Verse 59-60

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

तत्सामर्थ्यसमुद्भूतकल्पनानुगतात्मकम् ।
प्रतिसन्धानविज्ञानं समुदायं व्यवस्यति ॥ ५९ ॥
जलानलादि नैवेदं द्वीन्द्रियग्राह्यमस्त्यतः ।
आश्रयासिद्धताऽसिद्धेर्यथाऽभिहितधर्मिणः ॥ ६० ॥

tatsāmarthyasamudbhūtakalpanānugatātmakam |
pratisandhānavijñānaṃ samudāyaṃ vyavasyati || 59 ||
jalānalādi naivedaṃ dvīndriyagrāhyamastyataḥ |
āśrayāsiddhatā'siddheryathā'bhihitadharmiṇaḥ || 60 ||

As a matter of fact, what brings about the joint cognition (involved in recognition) is the fact that recognition consists in an assumption arising out of the potencies of the two cognitions concerned.—thus, such things as water, fire and the like are not ‘perceptible by two sense-organs ’; and hence the probans (of the naiyāyika) is found to have its substratum ‘unproven, inadmissible’, as is indicated by the ‘ un-proven ’ character of the object itself.—(59-60)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

[Says the Naiyāyika]—“If the two Cognitions (Visual and Tactile) cannot have the same objective, then how is it that there is the recognition in the form that ‘I am touching in the dark the same jar that I had seen in the light’?^[1]—Hence the proposition set forth (by the Buddhist) is annulled by Inference. The Inference has been formulated by Uddyotakara in the following form—‘The two Cognitions under dispute,—the Visual Cognition and the Tactile Cognition,—have the same object,—because it is recalled (recognised),—like the Cognition of the Blue Lotus’.”^[2]

The answer to this is provided in the following Text:—[see verse 59-60 above]

‘Tayoḥ’—i.e. of the Visual and Tactile Cognitions as apprehending (respectively) Colour only and Touch only;—‘Potency’ is capacity;—out of that capacity arises the assumption, which constitutes—forms the essence of—the ‘Recognition’ (in question).—This shows that Recognition is not perceptible; firstly, because it is an essentially wrong cognition, apprehending as one what is really not one,—and secondly, because its very essence lies in an assumption.—Nor is there any other Means of Cognition (available for bringing about a valid notion of Recognition); firstly, because it apprehends what has been already covered by previous Cognitions, and as such it apprehends what has been already apprehended (and as such, is not of the nature of a Direct Valid Cognition); and secondly, because it is essentially wrong. From all this it follows that the Reason put forward (by the Naiyāyika)—“Because there is Recognition”—is ‘inconclusive’, If the validity of Recognition had been established and admitted, then the Reason would not be open to the charge of being ‘inconclusive’; because in cases where notions of such things as the Jar and the like have appeared,—taking in, in accordance with the capacity ofngs, a common idea of its Colour and other details,—if the Colour and the Touch have been duly apprehended, each by itself, by the organs of Vision and of Touch, then, at some future time, if the impressions of the things perceived present themselves accompanied by signs indicative of those things, there appears the notion of ‘unity’, ‘sameness’, which is essentially wrong, and is of the nature of ‘Remembrance’ (not Direct Cognition). It is for this reason that in this joint notion, the Colour—Blue,—also presents itself; though it is not right that the notion, of Colour should appear in the notion of Touch; as Colour is perceptible by the Organ of Vision (not of Touch).—For these reasons, the only reasonable view is what the Teachers have stated in the following words:—‘After one has perceived by the Visual and Tactile Organs, each in its own way, there appears, subsequently, a notion, joining the two perceptions and apprehending the two objects conjointly as one unit; and this notion is of the nature of Remembrance’,

Objection—“In case the conjoint entity (Colour and Touch combined) has been previously actually perceived, then it would be right to regard this as Remembrance; but, you (Buddhists) do not admit of any joint entity,—apart from the individual things, Colour and the rest,—which could have been thus previously perceived; and if Colour and the rest were only individually perceived, then the Remembrance could only be one of ‘Colour’ only, or of ‘Touch’ only and so forth,—and not of the ‘Jar’; and in regard to things that have not been previously cognised, there can be no Remembrance;—then how could any Remembrance arise in regard to the joint entity (as asserted by your Teachers)?”

This is not right, we reply. It is not asserted that the joint entity that is previously perceived is something distinct from Colour and the rest;—your objection would hold only if the assertion of our Teachers meant this; what is meant however is that those same Colour and the rest, when serving the fruitful purpose of holding water and the like, come to be collectively called the ‘Jar’; and what happens is that after each of those Colour and the rest, has been perceived by means of each of their pertinent sense-organs,—there appears, at some future time, the Remembrance of these under the appellation of ‘Jar’, which bears the impressions of the said perceptions.—Or the ‘Joint Entity’ may be regarded as ‘conceptual’, and being of the nature of a ‘conceptual entity’, as apprehended by its own cognition; under the circumstances, why cannot Remembrance of such a Joint Entity be possible?

From all this it is clear that the Reason (put forward by the Naiyāyika),—“Because of the peculiar arrangements of its component parts”,—has its substratum ‘unproven’,—“Why so?”—The Answer is—By the ‘unproven’ character of the object itself; that is, the object as stated by the Naiyāyika in the form ‘perceptible by two sense-organs’ is not proven, unknown; and thus the Reason having its substratum ‘unproven’, becomes itself open to the fallacy of being ‘unproven’, ‘unknown, Inadmissible—(59-60)

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

This discussion is a clear reference to Nyāya-Sūtra 3.1.1—‘Darśanasparśanābhyāmekārthagrahaṇāt’.

[2]:

This is a reference to Nyāya Vārtika, 3.1.1, page 350, Bib. Ind.