Verse 18

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

हेतुजन्यं न तत्कार्यं सत्तातो हेतुवित्तिवत् ।
अतो नाभिमतो हेतुरसाध्यत्वात्परात्मवत् ॥ १८ ॥

hetujanyaṃ na tatkāryaṃ sattāto hetuvittivat |
ato nābhimato heturasādhyatvātparātmavat || 18 ||

(A) The said effect cannot be produced by the cause,—because it already exists,—like the cause and the spirit.—(B) Thus also what is postulated cannot be the cause,—because there is nothing that can be brought about by it,—just like the other thing.—(18)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

The Author now formulates the argument in the clear and proper form—[see verse 18 above]

‘Hetu’, ‘Cause’, stands for Primordial Matter, and also the common things, Milk and the like;—‘Tat kāryam’, ‘the said effect’, stands for the Cosmic Intelligence, etc. (products, according to the Sāṃkhya, of Primordial Matter), as also the common things, Curd and the like;—‘Sattātaḥ’, means ‘became it already exists’;—‘hetu-vitti-vat’, ‘like the Cause and the Spirit’,—‘Cause’ stands for Primordial Matter and also for the common things, Milk and the like; ‘vitti’, ‘Spirit’, stands for the Sentient Faculty; and what is like these two is ‘like the Cause and the Spirit—The argument may be thus formulated—That which is existent in its entirety cannot be produced by anything,—as, for instance, Primordial Matter and Spirit.;—and the Effect in its mature state is already existent (ex hypothesi),—according to the opinion of our Opponent the Curd and the Products are already existent;—hence (if these were held as to be produced) it would involve the contingency of going against a universal law.—Nor can the reason (probans) here put forward be regarded as not true, inadmissible; because, if what cannot be produced in any form were regarded as producible, then all things would have to be regarded as producible, and this would lead to a regressus ad infinitum, which would nullify the Opponent’s proposition; and it would also involve the further absurdity of the producibility of what has already been produced.

So far the Author has shown that what are regarded (by the Sāṃkhya) as ‘Effects’ cannot really be ‘Effects’ or ‘Products’; now he proceeds to show that what are regarded as ‘Causes’ cannot really be ‘Causes’—‘Thus also what is postulated, etc?—‘Postulated’,—i.e. the Entity posited. What is meant is as follows:—Primordial Matter, and also the Seed, Milk and other common things,—which have been postulated as the ‘Cause’ of such intended effects as Cosmic Intelligence and the rest, as also Curd and other common products,—cannot be the cause of these latter,—that is, it is not capable of being treated as the producer;—why?—because there is nothing that can be brought about by such a cause; as a matter of fact, there is nothing that can be brought about by the said entity; and as the said entity has this character, it cannot be regarded as the ‘Cause’, That this is so follows from what has been said (in the first half of the Text), regarding the effects in question being not effects at all; it is for this reason that the Text has used the term ‘ataḥ’, ‘thus’.

‘Parātmavat’, ‘Just like the other things’, i.e. like the thing with a different character,—i.e. like the entity which has not been posited as a Cause; the entity that has not been posited as the Cause is the Spirit,—as declared (in the Sāṃkhyakārikā, 3)—‘The Spirit is neither productive nor product

This argument may be formulated as follows:—That for which there is nothing to be brought about cannot be a Cause,—e.g. the Spirit;—the entity postulated (as Cause) is one for which there is nothing to be brought about;—hence the entity concerned is not found to fulfil the conditions which are invariably concomitant (with the nature of the Cause).

Both these arguments put forward in the Text are only meant to expose the anomalies (involved in the Sāṃkhya doctrine); hence there is no need for putting forward only such corroborative examples as are accepted by both parties.

There is a party among Sāṃkhyas who hold the view that—“The Spirit also is also a doer (a Cause) in regard to his own experiences,—on the analogy of the Reflection [which, though not of the Reflecting Substance, is yet attributed to it; similarly though Experience does not subsist in the Spirit, yet it is attributed to him]

As against this party, the explanation of the Text would be as follows:—The term ‘parātma’ stands for the ‘Para-ātmā’, the Liberated Spirit; as such a Spirit would be liberated, he could not be the doer (Cause) in regard to Experience. Hence (even so) there is nothing wrong with the corroborative instance cited in the Text.—(18)