Verse 16 (refutation of the Sāṃkhya Doctrine)

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

तदत्र सुधियः प्राहुस्तुल्या सत्वेऽपि चोदना ।
यत्तस्यामुत्तरं वः स्यात्तत्तुल्यं सुधियामपि ॥ १६ ॥

tadatra sudhiyaḥ prāhustulyā satve'pi codanā |
yattasyāmuttaraṃ vaḥ syāttattulyaṃ sudhiyāmapi || 16 ||

In answer to this, the wise ones hectare that the argument that has been urged (by the sāṃkhya against the doctrine that the effect is non-existent prior to its production) is equally applicable to the doctrine of the existence of the effect. and the answer that you would have to that argument would equally aptly be the answer of the wise ones also.—(16)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

(B) Refutation of the Sāṃkhya Doctrine.

With the words ‘Tadatra’, the Author begins the Refutation (of the Sāṃkhya Philosophy).—[see verse 16 above]

It has been asserted (by the Sāṃkhya) that “The various products emanating from Primordial Matter and other Causes, are of the same essence as those Causes—In regard to this, we proceed to consider the following points:—If these diverse Effects are of the same essence as Primordial Matter, then how is it that they emanate from it as its effects? When one thing is non-different from (of the same essence as) another, it cannot be its cause or effect; because the Cause and its Effect must be totally different in character from one another. If it were not so, how could there be any clear conception as to one thing being the ‘Cause’ and another the ‘Effect’? In that case, how could there be any such deduction as that made by you—(a) that Primordial Matter -must always be the Cause, (b) that the group of sixteen, consisting of the five Gross Substances and eleven Sense-organs must always be the Effect, and (c) that among Cosmic Intelligence, I-principle and Rudimentary Substances, one is the Effect of what precedes, and the Cause of what follows it? This deduction has been thus formulated (in the Sāṃkhya-kārikā, 3)—“Primordial Matter is never a Product—the group of seven consisting of the Cosmic Intelligence and the rest are both Product and Productive—the group of sixteen is always Product;—the Spirit is neither Product nor Productive—In fact (under the Sāṃkhya Doctrine) everything would be equally liable to be the Cause or Effect of everything else. Or, the character of Cause and Effect being always relative,—and (under the Sāṃkhya doctrine of all things being of the same essence) there being no entirely different thing to be conceived of as in relation to another,—all things would, like the Spirit, be ‘neither Product nor Productive’; otherwise the Spirit also might be spoken of as ‘Product’ and ‘Productive’. It has been said that—‘When Rudrila asserted that what is Curd is Milk and what is Milk is Curd, he gave evidence of his being Vindhyavāsin, an inhabitant of the wilds of the Vindhya Hills’.^[1]

[Under Sāṅkhyakārikā, 10] it has been declared that the Manifest has the character of being ‘caused’ and the rest, and the Unmanifest is the reverse of all this;—this also is mere childish prattle. As a matter of fact, when one thing is not different in nature from another thing, it cannot be contrary to this latter; because ‘contrariness’ consists in difference of nature; otherwise, there would be an end to all notions of ‘difference’; and as a consequence, there would be no grounds for accepting any difference among the Attributes of Harmony, Energy and Inertia (which are insentient) on the one hand and the sentient Spirits on the other; and the whole universe would be uniform; this would involve the contingency of the whole being produced and also destroyed at one and the same time. That all these contingencies would follow would be due to the fact that the notion of all lands of ‘Non-difference’ must share the same fate (of being accepted or rejected). From this it follows that the ‘Unmanifest’ also, like the ‘Manifest’, should possess the qualities of being ‘with cause’ and the rest (which have been attributed to the ‘Manifest’ only), for the simple reason that the form (essence) of the Unmanifest is not different from that of the ‘Manifest’;—or (conversely) the ‘Manifest’ should, like the ‘Unmanifest’, possess the qualities of being ‘without cause’ and the rest, on the ground of its form being not different from the Unmanifest; both these universal affirmative propositions would have to be accepted; otherwise undesirable contingencies would arise.—Then again, in ordinary worldly experience, the relation of Cause and Effect is always apprehended on the basis of well-ascertained positive and negative concomitance; while as regards the subject under discussion, Cosmic Intelligence and other things are not ordinarily known to be produced from such causes as Primordial Matter and the rest. Nor again is any eternalng found to have the nature of a Cause, on the basis of which the fact of the diverse Products being produced out of Primordial Matter (which is eternal) could be admitted. And the reason for this lies in the fact that, if an eternal thing is capable of any effective action, any idea of its operations being gradual or non-gradual (simultaneous), would involve self-contradictions.

