The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 199 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 199.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

क्रमिणां त्वेकहेतुत्वं नैवेत्युक्तमनन्तरम् ।
अतोऽनुमानबाधाऽस्मिन्व्याप्तेर्व्यक्तं समीक्ष्यते ॥ १९९ ॥

kramiṇāṃ tvekahetutvaṃ naivetyuktamanantaram |
ato'numānabādhā'sminvyāptervyaktaṃ samīkṣyate || 199 ||

That things appearing consecutively, one after the other, cannot have one and the same cause, has just been pointed out. for this reason, herein the (opponent’s) premiss asserting the invariable concomitance is found to be clearly annulled by inference.—(199)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

If what you seek to prove is the fact of the Cognitions having a single Cause, by the fact of their having for their Cause a Single Eternal and Uniform Entity,—then your premiss is one that is annulled by Inference.—This is what is shown in the following Text:—[see verse 199 above]

Just been pointed out,’—in Text 197.

The ‘annulment’ is in the following manner:—Things whose causes—efficient and untrammelled,—are present, must he produced simultaneously;—e.g. Sprouts and such other effects, whose causal paraphernalia is complete, appear at one and the same time;—Devadatta’s cognitions of Colour and such objects have their Causes—efficient and untrammelled,—present; this is a reason based upon the nature of things.—As a matter of fact however they never appear simultaneously; hence the conclusion is wrong.—(199)

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