The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 294-295 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 294-295.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

अर्थोपभोगकाले च यदि नैवास्य विक्रिया ।
नैव भोक्तृत्वमस्य स्यात्प्रकृतिश्चोपकारिणी ॥ २९४ ॥
विक्रियायाश्च सद्भावे नित्यत्वमवहीयते ।
अन्यथात्वं विकारो हि तादवस्थ्ये च तत्कथम् ॥ २९५ ॥

arthopabhogakāle ca yadi naivāsya vikriyā |
naiva bhoktṛtvamasya syātprakṛtiścopakāriṇī || 294 ||
vikriyāyāśca sadbhāve nityatvamavahīyate |
anyathātvaṃ vikāro hi tādavasthye ca tatkatham || 295 ||

If, at the time op his enjoying a thing, there is no modification in the soul,—then he cannot be the enjoyer; nor can primordial matter be of any service to him.—If (on the other hand) there is modification in him, then his eternality disappears; as ‘modification’ consists in becoming changed into something else; and how could any such change be possible if the soul remained in the same condition always?—(294-295)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

Further, if Primordial Matter presents the thing to the Soul,—even so, it cannot be right to regard him as the ‘enjoyer’, as he is unmodifiable.—This is what is pointed out in the following—[see verses 294-295 above]

If the Soul is not made to undergo ‘modification’ into Joy and Sorrow due to Pleasure and Pain and so forth,—then he would be just like Ākāśa, and hence he cannot be the Enjoyer; and Primordial Matter also cannot be of any service to him,—[such is the construction of the Sentence];—because no service can be rendered to that which is unmodifiable.—If then, it be admitted that the Soul is modifiable,—then there is the undesirable contingency of his losing his etemality; because what we mean by the ‘Non-eternality’ of a thing is that it does not remain in the same form always; and as this would be there, if the Soul were modifiable, how could he be eternal? As what is meant by ‘eternality’ is that the thing should retain the same form always.—(294-295)

Like what you read? Consider supporting this website: