Mind. Nor does the argument prove what is wanted by the Naiyāyikas; because it is already admitted that the Eye and the rest are ‘for another’s purpose’, in the sense that they are helpful to one another; specially as the notion of ‘another’ is purely relative, like the notion of ‘near and far’,

Then again, the ‘composite character’ that is assumed in the Mind is actually there, inasmuch as it takes in the help rendered by several causes; and to this extent your reason would be ‘unproven’ also (if the Mind also is included among ‘the Eye and the rest’).—(307-310)

End of the Examination of the Sāṃkhya Doctrine of ‘Soul’.