The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains introduction by kamalashila (verses 1-6) of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses in total.

Introduction by Kamalaśīla (verses 1-6)

Note: Kamalaśīla is the author of the Pañjikā (commentary) on the Tattvasaṃgraha, also known as the Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā.

After reverentially bowing to that World-Teacher, the best of the Knowers of Truth,—who, through mercy, made the World happy by alleviating the sufferings of Birth, Disease, Decay and the rest,—through the nectar of Truths obtained by the churning of the ocean of knowable things,—the clear ‘Commentary’ on the Compendium of True Doctrines is hereby commenced.—(1)

Dull-witted persons like me are never able to assert anything new; what path too is there which has not been trodden many times by the learned? This effort of mine therefore is purely from the selfish motive of acquiring merit; and my mind proceeds to study the True Doctrines, which is likely to bear excellent fruit.—(2)

[Page 2.] Whenever intelligent persons turn towards Philosophy, it is only after having fully understood the nature of the subject it deals with and the purpose it is likely to serve; the grace of Great Beings also is the most important means of securing all that is good;—bearing these two ideas in mind, the Author,—with a view to secure the grace of the Blessed Lord, and to urge the listeners to seriously undertake the study of the Philosophy herein set. forth,—first of all offers his worshipful obeisance to his Teacher, and then states the Subject-matter and Purpose of his work, by means of the verses beginning with the term ‘Prakṛti’ and ending with the words ‘Kriyate tattvasaṃgrahaḥ’.

The justification for this lies in the fact that, if the Subject of the treatise had not been stated, the intelligent enquirer might suspect it to be of no use and hence would not undertake even to listen to it; it is necessary therefore that the Subject should be stated.

Even so, though the Subject would be known, it might be suspected that the Teaching herein set forth serves no useful purpose,—being like such teachings as those dealing with investigations into the matter of the ‘teeth of crows’; and if so, then intelligent enquirers would not care even to listen to it;—hence in order to lead the intelligent enquirer to take up its study, it is necessary that at the very outset, the Purpose should be stated. In fact, it is the purpose, the motive, that forms the principal factor in all activity; and it is only when the person listening to the Teaching desires to secure for himself the purpose that the Teaching is calculated to serve, that he betakes himself to the action (of studying it).—The Purpose of the Teaching also could not be asserted without stating its Subject; hence, for the purpose of showing that the Teaching is actually a means of accomplishing the desired purpose, the Subject has been stated.—The Purpose again should be shown to be such as can be accomplished by suitable means, and not one that cannot be accomplished by such means. Otherwise, the setting forth of the Teaching would be like the teaching that ‘the securing of the crest-jewel of Takṣaka the Great Serpent-King is a means of curing the effects of poison’; and in that case, even though the Purpose would be there, if the employment of the means of accomplishing it were found to be impossible of execution, the intelligent enquirer would never undertake any activity towards such a purpose. It is to this effect that we have the following declaration—Every investigation (and teaching) should be carried on in mi-involved (simple), never in involved, language, and it should mention the purpose of man (calculated to be served by it) and also the suitable means relevant thereto—Thus for these reasons, the assertion of the Subject-matter and other things is necessary for securing the activity (of the intelligent enquirer).