The following argument might be urged—“The relation of Cause and Effect that we postulate is not based upon the idea that the Cause produces something that did not exist before at ail; and it is only such causal relation that would be incompatible with the non-difference in essence (form);—what we do assert is that Primordial Matter undergoes modification into the form of Cosmic Intelligence and other Products,—just as the Coiled Serpent uncoils itself and becomes modified into the Elongated Serpent,—and it is in this sense that it is called the ‘Cause’ of Cosmic Intelligence and other Products; and these; Cosmic Intelligence and the rest, being of the nature of modifications, are called its ‘Effect’ (or Product);—and there is nothing self-contradictory (or incongruous) in such modification, even though there he non-difference (between the original and its modification).”

This cannot be right; as under such circumstances, there can be no ‘modification’, Because if there were Modification, it could come about either on the abandoning of the original form, or on the non-abandonment of it. If it were to come without the abandoning of the original form, then there would be a commixture of the two forms (original and modified); and it would be possible to perceive youth at the time of old age. If, on the other hand, Modification were to come after the abandoning of the original form, then this would involve the loss of form (of the original); so that it would mean that the previous form has been destroyed and a new and different form has come about; so that it could not be proved that any one thing is the ‘modification’ of another.—Then again, you explain ‘modification’ to consist in a change in the original itself into something else now would this change be in part or in whole? It could not be in part, because there are no parts (in Primordial Matter); nor could it be in whole, because that would mean the production of an entirely new thing and the consequent destruction of the original. Hence it cannot be right that there is change of the same thing; as it involves the notion of the coming into existence of an entirely different character (and thing’.

It might be argued that—“What is meant is that while the thing itself remains constant, one property of it disappears and another property appears, and this (variation of the Property) is what is called Modification; and it does not-mean that the very essence of the thing itself becomes different

This also cannot be right. Because when the Property appears and disappears, would that Property be something different, or non-different, from the thing itself (in which it appears and disappears)?—If it were something different, then the thing itself -remaining exactly the same, how can it he said to be modified? When two such things as Cloth and Horse, which are entirely different from the Jar and otherngs, are produced or destroyed, it is not regarded as a modification of the Jar and other things. If it were so regarded, it would lead to an absurdity. It might be argued that—“if this line of argument were adopted, then the Spirit also would be ‘modifiable’; inasmuch as the properties related to the Spirit actually appear and disappear, which would mean ‘modification’ of the Spirit itself, not of anything else—Not so, we reply. As no relationship can subsist either in an entity or a non-entity, there can be nothing that could have any relationship at all. For instance, if a Relationship existed, it could subsist either in an entity or in a non-entity;—as a matter of fact however, it cannot subsist in an entity; because the full majesty of its entire nature being already known as independent, it would not be possible for it to be dependent upon anything else (in the shape of a Relationship). Nor could the Relationship subsist in a non-entity, because by its very nature, it is devoid of all characterisation and as such cannot be dependent upon anything; e.g. the ‘Hare’s Horn’ and such non-entities cannot be rightly held to be dependent upon anything.—Further, you do not advocate that there is modification on the appearance and disappearance of entirely different properties;—what then?—what you advocate is that, in the case of an entity, its own essential character remaining constant, there is variation in its conditions (states), and this is what is meant by ‘Modification When, however, the Properties are distinct from the Entity having the properties, there is no possibility of any essential character remaining constant; as the entity itself is the one ‘essence⁵ of the Properties; and that, ex hypothesis is entirely different from them; so that there is no possibility of any essential character remaining constant. Nor again does any person ever become cognisant of any such Property coming within his range of cognisance as is different from the appearing and disappearing Properties; hence all wise men regard such a property as non-existent.—If, however, it be held that it is not a different entity at all, as both the properties, the appearing as well as the disappearing, would be non-different from the Entity to which they belong,—they should, like the Entity itself, be one only; and under the circumstances, on what basis would either the Entity or the Property be ‘modified’? The two varying Properties being non-different from the Entity which remains constant,—there can be no appearance (production) or disappearance (destruction) of these,—just as there is none of the constant Entity. As regards the Entity also, inasmuch as it is non-different from the Properties, all that might be possible would be the production (appearance) of something new that did not exist before and the destruction (disappearance) of that which has been in existence; so that in no case would there be ‘Modification’ of any single thing. From all this it follows that, even on the basis of ‘Modification’, your theory of ‘Cause and Effect’ is not tenable.

