The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 57 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 57.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

दृश्यत्वेनाभ्युपेतस्य द्वयस्यानुपलम्भनात् ।
साधनानन्वितं चेदमुदाहरणमप्यतः ॥ ५७ ॥

dṛśyatvenābhyupetasya dvayasyānupalambhanāt |
sādhanānanvitaṃ cedamudāharaṇamapyataḥ || 57 ||

Because both the facts that have been assumed (and put forward) are such as are not actually apprehended; and for the same reason the corroborative instance also that has been cited has no connection with the probans cited.—(57)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

In brief, the Author for the present states his reason only in the form of ‘Non-apprehension’, which annuls the Naiyāyika’s argument,—a detailed objection to these two arguments will be provided under the Chapters (10-15) dealing with the Six Categories.

Both the facts,—i.e. that have been put forward as the ‘Arrangement’ and the ‘Composite’,—[Both of these are not apprehended] because the ‘Arrangement’ has been regarded as something visible, in such statements (by the Naiyāyika) as ‘Number, Dimension, Separateness, Conjunction, Disjunction, Higher Universal, the Lower Universal and Action are visible, as inhering in coloured substances’,—The ‘Composite’ also has been regarded as visible, in the statement—‘There is perception of it because it is large, is made up of several component substances and is coloured—As a matter of fact however, apart from Colour, etc., no other ‘Conjunction’ or ‘Composite’—such as is accepted by the Naiyāyika,—ever appears in Consciousness, Thus, while fulfilling the conditions of ‘perceptibility’, if it is not perceived, it must be regarded as non-existent, like the ‘Hare’s Horns’,—It will not be right to argue that—“inasmuch as Atoms are beyond the reach of the Senses, [if there were no suchng as the Composite composed of the Atoms], the perception of Colour and other qualities would be impossible”;—because it is admitted that qualified Atoms are apprehensible by the Senses, and hence they are not ‘beyond the reach of the Senses—Thus then, both ‘Conjunction’ and ‘Composite’ being non-existent, the Jar that has been cited as the Corroborative Instance per similarity is found to be devoid of that character which has been set up as the Probans; this is what is meant by the Text in the words ‘has no connection with the Probans, etc,’—(57)

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