Objection—“The activity of all intelligent persons arises from definite indubitable cognition; and definite indubitable cognition can follow only from a valid means of right cognition; the assertion in the text of the Purpose of the Treatise can have no validity as a means of right cognition of such external things as. the subject-matter of the Treatise; for the simple reason that there is no sort of constant relationship (between the said assertion and external things). For instance, they are not related by the relation of Identity, as the two are entirely different from one another.—Nor can the relation between them be that of one being produced by the other; because the only thing that produces the assertion is the desire to speak (in the speaker). Any cognition regarding the subject of enquiry that would be produced by an assertion not related to it cannot be valid; as such validity would be liable to most undesirable contingencies.—Though it is true that the assertion may be regarded as a valid means of knowing the desire to speak,—yet it could never form an auxiliary factor in the activity of the intelligent investigator; because as a matter of fact, even though people may desire to say things at one time, yet when the time for action comes, they do not always act in exact accordance with what they have spoken; as a matter of fact, it is often found that the action of men is not always in strict accordance with their intentions. If notions like those in question were valid, then it might be possible to compile Teachings contrary to the declaration (of purpose) made previously.—Further, for a person who already knows the purpose of the Teaching, any assertion of the purpose would be absolutely futile; as his activity (towards the study of the Teachings) would be already aroused by his previous knowledge.—On the other hand, for the man who has been already convinced, through other sources of knowledge, of the purposelessness of the Teaching, the assertion of the purpose would be all the more futile; because the purposefulness having been already set aside by his previous conviction, the fresh assertion could not lead to any activity on his part (towards the study of the Teaching).—Both these arguments however we are urging after admitting, only for the sake of argument, (that such activities can be brought about by the statement of purpose); as a matter of fact however, in the case of men of limited intuitions (and intelligence), there is no such valid agency prior to their activity as would be either conducive to, or preclusive of, the purpose and other details relating to the said activity; and it is only through such an agency that they could cognise the existence of the said details; for the simple reason that all these can be cognised by ordinary men only through (and after) the activity.—It may be then that the assertion in the Text is meant for the person who is not already cognisant of the Purpose and other details related to the Teaching. But for an intelligent enquirer, any such assertion would arouse a doubt, and bring no valid definite cognition; for the simple reason that the assertion is not a reliable source of knowledge. And so far as the doubt is concerned, it is already there, even before the assertion in question. So that the declaration of the Purpose and other details relating to the Teaching is entirely futile.”

[Page 3.] Our answer to the above is as follows:—It has been argued that “the activity of all intelligent persons arises from a definite indubitable cognition”.—This is not true; because as a matter of fact, activity is found to follow from doubtful cognition also; as in the case of agriculturists and the like.—It might be argued that—“Though in the minds of the agriculturists there might be some doubt regarding the likely fruit of their labours, yet the definite cognition is always present that the means going to be employed are such as would bring that fruit; so that the activity of these people also is based upon a definite cognition—This however is not right. All that is germane to the present discussion is the view (asserted by us) that when a man undertakes an activity for a certain purpose, this, activity is found to arise also from an uncertain cognition of that purpose; and in the case in question, when the agriculturist betakes himself to agriculture, he does not do so, for the purpose of the means of attaining the real end.—on the basis whereof the opponent argues that the agriculturist’s activity is due to his definite cognition of the means; as a matter of fact, the agriculturist betakes himself to the activity for the purpose of attaining the fruit (reaping of Harvest); in regard to this Fruit, there is always a possibility of obstacles coming in the way, there can be no definite indubitable cognition in the mind of the operator; hence the activity must be regarded as proceeding only from a doubtful cognition.—As regards the first step in the activity of these people, which has been held to be prompted by the definite cognition of the means of accomplishing the fruit,—there can, in fact, be no definitely certain cognition of the Means also; for the simple reason that the activity is for that purpose itself.—Further, even if the well-defined cognition of the Means of accomplishment were there, it could come in only in reference to the fruit to come, and hence it would surely be in the form ‘such and such a future fruit will be accomplished by this means’,—or in the form ‘this will most certainly accomplish such and such a result, if there are no obstacles in the way and if there is no lack of auxiliary aids—The former of these two forms does not appear to be of the right form; because even though a certain person, who was likely to be met by obstacles and lack of auxiliary aids, may have succeeded in obtaining the desired fruit, in the shape of the harvest of paddy and the like,—yet he has not yet actually seen the efficiency of the means in regard to the fruit yet to come; so that there will always be an element of uncertainty. To this effect, there is the following declaration—‘In regard to an effect which is prone to modification, there is no infallibility in the auxiliary aids, or the fruit or the efficiency, since there is always the likelihood of obstacles and other impediments cropping up’.—If the latter of the two forms (of well-defined cognition, i.e, that ‘this will certainly accomplish such and such a result, if there are no obstacles in the way and there is no lack of auxiliary aids’), be the one that is accepted (by the Opponent),—then this is surely the more reasonable of the two; as it is in this form that all such activity appears as is preceded and prompted by right cognition. It is for this very reason that our Teachers always lay down the qualification of ‘possible efficiency’—in the form ‘such and such a thing is likely to be efficient if there is no impediment’, But even so, there is no certainty in the cognition that ‘such and such a fruit must come out of such and such activity so that there can be no certainty regarding the means being really efficient. Nor would it be true to hold that even under such activity, the activity that really follows is always preceded by the certain cognition of the fruit; because under the philosophy of our opponents, it is impossible to be sure of the absence of impediments and obstacles.