All this defect in the Sāṃkhya theory is too manifest to need assertion;—with this idea, the Author has omitted to set it forth, and with the idea that ‘we shall answer later on the objection that the Sāṃkhya has urged against the theory of the Effect being nôn-existent (before the causal operation)’,—he proceeds, at this stage, to criticise the theory of the Effect being existent, by showing that it is open to the same objections (that have been urged against the theory of the Effect being non-existent). This is what is done in the text.—‘In answer to this, etc.’

The term ‘sudhiyaḥ’, ‘wise ones’, stands for the Bauddhas; they declare that the fivefold argument that the Sāṃkhya has set forth in the words ‘Because what is non-existent cannot be produced, etc.’ (Sāṅkhyakārikā, 9),—is equally applicable against the theory of the Effect being existent. For instance, it can be asserted (with equal reason) that ‘Because what is existent cannot be produced,—because there is recourse to the Cause,—been use all things are not possible,—because the efficient thing can produce only that for which it is efficient, and—because the Effect is of the same essence as the Cause,—therefore the Effect is not-existent’;—[the reading ‘Asadakaraṇāt’ of the Sāṅkhyakārikā being altered into ‘Na sadakaraṇāt’] the negative ‘not’ (in the beginning) being construed with the phrase ‘the Effect is existent’ (at the end of the sentence). “Why should the Effect be regarded as not-existent?”—Because of all the very same reasons that have been set forth in the Sāṅkhyakārikā—Because what is non-existent cannot be produced, etc. etc.—And when an objection is equally applicable to both parties (to a discussion), then it should not be urged by one against the other; such is the sense of the Text.

Objection—“In what way is there this equality (between the two theories),—when the objection as urged by one party is that ‘the Non-existent cannot be produced’, while as urged by the other, it is that ‘the Existent cannot be produced?”

There is no force in this objection; as it arises from non-comprehension of the seme of what is asserted. All that is meant by the assertion of ‘equality’ in the Text is only with reference to the five statements (in the Kārikā) regarding ‘non-production’, ‘presence of connection between Effects and Specific Causes’ and so forth [and not with reference to the conclusion deduced from these statements by the two parties, which are certainly contradictory]; because the reasons of the ‘non-producibility’ and the rest are equally applicable as against the theory of the Effect being existent. The answer that you, upholders of the doctrine of the Effect being existent, would make against these arguments (as against your doctrine) would also be the answer of the wise Bauddhas who uphold the Doctrine of the Effect being nonexistent.—(16)

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

There appears to be a pun here upon the name ‘Vindhyavāsin’; Vindhya is the name given to the Vindhya Hills, so the direct meaning of the term ‘Vindhyavasitā’ would be the character of being a denizen of the wilds of the Vindhya Range; the indirect inuendo is to the Sāṃkhya author who gave expression to the opinion referred to here; his name was Vindhyavāsin, See Foreword, page LXI.