The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 44 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 44.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

चैतन्याद्यन्वितत्वेऽपि नैकपूर्वत्वमिष्यते ।
पुरुषाणाममुख्यं चेत्तदिहापि समं न किम् ॥ ४४ ॥

caitanyādyanvitatve'pi naikapūrvatvamiṣyate |
puruṣāṇāmamukhyaṃ cettadihāpi samaṃ na kim || 44 ||

In the case of ‘spirits’, even though they are endowed with ‘sentience’ and other qualities, they are not regarded (by the sāṃkhya) as preceded (produced) by a single entity (as their cause).—it might be said that “the said qualities are attributed (to the spirits) only secondarily (indirectly, figuratively)”;—then why cannot the same be the case in regard to the matter under discussion also?—(44)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

The Text again proceeds to show the ‘inconclusiveness’ of the Sāṃkhya’s Reason—“Because of Homogeneity”—by itself:—[see verse 44 above]

For instance, the Spirits are regarded (by the Sāṃkhya) to be endowed with endless such properties as being ‘sentient’, ‘enjoyer’ and the like; and yet they are not regarded by yon as having a single Cause endowed with the same properties.—It might be urged that—“The property of being endowed with Sentience and the like that has been attributed to Spirits, is not in the direct literal sense, but in the indirect, secondary, figurative sense; and the reason for this lies in the fact that, all Spirits are found to be excluded from ‘insentience’ and other such qualities, and hence they are placed under the genus ‘Sentient’, which stands for the ‘negation or exclusion of Insentience’, which is assumed to meet their case; though in reality there is no such genus”,—If then, it is only indirect and figurative, then, in regard to the ‘Manifest’ also,—as in the case of Spirits,—why is the presence of Pleasure, etc. not taken as ‘assumed’ in the same way,—without their being preceded and produced by any single Cause endowed with the same qualities?—Thus the Probans (Reason) is found to be Inconclusive.

The mention of ‘Spirits’ is only by way of illustration. In the same manner, Pleasure, etc., being so many modifications of Primordial Matter, are endowed with such qualities as being ‘attributes’, ‘insentient’, ‘non-enjoyer’ and so forth,—and Primordial Matter and the Spirits are endowed with such qualities as ‘Eternality’ and the like,—and yet none of these are preceded and produced by any single such Cause. So the Probans is clearly Inconclusive.—(44)

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