The following argument may be urged by the Opponent—“Though in reality, it is not possible to have a certain cognition regarding the absence of impediments, yet in every activity aroused by valid cognitions, the idea is always present that ‘if there be no impediments, then the attainment of the desired fruit by this action of mine would be certain but there is no such certainty in the case of activity arising from wrong cognitions; if it were, then there would be no difference between the activity arising from right and that arising from wrong cognitions. Even so, however, this certainty cannot proceed from a mere assertion; because in regard to all external things, verbal statements are always found to be unreliable.”

This is true; but if it were proved that no activity of an intelligent person is aroused by an assertion, then all this would be as stated (by the opponent). As a matter of fact, however, some people are actually found to betake themselves to activity on being urged to it by mere assertion (scriptural),—such activity as consists in acting or desisting from action in connection with acts conducive to imperceptible (transcendental) results; the assertion heard in the case would be one giving expression either to great hopes (of welfare resulting from the doing of an act) or fears (of calamity resulting from the act which is declared as one to be avoided); and these persons are, under the circumstances, unable to sit- idle and wait for being assured of the validity of the verbal assertion (Scripture) concerned. And yet, by undertaking such activity these persons do not cease to be ‘intelligent as the activity is still undert aken on the understanding that it is a means to the desired end; specially as a matter of fact, in regard to all imperceptible things, no activity is possible except on the basis of trustworthy assertion (Scriptures); and yet it is necessary that the activity should be undertaken on the basis of the assertion. It is only when persons accept such assertions and scriptures as stand self-condemned, and act according to them, that they would be persons acting without proper understanding. On the other hand, if they accept such assertions as are not self-condemned and act accordingly, how could they cease to be intelligent agents? specially in cases where such trustworthy assertion is the sole means of cognition available.—It would not be correct to say that “the Scripture being composed by a Superior Person, the man concerned becomes actually convinced of the truth of the scriptural assertion, and it is on the basis of this certainty that he takes up the activity—because for the other (Non-Buddhistic) systems, it is impossible to prove the existence of any such Superior Person. And yet, it is not that even intelligent persons do not act on the strength of scriptures.

Exactly so, in the case in question (of our text), there would be intelligent enquirers who would undertake the activity of studying the Teachings, on hearing the assertion (of the writer) regarding the purpose to be served, specially when there is nothing to contradict (and shake the validity of) such assertion. It is only through an impelling cause that man betakes himself to an activity; and in the case in question there is no other impelling cause (than the assertion); for the simple reason that prior to the promulgation of the Teachings, any activity would be absolutely beyond our ken.

It has been argued by the Opponent that—“though it is true that the assertion may be regarded as the valid means of knowing the desire to speak, yet it could never form an auxiliary factor in the activity of the intelligent investigator” (Text, page 2, line 20).—There is nothing in this argument; because as a matter of fact, people are actually found to be accomplishing, by means of scriptures, their purpose in exact accordance with what was meant to be asserted therein. On the same analogy, in the present instance also, it is just possible that the asserted purpose may be fulfilled; and on the basis of this, if the intelligent person were to take up an activity, who could prevent him?—Nor would it be right to say that the man would refrain from the activity merely on account of the doubt that the avowed purpose may not be fulfilled by the asserted means; because activities often arise from assertions even in eases where there is doubt regarding the fulfilment of the avowed purpose. If that were not so, then, even in a case where the activity arises out of a valid cognition, it is just possible that there may be doubts regarding the possibility of the purpose being fulfilled; so that there would be no activity at all. Nor will it be right to hold that the man may desist from activity through fear of some evil resulting from it. Because it is absolutely impossible for any undesirable result to follow from the Scripture.—Nor will it be right to say that there would be fear of the undesirable result in the shape of not obtaining the desired fruit. Because such fear would be present in the case of all activities.

