The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 198 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 198.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

एकानन्तरविज्ञानात् षड्विज्ञानसमुद्भवः ।
युगपद्वेद्यते व्यक्तमत इष्टप्रसाधनम् ॥ १९८ ॥

ekānantaravijñānāt ṣaḍvijñānasamudbhavaḥ |
yugapadvedyate vyaktamata iṣṭaprasādhanam || 198 ||

Inasmuch as the appearance of six cognitions out of a single preceding cognition is clearly recognised simultaneously,—what your argument proves is admitted (by us).—(198)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

Further, if what is meant to prove is merely the fact of the cognitions being ‘preceded by a Cause’, then the effort is futile;—this is what is shown in the following Text:—[see verse 198 above]

From a single preceding Cognition,—out of a single Cognition immediately preceding them,—there is an appearance of Six Cognitions, through the Eye and other organs,—which ‘appearance’ is clearly recognised. For instance, at the time that a man sees the complexion of the dancing girl, he also hears the Sound of the drum and other musical accompaniments, smells the odour of the Lotus and other fragrant things, tastes the Camphor and other things, feels also the wind emanating from the fans, and thinks of taking up his clothes.—It cannot be right to say that his vision appears to be such because it moves quickly, like the whirling fire-brand. For if it were so, then the appearances would be vague and dim. To explain;—it is on the basis of the ‘recalling’ of all these perceptions (through the several Sense-organs) that you explain the feeling that the whole lot of the perceptions appears in a single Cognition; the Recalling too is done through Remembrance;—and Remembrance, appertaining, as it does, to the past, is always indistinct;—while the single Cognition of Colour and the rest is found to be quite distinct.—Further, in the case of such expressions as ‘saro-rasa’, there is an appearance of the cognitions quickly apprehending the ‘sa’ and other letter-sounds; so that in this case also there might be the notion of a single Cognition; and there would, therefore, be no idea of any order of sequence among them.—All this is going to be explained later on; in the present context the Text has merely indicated the lines of the refutation (of the Opponent’s doctrine).—(198)

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