Verse 220

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

घटादिषु समानं च यवैरात्मा(यन्नैरात्म्यं ?)निषिध्यते ।
परैर्जीवच्छरीरेऽस्मिंस्तदस्माभिः प्रसाध्यते ॥ २२० ॥

ghaṭādiṣu samānaṃ ca yavairātmā(yannairātmyaṃ ?)niṣidhyate |
parairjīvaccharīre'smiṃstadasmābhiḥ prasādhyate || 220 ||

That ‘negation of the soul’ which other people seek to prove in regard to the jar and other things,—that same we are going to prove in regard to the living body.—(220)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

The objection that has been urged above is equally applicable to your case also. For instance, it is admitted by you that the Jar and other external things are ‘without Soul’, either on the ground of their being not occupied by a Soul, or on the ground of their being the receptacle of the Soul’s experiences. If it were not so, then you could not have mentioned these as the Corroborative Instance in your argument which is stated in the form—‘This Living Body is not without Soul, because, if it were, then it would be devoid of Breathing and such other functions,—like the Jar and other things’,—Now in reference to these Jar and other things, the question may be put—‘In what sense are these without Soul? Does it mean that ‘they serve no useful purpose for the Soul’ and so on (as has been urged by Uddyotakara, in the passage quoted above). If so, then (a) you affirm the fact of all external things, like the Jar, being equally without Soul,—on the ground of their being not occupied by the Soul, or on account of their being the receptacle of the Soul’s experiences;—and you deny the absence of Soul in regard to the Living Body, in the assertion ‘The Living Body is not without Soul’; and from this denial you deduce the conclusion that it is the Living Body alone that is with Soul, and not the dead body, or the Jar and other things. In the same manner, we also prove the fact that ‘the Living Body is without Soul, because it is a thing and so forth’ (as explained above).—Thus the various alternatives put forward—‘Is it meant that the Body serves no useful purpose for the Soul’ and so forth,—are entirely out of place; as ‘absence of Soul’ has been admitted by you also (in regard to certain things).

Further, it has been alleged that “there is no Corroborative Instance in support of the assertion that the Body serves no useful purpose for the Soul”,—This is not right. Because it is possible to set up the following argument—When one thing does not add any peculiar property to another thing, it cannot be regarded as serving any useful purpose for this latter,—e.g. the Vindhya of the Himālaya;—the Body and the rest do not add any peculiarity to the character of the Soul, which remains eternally of one uniform character;—hence the wider factor not being present (the less extensive factor cannot be admitted).—The Probans put forward in this argument cannot be said to be ‘unproven’, ‘inadmissible’; because the ‘additional property⁵ not being anything distinct from the Soul itself, any ‘adding’ to it would mean the ‘adding’ to the Soul itself; and this would imply the ‘transience’ of the Soul. If, on the other hand, the ‘additional property’ be held to be distinct from the Soul itself,—as there would be no basis for any connection between that property and the Soul, there would be no such idea as that ‘this property belongs to the Soul’,—From all this it follows that for an Eternal Entity, there is nothing that can serve a useful purpose; as, in regard to such an Entity, it could not do anything at all.

It has been further alleged—‘Who is there who regards the Soul as the Body?’—This again is not right; there are actually some people who describe the Body, etc. as being transubstantiation of the ‘Soul’ (Spirit) e.g, the Followers of the Upaniṣads (Vedantins). So that the denial in question may well be regarded as urged against these people.

Then again, it has been argued that—“the preposition ‘niṣ’ (in the term ‘nirātmakam’) must pertain to the term that follows after it; hence it behoves the other party to say what is it that is with Soul (which is denied by the negative Preposition)?”—This also is entirely irrelevant. What is denied by the negative Preposition cannot be a real positive entity,—in fact it is only a conceptual entity that may be denied; areal positive entity can never be denied. Thus then, what is denoted by the negative compound (‘nirātmaka’, without Soul) is that particular entity which the other party has conceived through illusion; as it is only with reference to such an entity that the said denial is made, in order to proclaim that the other party entertains a wrong notion.—If it were otherwise, then, when you proceed to put forward denials of the Buddhist’s assumption of ‘momentariness’ expressed in such words as ‘The Lamp and the rest are momentary’,—you would be open to the same objection; because we never find any case where the negative is used without a term following it.

Then again, it has been asserted—“Who is there who holds that the Soul subsists in the Body?”—This also is not right; as there are some people who regard the Soul to be of the size of the ‘half of the Thumb’ or of ‘a Śyāmāka grain’; and under their view, the Soul, being a corporeal material substance, must be subsisting in the Body; and it is only right that the denial in question should be made against these people.

It has been alleged that “there is no Corroborative Instance in support of the denial of the Body being related to the Soul”.—This is not true; as it is easy to prove, as shown above, that ‘there can be no relationship between the Body and the Soul,—because one does not render any help to the other,—as between the Vindhya and the Himālaya mountains.

It has also been alleged that—“The denial of the particular implies the acceptance of the general”.—This generalisation is not true; e.g. even though you deny the momentariness of the Lamp and other particular things, you do not accept the momentariness of anyng in general.—It might be argued that—“We do admit the applicability of the term ‘momentary’ to the Lamp and such things, on the basis of their not continuing to exist for a long time; so that in this way, momentariness in general may be regarded as admitted”.—If it is so, the applicability of the term ‘Soul’ also to the Mind associated with ‘I-consciousness’ is admitted by us; and this may be regarded as the Soul in general being admitted.

The assertion of the two alternative views regarding the term ‘Soul’ denoting something transient, etc. etc.—is not relevant; for the simple reason that no such view has been held; nothing, in fact, has been held (by us) as to be really denoted by the term ‘Soul Nor has any such object been admitted by us as is ‘distinct from Colour, etc.’. Nor again is the denotation of the term ‘Soul’ admitted in regard to any eternal thing, which would falsify the said premiss.—Nor lastly can the use of the term ‘Soul’ in reference to the Body, etc. be regarded as ‘figurative’ (indirect);—because such use is never found to fail, as explained above. Hence there is no ‘Superfluity’ in our reasoning.—(220)