It has been argued (on P. 2, L. 27 of the Text) that—“it may be that the assertion in the Text is meant for the person who is not already cognisant of the purpose and other details related to the Teaching”.—This is exactly what we also are saying. But, even though there is a doubt regarding the final issue, prior to the assertion of the purpose,—this doubt is present in rega-rd to purposes in genera’, as to whether the act in question is going to serve any useful purpose at all or it is absolutely useless. Nor is it right that there should be activity merely on a doubtful chance that some useful purpose might be served; as if it were so, then there would be activity in all cases; also because merely a vague purpose in general is never what is desired.—[All this is true] but what is actually perceived is that the activity does follow from even an uncertain cognition regarding a particular purpose likely to be accomplished through a particular well-defined means calculated to accomplish it. It is only in some eases that people seeking for a purpose take up an act to bring about the means that would lead to the fulfilment of that purpose; because as a general rule, it is the fulfilment of the purpose itself that is desired.—Prior to the assertion of the purpose, there is nothing to bring about any doubtful cognition regarding that particular purpose,—on the basis whereof one could give up one Scripture and take up another.

[Page 5.] Says the Opponent:—“The very desire for a particular purpose is already there from before (the assertion); and it is this desire that serves to arouse the doubtful possibility that that particular purpose may be served (by the activity in question). For instance, when a man’s mind is taken up by the desire for a particular purpose, the working of his mind is somewhat like this—Is this (act that I intend to take up) conducive to the accomplishment of the purpose that I have in view? Or to that of some other purpose? Or is it absolutely useless?—So long as there is no proof in support of, or against, any of these alternatives, all of them are equally logical. This uncertainty is also due to the fact that there are other scriptures (than the one in question) which hold forth other purposes.—From all this it follows that, even before the assertion of purpose, the doubtful possibility regarding the particular purpose is already there; and hence the putting forward of the assertion of the purpose of the work is entirely useless.”

All this is not true. Though it is true that the desire for a particular purpose also becomes a source of uncertain idea of possibility, yet, such desire does not present itself before all men; because, it never presents itself before persons who are illiterate and of dull intelligence. For instance, Emancipation is well known as the highest end of man; and yet there are some illiterate persons who do not know this highest end of man as an end desired by man at all; and naturally these people would never seek for it.—Nor is it right to say that the desire for a particular purpose, presenting itself before a man, becomes the source of an uncertain cognition regarding that particular purpose; because as a matter of fact, all effects are dependent upon the actual presence of their cause. If the said desire for a particular purpose presents itself before some persons,—even so, it does not give rise to any particular uncertain cognition which would lead the persons to have recourse to certain definite means for the accomplishment of the said purpose, and to eschew other means. Because in all cases, uncertain cognitions can reasonably be attributed only to the circumstance that there are no proofs either for or against the cognition in question. But this alone cannot be held to be the cause of the activity of man; as, if it were so, then there would be such activity in all cases; and yet it is not possible for any one to have recourse to activity everywhere hi all cases; hence even persons desiring a particular fruit, not knowing of any definite means of attaining it, would “remain neutral (inactive). Thus then, just as scriptures have been propounded in connection with things entirely beyond the ken of man, for the purpose of arousing the idea of a doubtful possibility regarding a particular purpose, which possibility leads to the agent adopting a definite means for the accomplishment of his purpose,—the assertion of purpose has to be made for the man desiring a particular fruit, in order to enable him to select, and have recourse to, particular means for the accomplishment of that purpose. And by this method what is set forth is the purpose of this Teaching alone, and not of any other. The person too who hears this assertion made has the idea that ‘it is just possible that this particular purpose may be fulfilled for me’,—this idea arising from the assertion of the particular purpose;—and on the basis of this idea he would have recourse to activity; just as activity results from the uncertain idea of possibility brought about by Scriptures in regard to things entirely beyond the ken of man.—It is for these reasons that the Text has set forth the assertion of the Purpose of the Teaching (going to be expounded).

