The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 43 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 43.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

मृद्विकारादयो भेदा नैकजात्यन्वितास्तथा ।
सिद्धा नैकनिमित्ताश्च मृत्पिण्डादेर्विभेदतः ॥ ४३ ॥

mṛdvikārādayo bhedā naikajātyanvitāstathā |
siddhā naikanimittāśca mṛtpiṇḍādervibhedataḥ || 43 ||

So also the various products of clay and other things are not recognised as imbued with any single generic character,—nor as the effects of any single cause; as all such things as the ‘lump of clay’ are diverse.—(43)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

It has thus been shown that the Reason ‘Because of Homogeneity’ (as propounded by the Sāṃkhya in support of his doctrine of all things being the product of one ‘Primordial Matter’) is open to the three fallacies of being ‘Unproven, Inadmissible’, ‘Contradictory’ and ‘Too Wide, Inconclusive’,—The Author now proceeds to show that the corroborative instance cited (by the Sāṃkhya in Text 15, above) in the words ‘Just as in the case of the Jar and other things’ deos not fulfil the conditions of,—and is not possessed of the properties of—the Probans and the Probandum [and as such cannot serve as a ‘corroborative instance’]:—[see verse 43 above]

The phrase ‘and other things’ is meant to include the products of suchngs as Gold and the like.—The term ‘so also’ may be taken as cumulative,—adding one further defect in the Opponent’s reasoning,—or as indicating similarity (to other defects already pointed oat).—The phrase ‘not imbued with any single Generic Character’ serves to show that the Instance cited (Jar, etc.) is devoid of the property of what has been cited (by the Sāṃkhya) as the Probans of his reasoning.—The phrase ‘Nor as the effects of any single Cause’,—has to be construed with ‘recognised’; and it serves to show that the property of the (Sāṃkhya’s) Probandum also is not present in the instance cited.

Objection—“As a matter of fact, single Causes—of all such things,—are actually found in the form of the Lump of Clay or of Gold and other things; and every one of these is also found to be imbued with the Generic Character of ‘Clay’, ‘Gold’ and the like. In what way then is our Instance devoid of both the properties of the Probans and the Probandum?”

AnswerAs all such things as the ‘Lump of Clay’ are diverse;—there can be no such single composite entity as ‘Lump of Clay’;—if there were, then (since Generic Characters are all-pervading ex hypothesi), if it covered one point in space, the entire space would become covered. Nor is any ‘Generic Character’ found to appear in each individual thing,—every one of which is perceived as distinct by itself.—(43)

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