Verse 26

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

अव्यक्तो व्यक्तिभाक्तेभ्य इति चेद्व्यक्तिरस्य का ।
न रूपातिशयोत्पत्तिरविभागादसङ्गतेः ॥ २६ ॥

avyakto vyaktibhāktebhya iti cedvyaktirasya kā |
na rūpātiśayotpattiravibhāgādasaṅgateḥ || 26 ||

If it be held that—“the effect, which has been unmanifested (latent, in the cause), acquires manifestation through the causes”,—then (the question is) what is this manifestation of the effect?—it cannot consist in'the appearance (production) of a peculiarity in its nature; because of non-differentiation and non-connection.—(26)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

The Sāṃkhya may argue thus—“Though, even prior to the operation of its Means, the Definite Cognition is already in existence, yet the Means (Cause) is not futile; because prior to the operation of the Cause, the Cognition was unmanifested (lying latent in the Cause), and subsequently (to the operation), it acquires mamfestation through that cause; hence what the Cause operates for is the manifestation (of the latent Effect); and so there is no futility.”

This however cannot be right; because there can be no such ‘manifestation’, This ‘manifestation’ consists either (a) in the appearance of some peculiarity in the nature of the Effect, or (b) in the apprehension of the peculiarity, or (c) in the disappearance of what has been obstructing the apprehension of the peculiarity.

It cannot consist in the appearance of some peculiarity in its nature; because would this ‘peculiarity in its nature’ be non-distinct from the Effect [Definite Cognition in the case in question], or distinct from it? If it were non-distinct, then, inasmuch as there would be non-differentiation from the Definite Cognition (Effect), it would be as constant as the form of the Definite Cognition itself; and hence there could be no ‘production’ of it. If, on the other hand, the ‘peculiarity’ is something distinct from the Effect (Definite Cognition) itself,—even so, there could be no such connection (or relationship) as ‘this is a peculiarity of that’, Because any such connection (between the Effect and its Peculiarity) could only be either one of ‘container and contained’ or of ‘Cause and Effect’ (Producer and Product).—The former is not possible in the case in question; because the two factors concerned not rendering any help to one another, the said relation of ‘Container and Contained’ is not possible; even if there were any help rendered, if that Help were something distinct from the two factors, then the Connection itself could not be there; so that there would be an infinite regress. If, on the other hand, the Help were not so distinct, then the operation of the Cause would be futile; as the Definite Cognition (Effect) itself would have brought about the ‘Peculiarity’, which, ex hypothesis is not-distinct from the said Help.—Then again, the ‘Peculiarity’ being something incorporeal, it would not be possible for it to fall downwards, and as such, it would not need a ‘container’ (or receptacle, support), because a ‘receptacle’ can only serve the purpose of preventing this downward fall (due to gravity).—Nor is the relation of ‘Cause and Effect’ possible (between the Effect and its ‘Peculiarity’); because the Cause in the shape of the Definite Cognition being always there, it would be possible for the peculiarity to be produced always,—which is absurd. Nor would it be right to hold that the production of the Peculiarity by the Definite Cognition would be dependent upon the actual operation of the Cause. Because there can be no dependence upon what renders no help; and if there is help rendered, then the theory becomes open to the objection and infinite regress urged above.—Further, this Peculiarity that is held to be produced as something distinct,—is it existent or non-existent (prior to the operation of the Cause)? These two horns of the dilemma present themselves here also.—If the Peculiarity is something non-existent, then, as urged above, all the reasons (put forward by the Sāṃkhya) become invalidated. If, on the other hand, it has been existent, then there is no use for the Cause.—If in regard to the Manifestation also, a further ‘manifestation’ were postulated,—there would be nothing to prevent the infinite regress as to what this further ‘manifestation’ is and so forth.—Thus, even on the alternative of the two being distinct, there would be ‘non-connection’;—and as there would be no connection (relationship), any production of ‘peculiarity’ in the nature of the Effect would not be possible.—(26)