It is absolutely necessary to understand this matter thus; otherwise the act of propounding the Scripture in regard tongs absolutely beyond the ken of man would also be useless; because even prior to the propounding of such Scriptures, the uncertain idea of possibility of the particular results being obtained is already there, in connection with such acts as those of Charity and the like, specially while there are no proofs either for, or against, such an idea. This however is not possible in the case of people who have no idea of such fruits of action as ‘Heaven’ and the like; for the simple reason that the prompting cause, in the shape of the desire for the particular fruit, cannot be present before the mind’s eye of the persons concerned. Even for those persons who have such fruits before their mind’s eye, as the resultant prompting would operate equally towards even such acts as the eating of stones and the like, it would seem to be unable to lead to recourse being had to any definite means towards that end; and it is for this latter purpose that the compilers of Scriptures proceed to compile the Scriptures; and on the same analogy, the authors of philosophical teachings also state the purpose of their works.—Thus there is no force in the objection put forward (by the Opponent).—Nor have we come across any other treatise setting forth the purpose in question,—on the basis whereof there might be an idea of the possibility of the desired purpose being accomplished. So long as some other Treatise were available wherein the means of fulfilling the said purpose is set forth, no intelligent person would care to compose another treatise for the same purpose; for if he did, he would cease to be intelligent. From this it follows that the knowledge derived from other treatises also cannot be regarded as giving rise to the idea of the possibility of any particular purpose in question being accomplished; and hence for the purpose of bringing about the activity of his hearers, the author sets forth the declaration of the purpose (of his work).

Some people have sought to justify the assertion of Purpose on the following grounds; “It might be argued by the opponent that the assertion of the Purpose and other details cannot serve the purpose of securing the activity of the hearers; because all that such a statement does is to bring about the idea of mere possibility (of the purpose being accomplished by the means going to be prescribed in the treatise); and it is not possible for any intelligent person to undertake an activity merely on the ground of the possibility; but (at the same time), no work should be undertaken which has no purpose in view and which is useless; such work, for instance, as the examining of the crow’s teeth or the bablings of the lunatic;—the present Treatise has, as a matter of fact, no purpose to serve; hence no one should either compose it or even listen to it.—The Opponent who urges the above objection on the basis of the unusual proposition set forth, has to be met by proving the invalidity of the Reason put forward by him; and to this end it is necessary, at the very outset, to set forth the Purpose and other details.”

This justification however does not appear to be right and proper. Because it has been already proved that the idea of mere possibility also gives rise to activity; and it is futile too to point out the invalidity (of the Reason put forward by the Opponent). The urging of this invalidity would have served a useful purpose if the assertion in question were to lead to any activity on the part of the Opponent. As a matter of fact, however, even when the said invalidity has been urged, it would not bring about any conclusive knowledge of the truth on the basis of the said premiss (of the Opponent) to the mind of any intelligent person; on the basis of which knowledge he could undertake any activity. Because the assertion remains as unreliable as before; and, under your view, it is not possible for any activity of the intelligent agent to be prompted by the notion of mere possibility (of a purpose being served by the activity). Hence any urging of the said invalidity would be absolutely useless. Nor does any intelligent person, without knowing the body of the Teachings of a Treatise, all at random make up his mind regarding the invalidity of a Reason and proceed to oppose it on that account. Nor, on account of that opposition, does the author of the Treatise, though fully cognisant of the purpose to be served by it, desist from the composing of the Treatise; nor again does his listener (or reader), if he is intelligent in his dealings, necessarily desist from listening to (or reading) the Teachings which have not yet been set forth;;—and it is only if these two contingencies were possible that there would be some point in pointing out the fallacy in the reasoning of the Opponent. It will not be right to say that a man who is not intelligent in his dealings may suddenly grasp the fallacy himself, or be made by others to grasp it,—and hence the fallacy is to be pointed out for the benefit of such a person.

