by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588
This page contains verse 147-148 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 147-148.
Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:
न तत्प्रत्यक्षतः सिद्धमविभागमभासनात् ।
नित्यादुत्पत्त्ययोगेन कार्यलिङ्गं च तत्र न ॥ १४७ ॥
धर्मिसत्वाप्रसिद्धेस्तु न स्वभावः प्रसाधकः ।
न चैतदतिरेकेण लिङ्गं सत्ताप्रसाधकम् ॥ १४८ ॥
na tatpratyakṣataḥ siddhamavibhāgamabhāsanāt |
nityādutpattyayogena kāryaliṅgaṃ ca tatra na || 147 ||
dharmisatvāprasiddhestu na svabhāvaḥ prasādhakaḥ |
na caitadatirekeṇa liṅgaṃ sattāprasādhakam || 148 ||
The undifferentiated Brahman cannot be proved by perception, because it never appears in that form;—and as nothing can be produced from what is eternal, there can be no probans in the form of an effect (which could lead to the inference of Brahman); and as the very existence of the thing itself (Brahman) is still unproved, no character of its own could serve as the probans leading to the inference (of the said Brahman); and apart from these two, there can be no probans which could prove the existence (of Brahman).—(147-148)
Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):
The following might be urged (by the other party):—“The said Brahman is proved by Its own cognition, since it is of the nature of Consciousness itself. For instance, Brahman Itself is Light, because It is of the essence of Sound, and because it is of the nature of Intelligence.”
This however is contrary to our own experience; for instance, even when one has his mind wandering elsewhere, when looking with his eyes upon Colour, one has such non-determinate perception of the Blue and such things as is free from verbal expression; this is going to be explained in detail later on.
This also sets aside what has been asserted as to “there being no cognition in the world which is not associated with words”.
From all this it follows that the undifferentiated Brahman of the essence of Sound cannot be proved by Perception.
Nor can It be proved by Inference. If there were an Inference (of Brahman) it could be based on a Probans in the form of an Effect (of that Brahman), or in that of the nature of Brahman Itself.—As for mere Non-apprehension, it can have only negation for its object, and can have no influence upon an affirmation (such as that of the Existence of Brahman).—Now, there can be no Probans in the form of an Effect, because no effect can proceed from what is eternal; because any fruitful action—either consecutive or concurrent—would be repugnant to the very nature of the eternal Thing.—Nor can there be a Probans in the shape of the nature of Brahman Itself; because the Thing itself, in the form of Brahman, is still not established; and so long as the Thing itself has not been established, no nature or character of it can be established independently by Itself.
It might be urged that there may be some other Probans (apart from the two just mentioned).—In answer to this, it is added—Apart from these, etc.;—i.e. apart from Nature and Effect, there is nothing that can prove your Probandum; as no other Probans would be invariably concomitant with it; and what is not invariably concomitant cannot serve as a Probans; for, if it did, it would lead to absurdities.
It has been asserted that Things are associated with Sound-forms;—such association has not been proved, and is absolutely false; and as such cannot prove the fact of Brahman being really of the essence of Sound.
Nor can such a Brahman be proved by Scripture; as the character of ‘Scripture’ itself is uncertain.
‘Non-apprehension’ also is a sort of Indication (Probans); but that is included under what has been mentioned already as ‘Nature’.—Nor can this ‘Non-apprehension’ serve to prove Existence; and it is Existence that is desired to be proved; this is what is meant by the phrase—which could prove the existence of Brahman.—(147-148)