The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 127 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 127.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

तस्मात्सहेतवोऽन्येऽपि भावा नियतजन्मतः ।
साध्यार्थविषयं यद्वज्ज्ञानं साधनभावि ते ॥ १२७ ॥

tasmātsahetavo'nye'pi bhāvā niyatajanmataḥ |
sādhyārthaviṣayaṃ yadvajjñānaṃ sādhanabhāvi te || 127 ||

From all this it follows that other things also have their ‘causes’,—as their production is restricted,—just like your cognition of the probandum appearing when the probans is there.—(127)


Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

With the following Text, the Author sums up his position and thereby also shows that the conclusion of the other party is contrary to, and set aside by, Inference also:—[see verse 127 above]

Tilings like the Lotus and its filaments,—which are ‘other’ than thengs spoken of by the other party in his reasoning.—As their production is restricted;—i.e. they are produced only when certain particular things are there.—The argument may be formulated as follows:—Those things whose production is restricted to occasions when certain other things are there must be regarded as with Cause,—as for instance, your own cognition of the Probandum (desired to be proved) which appears only when the Probans (Reason) is there;—the same is the case with the Lotus and otherngs;—[hence these must be regarded as ‘with Cause’]—this being a Reason based on the nature of things.—(127)

End of Chapter (4)—dealing with the Doctrine of theThing by Itself’.

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