If the prompter of the activity of such a person does not form part of the Treatise, then the indicating of the fallacy for his benefit would be absolutely futile; otherwise, there would be no end to such aimless argumentation. There are many persons who go on making most incoherent assertions; and if the Treatise were to make it its business to expose the impropriety of those assertions, then it would have to say much that is of no use at all. From all this it follows that in the beginning of a treatise there need not be any useless indication of fallacies, or of too much of aimless assertions; and all that is necessary is to describe the fruit expected to follow from the activities of the body of hearers. And why should not this prove useful also for one who does not set up an opposition on the basis of a fallacy, or for one who does not undertake any activity without learning what purpose is to be served by it? This is what has been already explained above.

Thus it stands established that the assertion of the subject-matter and purpose, etc. is for the purpose of bringing about the activity of the body of hearers (pupils), and not for the sake of the author himself; because the Teacher’s own activities are not prompted by his own words. If it were otherwise, his words would be entirely incoherent, like the bablings of a lunatic.—Though it has been declared by the Teacher (Dharmakīrti) in the Nyāyabindu[1] that ‘The man himself learns things in this manner, hence this is used in Inference for One’s Own Sake also’ (which would seem to indicate that the man’s own words may lead to his activity also),—yet this has not been said with reference to any outwardly propounded inference; it refers to the reasoning that is carried on in the man’s own mind; because Inference for one’s own sake is always in the form of thought (and not the verbally expressed form).—Another statement that has been made (in the same work?) to the effect ‘prāyaḥ prākṛtaśakti, etc.’, is also for the purpose of making the teaching available for such other persons as have their minds sullied by hate and jealousy. This point need not be stressed any farther.

[Page 7,] The offering of worshipful obeisance to the Teacher is for the bringing about of that Grace of the Blessed Lord which is the means of attaining all blessings. For instance, by the setting forth of His high qualities, the supreme character of the Blessed Lord is indicated; hearing this description, people become moved by faith and quickly attain their restful peace in the Blessed One. Those also who are moved by intellect (and not by faith) do not perceive anything wrong in the qualities delineated; and being cognisant of the fact that such qualities as Wisdom and the like become improved by practice, they come to conclude that, on the basis of the evidence in support of the existence of the Seer of Supersensuous Things going to be described, it is possible that similarly equipped wise men may appear in the world; and even under this belief, they bring upon themselves the Grace of the Blessed Lord; and through that Grace, they acquire some of those qualities; they turn with respect to examine and imbibe His teachings and Treatises based upon those teachings; in this way, there arise in him all those elements of wisdom which consist of Śrutamayī (Memory) and the rest; whereby they attain the Highest Good. Thus the Grace of Great Beings is the principal cause of the attainment of all blessings. It is for this reason that when treatises are composed on the basis of the teachings of well-known Teachers, the authors of those treatises, at the very outset of their work, almost always offer worshipful obeisance to their own Teacher; specially as such obeisance forms, to a certain extent, a factor in the activity of the writer. It is to this effect that we have the declaration that—‘when one desires to compose a treatise he begins with the offering of obeisance to his own Teacher, with a view to make known his greatness to the world’,—Thus it becomes established that the offering of worshipful obeisance to the Teacher is not absolutely useless.

It is this worshipful obeisance to the Teacher that has been indicated by the words of the Text ending with the expression ‘tam praṇamya’, ‘after bowing to That Person’.

The expression ‘the Compendium of True Doctrines is being composed’ sets forth the subject-matter and Purpose of the Treatise. The subject-matter of the Treatise consists of the True Doctrines in the shape of the absence of the operation of Primordial Matter and other agencies, as qualifying the doctrine of the ‘Intervolved Chain of Causation’. It has been already shown that these form the connotation of the term ‘True Doctrine any other doctrines cannot be ‘True Doctrines’,

Objection—“The principle is that it is only a Sentence, and nothing else, that has a meaning (subject spoken of); and the whole Treatise cannot be a Sentence; it is only a Group of Sentences; how then is it possible for it to have a subject?”

