The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 21 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 21.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

नातः साध्यं समस्तीति नोपादानपरिग्रहः ।
नियतादपि नो जन्म न च शक्तिर्न च क्रिया ॥ २१ ॥

nātaḥ sādhyaṃ samastīti nopādānaparigrahaḥ |
niyatādapi no janma na ca śaktirna ca kriyā || 21 ||

For the same reason, if there is nothing to be produced, there would be no ‘recourse to the cause’,—nor would there be any production out of even a specific cause,—nor would there be any ‘efficiency’, nor any ‘operation’ (of the cause).—(21)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

The argument ‘because what is already existent cannot be produced’ as stated by the Author himself (against the Sāṃkkya theory on p. 24,1. 20, parodying Sāṃkhyakārikā, 9) has been duly supported; now he proceeds to argue in support of the other four arguments,—‘became there is recourse to the Cause’ and the rest,—in the following—[see verse 21 above]

As in accordance with the said reasoning, the Effect to be brought about would (according to the Sāṃhhya) be already in existence [read ‘Sādhyasya bhāvāt’], ‘recourse to Cause’ would not be possible; as intelligent persons have recourse to a cause only for the purpose of something that could be brought about by that Cause. Nor would it be necessary that particular Effects, like Curd and the rest, must proceed only from particular causes; simply because there would be nothing to be produced out of any cause. This supports the (parodied) argument ‘Because all things are not possible’, What is meant is that when the Sāṅkhya asserts that ‘an Effect cannot be produced from all causes’, what he means is that ‘a particular Effect can be produced only from a particular Cause This is not possible under the Sāṃkhya theory of the Effect being already existent; as, under this theory, there would be nothing to be produced,—Similarly as regards the argument that ‘an efficient Cause can produce only that for which it is effiicent’, neither ‘efficiency’ nor ‘the production of that for which it is efficient’ is possible under the Sāṃkhya theory; for the very same reason that there is nothing to be produced (under the theory). If anything were produced by another thing, then alone could one admit the ‘efficiency’ of the latterng, which could then be accepted as the ‘Cause’ of that which would be produced;—not otherwise.—This is what is meant by the words—Nor would there beefficiency’, nor anyoperation of the Cause’,—(21)

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