Verse 129-131

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

इति संचक्षते येऽपि ते वाच्याः किमिदं निजम् ।
शब्दरूपं परित्यज्य नीलादित्वं प्रपद्यते ॥ १२८ ॥
न वा तथेति यद्याद्यः पक्षः संश्रीयते तदा ।
अक्षरत्ववियोगः स्यात्पौरस्त्यात्मविनाशतः ॥ १३० ॥
अथाप्यनन्तरः पक्षस्तत्र नीलादिवेदने ।
अश्रुतेरपि विस्पष्टं भवेच्छब्दात्मवेदनम् ॥ १३१ ॥

iti saṃcakṣate ye'pi te vācyāḥ kimidaṃ nijam |
śabdarūpaṃ parityajya nīlāditvaṃ prapadyate || 129 ||
na vā tatheti yadyādyaḥ pakṣaḥ saṃśrīyate tadā |
akṣaratvaviyogaḥ syātpaurastyātmavināśataḥ || 130 ||
athāpyanantaraḥ pakṣastatra nīlādivedane |
aśruterapi vispaṣṭaṃ bhavecchabdātmavedanam || 131 ||

Those people who assert the above view should be addressed as follows:—[when the blue and other things evolve out of the said sound] does—or does not—the sound abandon its sound-form and take up the blue and other forms?—if it is the first alternative (that it does abandon its own form) that is accepted, then the sound becomes deprived of its imperishability,—inasmuch as its previous form has become destroyed.—if the second alternative is accepted, then, on the cognition of the blue and other things, even the deaf should have the clear perception of the sound-form.—(129-131)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

The Author proceeds to refute the above doctrine (of Sound being the origin of the World) in the following Texts;—[see verses 129-131 above]

Is the World regarded as ‘of the Essence of Sound’,—‘Śabdamaya’—in the sense that sometimes it takes the form of the modification of Sound? Or in the sense that sometimes it is produced from Sound,—as in the case of the expression ‘annamayāḥ prāṇāḥ’ (‘Life is of the essence of food’), the affix ‘mayaṭ’ denotes cause (the meaning being that Food is the cause of Life)?

The first alternative cannot be right; as the said ‘modification’ itself is not possible. Because when Brahman who is ‘of the essence of Sound’ takes the form of the Blue and other things, does It—or does it not—abandon its own pristine Sound-form? If the former alternative be accepted—that It does abandon its pristine Sound-form,—then there would be an end to the view that it is ‘without beginning and end’, that is, imperishable, indestructible; as there would be a destruction of the pristine form.—If the second alternative be accepted,—that It does not abandon its pristine form,—then, at the time that Blue is cognised by the deaf person, he should have the perception of Sound also; as the cognition of Sound would be non-different from the cognition of Blue. This argument may be formulated as follows When one thing is non-different from another,—if one is cognised, the other becomes also cognised,—as when the Blue is cognised, the essence of that same Blue becomes also cognised;—Sound is non-different from Blue; hence this is a reason based on the nature ofngs.—If it were not so, inasmuch as the conditions for better or worse would differ in the two (Sound and Blue), they could not be recognised as of the essence of the other. This would be an argument against the conclusion (of the other party).—(129-131)

This same argument is set forth in greater detail, in the following Text:—[see verse 132 next]