Verse 209-210

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

न तावदिह तादात्म्यं भेदाङ्गीकरणात्तयोः ।
कार्यकारणता नापि यौगपद्यप्रसङ्गतः ॥ २०९ ॥
तदात्मनो निवृत्तौ हि तत्सम्बन्धविवर्जिताः ।
किममी विनिवर्तन्ते प्राणापानादयस्तनोः ॥ २१० ॥

na tāvadiha tādātmyaṃ bhedāṅgīkaraṇāttayoḥ |
kāryakāraṇatā nāpi yaugapadyaprasaṅgataḥ || 209 ||
tadātmano nivṛttau hi tatsambandhavivarjitāḥ |
kimamī vinivartante prāṇāpānādayastanoḥ || 210 ||

The breathing, etc. cannot be of the same nature as the soul, as a difference between them has been admitted; nor is the relation op cause and effect possible between the two, as in that case, there would be simultaneity; thus then, on the absence of the soul—with which they have no connection,—why should the breaths—upward, downward and the rest,—depart prom the body?—(209-210)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

‘Between the two,’—i.e. between the Soul and Breathing, etc., there cannot subsist the relation of being of the same nature; because the Naiyāyika himself admits the nature of the two to be different.—Nor can the relation between the two be one of being produced from it; because (if the Soul were the Cause), then, inasmuch this Cause would always be present in its perfect form, the Breathing, etc. would all be simultaneous.—Apart from these two, there is no connection possible. Thus then, being devoid of any connection with the Soul, why should they disappear from the Body which is still endowed with Life?—They can never so disappear. The sense is that for this reason, the Reason put forward by the other party is ‘Inconclusive

By this same argument all those indications of the Soul which have been put forward by the other party,—in the shape of Desire, Hatred, Effort, Pleasure, Pain, Cognition and so forth,—should be understood to be rejected; on the sole ground of there being no connection between these and the Soul. This argument may be formulated as follows:—When certain things are not related (by concomitance) with any particular thing, they cannot be regarded as indicators of this latter thing,—e.g. the line of cranes cannot be regarded as indicators of Sesamum and other things;—and Breathing, etc. are not related with the Soul; hence the conditions of the general proposition are not fulfilled by these.—The Probans here put forward cannot be said to be ‘unproven’; as it has been already proved that neither of the two forms of relation is present in the case.—Nor can the Probans be said to be ‘Inconclusive’; for, if the Probans were so, then all things would be indicators of all things.—Nor can the Probans be said to be ‘Contradictory’; as it is actually found to be present wherever the Probandum is present.

The other party has also asserted that “from the knowledge of the Instrument follows the knowledge of the Operator (of the Instrument)—This however is ‘not-proved’. Because it has not been proved that the Eye and other organs are ‘specific instruments’ (of specific cognitions), in reality; as in the producing of cognitions the ‘causal efficiency’ of all the organs is equal; and because any such distinction as that between the ‘Instrument’ and the ‘Operator’ is purely arbitrary.—If what is sought to be proved is only the fact of the Soul being the operator, then the argument is superfluous; because we have never denied the presence of the conceptual (assumed) ‘Operator’, If the Reason be intended to prove the real Operator, then it is ‘Inconclusive’; as the Eye and other organs have never been found to be invariably concomitant with any such real Operator.—(209-210)