Verse 180-181

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

रूपादिप्रत्ययाः सर्वेऽप्येकानेकनिमित्तकाः ।
मयेति प्रत्ययेनैषां प्रतिसन्धानभावतः ॥ १८० ॥
नर्त्तकीभ्रूलताभङ्गे बहूनां प्रत्यया इव ।
अन्यथा प्रतिसन्धानं न जायेतानिबन्धनम् ॥ १८१ ॥

rūpādipratyayāḥ sarve'pyekānekanimittakāḥ |
mayeti pratyayenaiṣāṃ pratisandhānabhāvataḥ || 180 ||
narttakībhrūlatābhaṅge bahūnāṃ pratyayā iva |
anyathā pratisandhānaṃ na jāyetānibandhanam || 181 ||

“All cognitions of colour, etc. should be regarded as having one and also several causes,—because they are recalled by the notion of ‘being cognised by me’;—just like the cognitions of several men regarding the glances of the dancing girl. if it were otherwise, there could be no ‘recalling’, as there would be no basis for it.”—(180-181)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

Uddyotakara, on the other hand, seeks to prove the existence of the Soul in the following manner:—[The words here are almost an exact reproduction, of the words of the Nyāyavārtika on 1, 1.10, page 70, also on 3.1, 1, page 340, Bib. Ind. Edn.]—“Devadatta’s cognitions of Colour, Taste, Smell and Touch must be due to one and to several causes,—because they are recalled as ‘mine’,—just like the simultaneous cognitions of several men who have come to an understanding among themselves, relating to the glances of the dancing girl.”—The meaning of this is as follows:—“When several men have come to an understanding to the effect that ‘when the dancing girl casts her glances, we should throw clothes to her’, there are several cognitions, by several cognisers, of the single object in the shape of the ‘glances’,—and yet as the object cognised (the glances) is one only, each man recalls the cognition as ‘I have seen’, ‘I have seen’;—in the same manner, in the case in question also, the cognitions of several things would be recalled, on account of their cause (cogniser) being one only; and that one Cause is the Soul,—The ‘recalling’ of the cognitions also consists in their being grouped together in such expressions as ‘It has been seen by me,—heard by me’ and so forth, as due to their belonging to a single Cogniser. In the case of ‘the glances of the dancing girl’ however, what is meant to be stressed is only the fact of the cognised object (not the Cogniser) being one. In all cases however the fact of the ‘recalling’ remains, whereby several cognitions become associated with a single entity.”

This argument of Uddyotakara’s is set forth in the following Text:—[see verses 180-181 above]

This is easily understood.—(180-181)