Verse 229-237

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

अहं वेद्मीत्यहंबुद्धिर्ज्ञातारं प्रतिपद्यते ।
स चात्मा यदि वा ज्ञानं स्यादेकान्तविनश्वरम् ॥ २२९ ॥
यद्यात्मा विषयस्तस्याश्चतुरस्रं तदाऽखिलम् ।
क्षणिकज्ञानपक्षे तु सर्वमेवातिदुर्घटम् ॥ २३० ॥
तथा हि ज्ञातवान्पूर्वमहमेव च सम्प्रति ।
अहमेव प्रवेद्मीति या बुद्धिरुपजायते ॥ २३१ ॥
तस्या ज्ञानक्षणः को नु विषयः परिकल्प्यते ।
अतीतः साम्प्रतः किं वा किं वाऽसावथ सन्ततिः ॥ २३२ ॥
तत्राऽऽद्ये विषये ज्ञाते ज्ञातवानिति युज्यते ।
जानामीति न युक्तं च नेदानीं वेत्त्यसौ ततः ॥ २३३ ॥
वर्त्तमाने तु विषये प्रवेद्मीत्युपपद्यते ।
ज्ञातवानित्यसत्यं तु नैवासीत्प्रागिदं यतः ॥ २३४ ॥
अत एव द्वयं ग्राह्यं नैव तस्याः प्रकल्प्यते ।
न ह्युभौ ज्ञातवन्तौ वा जानीतो वाऽधुना पुनः ॥ २३५ ॥
सन्तानोऽपि न तद्ग्राह्यो द्वितयस्याप्यसंभवात् ।
न ह्यसौ ज्ञातवान्पूर्वमवस्तुत्वान्न वाऽधुना ॥ २३६ ॥
तस्मादयमहङ्कारो वर्त्तते यत्र गोचरे ।
उक्तादन्यत्र सिद्धोऽसावात्मा शाश्वतरूपवान् ॥ २३७ ॥

ahaṃ vedmītyahaṃbuddhirjñātāraṃ pratipadyate |
sa cātmā yadi vā jñānaṃ syādekāntavinaśvaram || 229 ||
yadyātmā viṣayastasyāścaturasraṃ tadā'khilam |
kṣaṇikajñānapakṣe tu sarvamevātidurghaṭam || 230 ||
tathā hi jñātavānpūrvamahameva ca samprati |
ahameva pravedmīti yā buddhirupajāyate || 231 ||
tasyā jñānakṣaṇaḥ ko nu viṣayaḥ parikalpyate |
atītaḥ sāmprataḥ kiṃ vā kiṃ vā'sāvatha santatiḥ || 232 ||
tatrā''dye viṣaye jñāte jñātavāniti yujyate |
jānāmīti na yuktaṃ ca nedānīṃ vettyasau tataḥ || 233 ||
varttamāne tu viṣaye pravedmītyupapadyate |
jñātavānityasatyaṃ tu naivāsītprāgidaṃ yataḥ || 234 ||
ata eva dvayaṃ grāhyaṃ naiva tasyāḥ prakalpyate |
na hyubhau jñātavantau vā jānīto vā'dhunā punaḥ || 235 ||
santāno'pi na tadgrāhyo dvitayasyāpyasaṃbhavāt |
na hyasau jñātavānpūrvamavastutvānna vā'dhunā || 236 ||
tasmādayamahaṅkāro varttate yatra gocare |
uktādanyatra siddho'sāvātmā śāśvatarūpavān || 237 ||

“The notion of ‘I’ involved in the conception ‘I know’ envisages the cogniser; this cogniser may be either the ‘soul’ or the absolutely evanescent ‘cognition’ (idea). If it is the ‘soul’ that is the objective of that notion, then all is square; on the other hand, if the momentary ‘cognition’ (idea) is held to be so, then all becomes inexplicably confounded. For instance, the notion that appears in the form ‘it was I who cognised this thing on a previous occasion, and it is I who am cognising it now’,—of this notion, what ‘cognitive moment’ is assumed to be the objective? would such a ‘moment’ be (a) past, or (b) present, or (c) in the form of a continued series? if it be the first (a), the moment could well be the objective of the notion ‘I cognised it (in the past)’; but it could not be the objective of the notion ‘I am cognising it (now)’, because the cogniser is not cognising the thing at the moment of speaking; it is only when the object is present at the time (of cognition) that it can be spoken of as ‘I am cognising it but (in regard to such a present object) it would not be true to say ‘I cognised it’, because the object did not exist in the past.—From this it follows that both of these (past and present) cannot form the objective of the said notion. Nor did both ‘cognitive moments’ cognise the thing in the past; nor do they both cognise it in the present.—(c) Nor can the ‘series’ be regarded as the ‘cognised object’, as both are impossible; the ‘series’ could not cognise it in the past; and as it is not an entity, it cannot cognise in the present.—For all these reasons, it is established that that wherein ‘I-consciousness’ subsists,—which must be something distinct from the said cognition,—is the ‘soul’ of the eternal form.”—(229-237)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

Question—How do these two conclusions follow from the fact of Recognition?

The answer is as follows:—[see verses 229-237 above]

That the conception ‘I know’ envisages the Cogniser,—is beyond all dispute; as the verb ‘I know’ connotes the notion of the person who does the cognising. Now in regard to this Cogniser, there are two theories possible: (1) that it is the ‘Soul’, or (2) the absolutely evanescent Cognition (Idea) as postulated by you (Buddhists).—If the theory that ‘it is the Soul’ be accepted then all becomes square, as it accomplishes what is desired. If, on the other hand, the other view is accepted—that it is the Idea, then all becomes extremely inexplicable. Because, the conception appears in the form ‘I cognised this in the past and I am cognising it in the present’, and herein there is a clear conception, the notion of ‘I’ being the Cogniser in both cases;—of this conception of ‘I’, if the ‘Cognitive Moment’ be assumed to be the object, would this ‘moment’ be (a) past, or (b) present, or (c) both present and past, or (d) in the form of a continued series? There are these four possible alternatives.—Now as regards (a), the past ‘moment’ being assumed as the object of the notion of ‘I’, the idea that ‘I cognised’ might be all right, as the thing had been cognised in the past; but the idea that ‘I am cognising it now’ could not be true, because the past ‘Cognitive Moment’ does not cognise the thing at the present time,—as ex-hypothesi it has already disappeared.—(b) If the second alternative is accepted that the present ‘Cognitive Moment’ is the object of the notion of ‘I’, then the idea that ‘I am cognising’ would be all right, as it is really the Cogniser at the present moment; but the idea that ‘I knew it in the past’ would not be true,—why?—because it did not exist at the previous time. The word ‘idam’ (in the Text) stands for the present Cognition. Thus then, inasmuch as the conception operates both ways, it becomes established that the present and the past, both, Cognitive Moments cannot form the object of the notion of ‘I’; as both these ‘Cognitive Moments’ did not cognise the thing in the past, nor do they cognise it in the present; as a matter of fact, one ‘Moment’ cognised it in the past, and another ‘Moment’ is cognising it in the present.

For the same reason the ‘Series’ also cannot form the object of the notion of ‘I’; as both—the past and the present acts of cognition—are impossible. Because this ‘Series’ did not cognise the thing in the past, nor does it cognise it in the present; because being only ‘conceptual’, it is not a thing, an entity; and what is not an entity cannot be the Cogniser, as being a Cogniser is a property that can belong only to an entity.

From all this it follows that, that thing wherein the notion of ‘I’ (I-conscionsness) subsists,—and as shown above, it must be something distinct from the said Cognition,—is the Soul.—(229-237)