Verse 77

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

क्रमभावीश्वरज्ञानं क्रमिविज्ञेयसङ्गतेः ।
देवदत्तादिविज्ञानं यथा ज्वालादिगोचरम् ॥ ७७ ॥

kramabhāvīśvarajñānaṃ kramivijñeyasaṅgateḥ |
devadattādivijñānaṃ yathā jvālādigocaram || 77 ||

God’s cognition must be consecutive, because it is related to consecutive cognisable things;—just like the cognition of devadatta and other persons, relating to flame and other things.—(77)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

What has been just asserted (in the second line of the preceding Text) is further supported by the following Text:—[see verse 77 above]

That Cognition of which the object is consecutive must itself be consecutive; just as we find in the case of the cognition of Devadatta and other men pertaining to such things as Flame and the like;—and God’s Cognition has for its object only such things as are consecutive. This is a Reason based upon the nature of things. And as this reasoning is put forward only by way of exposing the incongruity involved (in the Theist’s position), [and not as a formal Inferential Argument],—it will not be right to urge against it the fact of the Probans being ‘unproven’ (not admitted by both parties). Inasmuch as the Cognition of Dëvadatta and others relating to such things as ‘Universal’ and the rest (which are held to be eternal) would be devoid of the main characteristic of the Probans (evanescence of the Object),—the instance cited is that of things like the Flame (which all parties admit to be evanescent).

Question—“What is the actual proof (argument) which annuls (the Theist’s reasonings)?”

Answer—If God’s Cognition manifesting itself is produced by an object which is consecutive, then it becomes proved that it must be consecutive;—if it is not so produced, then, as there would be no proximate contact (with the Object and the Cognition), God could not cognise the Object at all. And the result of this would be either that Cognitions would have to be held as valid even in the absence of their object, or you would have to renounce your doctrine (regarding the omniscience of God). There would be a further absurdity that, in regard to such objects as have been destroyed, or have not yet been produced, the Cognition (of God) would be objectless.—This is the argument that annuls the Theist’s reasonings.—(77)