The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 171-176 (atman according to the nyaya-vaisheshika school) of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 171-176 (atman according to the nyaya-vaisheshika school).

Verse 171-176 (Ātman according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika School)

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

अन्ये पुनरिहात्मानमिच्छादीनां समाश्रयम् ।
स्वतोऽचिद्रूपमिच्छन्ति नित्यं सर्वगतं तथा ॥ १७१ ॥
शुभाशुभानां कर्त्तारं कर्मणां तत्फलस्य च ।
भोक्तारं चेतनायोगाच्चेतनं न स्वरूपतः ॥ १७२ ॥
ज्ञानयत्नादिसम्बन्धः कर्तृत्वं तस्य भण्यते ।
सुखदुःखादिसंवित्तिसमवायस्तु भोक्तृता ॥ १७३ ॥
निकायेन विशिष्टाभिरपूर्वाभिश्च सङ्गतिः ।
बुद्धिभिर्वेदनाभिश्च जन्म तस्याभिधीयते ॥ १७४ ॥
प्रागात्ताभिर्वियोगस्तु मरणं जीवनं पुनः ।
सदेहस्य मनोयोगो धर्माधर्माभिसत्कृतः ॥ १७५ ॥
शरीरचक्षुरादीनां वधाद्धिंसाऽस्य कल्प्यते ।
इत्थं नित्येऽपि पुंस्येषा प्रक्रिया विमलेक्ष्यते ॥ १७६ ॥

anye punarihātmānamicchādīnāṃ samāśrayam |
svato'cidrūpamicchanti nityaṃ sarvagataṃ tathā || 171 ||
śubhāśubhānāṃ karttāraṃ karmaṇāṃ tatphalasya ca |
bhoktāraṃ cetanāyogāccetanaṃ na svarūpataḥ || 172 ||
jñānayatnādisambandhaḥ kartṛtvaṃ tasya bhaṇyate |
sukhaduḥkhādisaṃvittisamavāyastu bhoktṛtā || 173 ||
nikāyena viśiṣṭābhirapūrvābhiśca saṅgatiḥ |
buddhibhirvedanābhiśca janma tasyābhidhīyate || 174 ||
prāgāttābhirviyogastu maraṇaṃ jīvanaṃ punaḥ |
sadehasya manoyogo dharmādharmābhisatkṛtaḥ || 175 ||
śarīracakṣurādīnāṃ vadhāddhiṃsā'sya kalpyate |
itthaṃ nitye'pi puṃsyeṣā prakriyā vimalekṣyate || 176 ||

Others again postulate the ‘self’ (soul) as the substratum of desire and the rest,—which, by itself, is not of the nature of consciousness, but is eternal and all-pervasive;—it is the doer of good and bad acts and the enjoyer of the fruit of these; it is ‘conscious’, not by itself, but through the presence of consciousness;—the presence of cognition, effort, etc. as also the character of being the ‘doer’ is attributed to it. its being the ‘enjoyer’ (experiencer) consists in the subsistence in it of the feelings of pleasure, pain and the like;—contact with physical body and with special unprecedented cognitions and feelings is called its ‘birth’; and dissociation from these same as taken up before is called its ‘death’; its ‘rebirth’ consists in becoming equipped with a body and mind, under the influence of merit and demerit. it is assumed to be ‘hurt’ by the hurting of its body, eyes and the rest; so that though it is eternal, the said process (of birth and rebirth) has been held to be unobjectionable.—(171-176).

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

(A) According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika School.

[There is a large lacuna here in Śāntarakṣita’s Text tiself; as is clear from the following portions of Kamalaśīla’s Commentary, of which latter also, the earlier portions are wanting.]

The existence of the Soul as the cogniser has been asserted in the following words:—“All particular cognitions of such cognisables as Substance, Quality and Action, which are comprised under ‘Being’, etc.,—and also of Generality, Specific Individuality and Inherence, which are not comprised under ‘Being, etc.’—all which cognitions are perceptional or inferential or analogical or verbal or occult (astrological, etc.) or intuitional (e.g. ‘my brother will come to-morrow’) or doubtful or wrong or dreamy or dream-cognition,—are apprehended by a cogniser distinct from my body, etc.,—(a) because their origination is dependent upon their own causes,—(b) because they are ‘general’ and ‘particular’,—(c) because they are of the nature of Consciousness,—(d) because they are very quickly destructible,—(e) because they leave impressions,—(f) because they are cognitions,—just like the cognition of other persons;—the Jar and other things serving as. the Corroborative Instance per dissimilarity.”

The import of this comprehensive argument the Author sets forth (from the Nyāya-standpoint) in the following Text:—[see verse 177 next]

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