It is not so; though it is true that the Treatise is a Group of Sentences, yet, all these sentences stand connected with each other. If they were not so, the whole would be an incoherent jumble, like the bablings of the insane. Thus then, inasmuch as the Treatise consists of mutually connected Sentences it is as good a ‘Sentence’ as any single Sentence. Specially as it is not only of words that a Sentence consists; it consists of sentences also. Hence the Treatise being of the form of a long sentence, it has a meaning (subject-matter) of its own, Hence there is no force in the objection urged.

[Page 8.] As regards the Purpose, that has been indicated by the term ‘Saṃgraha’, ‘Compilation’,—when people are eager to undertake the study of a Treatise, the purpose to be accomplished thereby has to be indicated to be one that is contained in the Treatise itself, not in anything else; if it were not so, then the statement would be entirely irrelevant. It has been declared also that ‘when an exponent states the purpose in the very beginning of the Treatise, he does so,—not because such is his habit, but—because he desires to prompt another person to take up the study of the teachings of the Treatise’, How too does the other person become prompted to take up the study of the Treatise by the assertion of the Purpose? He becomes so prompted only when the Purpose indicated is one contained in the Treatise itself,—not in anything else. No intelligent person would undertake one activity when prompted by the mention of the purpose of another activity, ‘Treatise’ is the name given to such statements as set forth a particular subject,—and not one which conveys some sort of meaning. Mere word is never devoid of the power of expressing some sort of meaning; hence it is not necessary to state the purpose underlying the mere meaning of words.—[The next sentence is too corrupt and broken up to be understood.]

The said Purpose of the Treatise is of three kinds—(1) in the form of Action, (2) in the form of the fruit of the Action, and (3) in the form of the effect of the fruit of the Actions. For instance, when a Treatise is going to be composed for the purpose of expounding things to other persons, the contemplated Treatise may have the character either of the Instrument or of the Active Agent; and as the Instrument and the Active Agent would be the means of bringing about the result, there can be no purpose other than the one already stated (the teaching of others); because every means is dependent upon an action or operation; and as it is impossible for any of the said three kinds of Purpose to appear without the Action, it is only right and proper that it should be regarded as the Purpose; but there is always a difference due to the fact of the Purpose being served by it directly or indirectly.—As for the Purpose in the form of the Fruit of Action, it is the main purpose; as it is for the obtaining of that that the Action is undertaken. The Action of expressing its own meaning (subject) is one that is common to all sentences (statements); and this is too well known to need to be put forward as the Purpose (of the statement); specially as the Treatise also forms no exception to this universal fact.

It may be argued that—“it would be necessary to put it forward, for the purpose of precluding the doubt that what is meant to be express ed is not expressed by the sentence (Treatise) at all”.—But that is not so; as the said doubt is precluded by the mere assertion of the meaning (or subject).—Nor should the indication of the Purpose be needed for the pointing out of the particular phase of the subject-matter; because even this particular phase has been pointed out by the direct assertion of that phase. Hence what has to be indicated is that specific action which is peculiar to the case in question. And in the case of the present Treatise, this specific action is present in the form of the compiling of the true doctrines; as what this Treatise does is to compile, bring together to the mind, the True Doctrines scattered here and there (in the Scriptures). Hence it is that tins same peculiar action has been indicated (by the Author) by means of the term ‘Saṃgraha’ (Compilation, Compendium).—Of this action of compiling the True Doctrines, the fruit would consist of the easy comprehension of the True Doctrines by generations of learners; this also has been made clear by the term ‘Saṃgraha’ (Compilation, Compendium). When the True Doctrine is briefly set forth in one place, the learner finds it easy of comprehension, which becomes difficult when the doctrine lies scattered; it is with a view to this that the Author has used the term ‘Saṃgraha’ in the sense of the easily comprehensible Compendium, and thereby shown that the work is being undertaken for the purpose of bringing about the easy comprehension of the True Doctrines.—Mere comprehension of the True Doctrines is not the only purpose of composing the Treatise; as such an attempt would be useless, inasmuch as the exposition of the True Doctrine has already been done by older Teachers. Hence in the present Treatise there is the further motive of helping others; as the composing of Treatises is always for the benefit of other people. Even though the True Doctrines have been duly set forth by the old Teachers, yet, the dull-witted student is unable to grasp them with ease on account of their being scattered; hence it is for the benefit of such a student, in order to enable him to comprehend the doctrines with ease, that this Compendium of True Doctrines is taken up; so that it can never be useless;—it is with this in view that the composing of the Treatise is taken up. That is why the Text has used the term ‘tattvasaṃgrahaḥ’ (Compilation or Compendium of the True Doctrines).—If such were not the sense, then it should have used the phrase ‘Kriyate tattvaniścayaḥ’,

