The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 112 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 112.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

यथैव कण्टकादीनां तैक्ष्ण्यदिकमहेतुकम् ।
कादाचित्कतया तद्वद्दुःखादीनामहेतुता ॥ ११२ ॥

yathaiva kaṇṭakādīnāṃ taikṣṇyadikamahetukam |
kādācitkatayā tadvadduḥkhādīnāmahetutā || 112 ||

“Just as the sharpness and other properties of the thorn and other things must be regarded as without cause, on the ground of their appearing at certain times only,—so also must pain and other (internal) things be regarded as without cause”—(112)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

The following might be urged—“Even if it be regarded as proved that external things are without ‘cause’, because no such cause is perceived,—how can it be taken as proved in regard to internal things?”

The answer to this is provided by the following Text:—[see verse 112 above]

“Even though the fact of Pain and other internal things being without muse is not proved by Perception, yet it is clearly proved by Inference. For instance,—what appears only at certain times is definitely known to be without cause,—e.g. the Sharpness of the Thorn and such things;—Pain and such internal things appear only at certain times;—hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things. Nor is it right to hold that when a certain thing is present or absent when another thing is present or absent, then the latter should be regarded as the ‘Cause’ of the former;—as this is not found to be always true; for instance, Visual perception is present when there is Touch (in the object perceived), and is absent when there is no Touch; and yet Touch is not the ‘Cause’ of Visual perception. Hence the said definition of the causal relation cannot be true. From all this it follows that ‘the origination of all things is independent of all causes’,”—(112)

The Author answers the above arguments of the upholder of the ‘Thing by Itself’—with the following Texts:—[see verse 113 next]

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