The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 283-284 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 283-284.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

निरालम्बनता चैवमहङ्कारे यदा स्थिता ।
तन्नाहंप्रत्ययग्राह्ये ज्ञाता कश्चन विद्यते ॥ २८३ ॥
ततः सर्वप्रमाणेषु न दृष्टान्तोऽस्ति सिद्धिभाक् ।
हेतवश्चाश्रयासिद्धा यथायोगमुदाहृताः ॥ २८४ ॥

nirālambanatā caivamahaṅkāre yadā sthitā |
tannāhaṃpratyayagrāhye jñātā kaścana vidyate || 283 ||
tataḥ sarvapramāṇeṣu na dṛṣṭānto'sti siddhibhāk |
hetavaścāśrayāsiddhā yathāyogamudāhṛtāḥ || 284 ||

Thus then, the baselessness of ‘I-consciousness’ having been established, there can be no cogniser who could be apprehended by the said ‘notion of I’. Hence among all valid forms of cognition, there is not one which is found able to supply a fit example; and the reasons also that have been adduced in due course are found to be ‘unproven’ regarding their substratum.—(283-284)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

Thus ‘I-consciousness’ being baseless, there can be no Cogniser who could be admitted to be the object of that consciousness. Hence the existence of the ‘soul’ is not proved.

The other party has adduced (under Text 238, et seq.) such reasons as ‘because he has been apprehended by past I-notions’ and so forth,—for proving the eternity of the Soul; against this it is urged that there can be no Cogniser, etc.—i.e. neither an eternal nor a non-eternal Cogniser is there who could serve as the corroborative instance; hence the corroborative instance (of the opponent’s inference) is ‘unproven’ (non-existent). For instance, the first and second reasonings (set forth by the opponent) are open to the objection that the corroborative Instance is beset with the defect of having its subject unknown; as there is no such Cogniser known as is the object of the ‘I-notion’ of to-day and also of yesterday.—As regards the third reasoning, the Instance cited—‘like the single Cognition’—is devoid of the Probandum and the Probans; because the ‘one Cognition’ intended to be the ‘I-notion’ of the cogniser connected with the same chain,—and also to appertain to a single object,—is ‘not proven’ (not admitted by all parties). Thus, on account of the two characters being ‘unproven’, the Instance itself has been declared to be ‘unproven

Addled in due course,—i.e. those Reasons that have been adduced above;—‘in due course’—according to the nature of the defect found in each.—‘Unproven regarding their substratum’,—for instance, in the first and second arguments, the Reasons adduced are ‘unproven regarding their substratum’, as it is not admitted that there is any such object as ‘the Cogniser apprehended by I-notion’;—in the third argument, though the substratum is not ‘unproven’, inasmuch as the ‘Cognitions’ which form the subject are well-recognised entities,—yet, what is ‘not proven’ in regard to them is the fact of their being qualified by a ‘Cogniser connected with a single chain’,—because it is well known that Cognitions are baseless (devoid of any basis in reality). This is the reason why the Text has used the qualifying term, ‘in due course—(283-284)

End of section 7 (b) dealing with the Mīmāṃsaka’s Doctrine of the ‘Soul’.

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