The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 126 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 126.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

अतः कारक एवायं ज्ञापको हेतुरुच्यते ।
साध्यानुत्पादकत्वात्तु कारको न प्रकाश्यते ॥ १२६ ॥

ataḥ kāraka evāyaṃ jñāpako heturucyate |
sādhyānutpādakatvāttu kārako na prakāśyate || 126 ||

Thus it is really the ‘productive’ cause which is spoken of as ‘indicative’; it is because it does not actually produce (bring into existence) what is desired to be accomplished that it is not called ‘productive’.—(126)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

Question—“If this is so, then how do the Teachers make the distinction between the Indicative and the Productive?”

The answer given in the following text is that the ‘Indicative’ is so called because it makes the thing known, and what is called ‘productive’ is that which actually brings into existence the thing concerned:—[see verse 126 above]

It is called ‘Indicative’,—and not ‘Productive—because it does not actually produce what is desired to be accomplished; while that which actually produces what is desired to be accomplished,—such as the Sprout and the like,—is called ‘Productive Hence there is nothing wrong in the distinction that has been made.

This answers all the objections that may be urged against the declaration of Ācārya Sūri. For instance, the following is an objection that may be raised—“Even when asserting with Reason that there is no Cause, why should one demolish his own conclusion? As what he asserts is an Indicative Reason, while what he denies is the Productive Cause”.—The answer to this is as follows:—The Indicative Reason also is a Productive Cause, because it produces the cognition of the thing.—This urges against the other party the fact of his assertions being self-contradictory. In fact, there can be no Reason that could prove the absence of all Cause,—because such a proposition would be clearly one that is contrary to, and set aside by, sense-perception and the rest.—(126)

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