Verse 202-204

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

बुद्धिचित्तादिशब्दानां व्यतिरिक्ताभिधायिता ।
नैवैकपदभावेऽपि पर्यायाणां समस्ति नः ॥ २०२ ॥
अतोऽनैकान्तिको हेतुर्ननूक्त तद्विशेषणम् ।
उच्यते नैव सिद्धं तच्चेतःपर्यायतास्थितेः ॥ २०३ ॥
अहङ्काराश्रयत्वेन चित्तमात्मेति गीयते ।
संवृत्त्या वस्तुवृत्त्या तु विषयोऽस्य न विद्यते ॥ २०४ ॥

buddhicittādiśabdānāṃ vyatiriktābhidhāyitā |
naivaikapadabhāve'pi paryāyāṇāṃ samasti naḥ || 202 ||
ato'naikāntiko heturnanūkta tadviśeṣaṇam |
ucyate naiva siddhaṃ taccetaḥparyāyatāsthiteḥ || 203 ||
ahaṅkārāśrayatvena cittamātmeti gīyate |
saṃvṛttyā vastuvṛttyā tu viṣayo'sya na vidyate || 204 ||

In the case of synonyms,—such as ‘buddhi’, ‘citta’ and the rest,—we find that though each of them is a single term, yet it does not express a thing different (from that expressed by others);—hence your reason is ‘inconclusive’.—“but a qualification (in the form ‘as apart from recognised synonyms’) has been added.”—our answer to that is that the qualification is not ‘admitted’, as the fact remains that the ‘soul’ is synonymous with ‘consciousness’; as it is consciousness itself, as the substratum of ‘i-consciousness’, that is spoken of as the ‘soul all this has been said by us on the basis of ‘illusory conception’; in reality, there is nothing that is denoted by the term in question (‘soul’).—(202-204)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

Under Text 182, it has been argued that “the term ‘soul’ is expressive of something distinct from the aggregate of Intellect, Sense-organs and the rest—This is answered in the following Text:—[see verses 202-204 above]

The reason—‘because it is a single term’—is ‘inconclusive’,—Because in the case of such synonyms as (a) ‘buddhi’, ‘citta’, ‘jñāna’,—as (b) ‘indriya’, ‘akṣa’,—as (c) ‘vedanā’ and ‘citta’,—as (d) ‘kāya’ and ‘śarīra’,—which are denotative of (a) Intellect, (b) Sense-organs, (c) Cognition, and (d) Body,—according to our view, the character of denoting distinct things is not present, though each term is ‘one’; hence no preclusion from the contrary of the Probandum being possible, the Reason must be ‘inconclusive

Says the Opponent:—“It is because we suspected this that in our argument we added the qualification, ‘apart from well-recognised synonyms’, to our Reason; how then can it be Inconclusive?”

The answer to this is as follows:—This qualification of the Reason is one that is ‘not admitted—“How?”—Because the fact remains that the ‘Soul’ is the synonym of ‘Consciousness’, As it has been declared (by the other party) that—“It is Consciousness itself which, as the substratum of I-consciousness, is spoken of as ‘Soul’”; in this quotation ‘upacaryate’ stands for the phrase is spoken of in common parlance. It is for this reason that what Uddyotakara has said, regarding the ‘figurative use’ not being right where the ‘direct use’ is possible,—should be taken as being due to his ignorance of what is meant. This is what is made clear by the term ‘gīyate’ (is spoken of). Hence the Reason has a qualification that is ‘unproven’, inadmissible.

Whatever we have said regarding the ‘inconclusiveness’ of the Reason so far is on the basis of ‘Illusory Conception’—admitting, for the sake of argument, the fact of there being something denoted (by the term ‘Soul’);—if what is sought to be proved is the fact of the term ‘Soul’ being really denotative of something distinct from Intelligence and the rest,—then the Reason put forward is a highly improper one, the premiss (invariable concomitance) on which it is based being annulled by Inference.—This is what is shown by the Text in the words—‘all this has been said, etc.’;—that is, as a matter of fact, all verbal usage is based upon a conceptual imposition of its connection with things;—this is going to be explained later on. Thus then, in reality, there is nothing that is denoted by the term ‘Soul’; and under the circumstances, how could there be any invariable concomitance between the said Reason and the Probandum (the character sought to be proved)?—(202-204)