the Determining of the Doctrines is being done’,—In the way that the writer has put it, it has been clearly indicated what he intends to do. Hence it is the easy comprehension of True Doctrines which is the fruit of the action of Compiling the True Doctrines.—Of this easy comprehension of the True Doctrines also, there is the further purpose, in the form of the attainment of Prosperity and the Highest Good. This however is well known, hence it has not been mentioned. As it is well known among all Āstikas (Believers) that the knowledge of Truth brings about Prosperity and the Highest Good.

Or, the phrase ‘jagaddhitavidhitsayā’, ‘with a view to bringing about the welfare of the world’ (verse 5), maybe construed with what follows [i.e. the phrase ‘Kriyate tattvasaṃgrahaḥ’, ‘the Compendium of True Doctrines is being composed’] (verse 6); so that this welfare of the world also becomes indicated as the purpose of the Treatise; and under this construction, the meaning of the sentence comes to be that ‘The Compendium of True Doctrines is being composed for the purpose of bringing about the welfare of the world’,—“How can the desire to bring about the welfare of the world be the motive cause of the act of compiling the True Doctrines?”—It would be so only if the bringing about of the welfare of the world were the actual fruit of the act of compiling the True Doctrines. For instance, when it is said that ‘he is fetching water for the purpose of drinking’, it is understood that the drinking of the water is the fruit of the act of fetching water; similarly in the case in question also. Thus then the sense comes to be that ‘the Compendium of True Doctrines is being composed for the purpose of bringing about the welfare of the world’,—This Purpose herein indicated is one for which the means of accomplishment is entirely suitable. For instance, the ‘attainment of Prosperity and the Highest Good’ is said to be the ‘welfare of the world’; and what brings about this is the absence of wrong notions; as all trouble is due to wrong notions (i.e. Ignorance); and contrary to ‘Trouble’ is the ‘welfare of the world’; hence the means of accomplishing this latter comes to be one that is contrary to the source of Trouble. Absence of wrong notions (or Ignorance) consists in the true knowledge of the real connection between the Act and its Fruit, and also of the Doctrines of ‘Pudgala’—i.e. ‘Jīva’, ‘Living Entities’ (see Text, pp. 125 et. seq.),—of ‘Dharma’ and of ‘No-Soul’ (Naīrātmya). All this Right Cognition (or Cessation of Ignorance) proceeds from the present Treatise as elucidating the true doctrine of the ‘Intervolved Wheel of Causation’, by the process of listening to it, pondering over it and contemplating it; and hence it is understood that the ‘welfare of the world’ results from the act of compiling the True Doctrines. When Prosperity and the Highest Good have been attained, all that is desired by man is accomplished, and all his longings cease; and beyond this there is no other Purpose to be sought after. This represents the end of all Purpose and Motive.

Apart from the Subject-matter and the Purpose it is not necessary to deal with the factor of ‘Connection’ between these (which has been regarded as the third factor in the composition of all treatises); as no useful purpose would be served by it. Because if such a Connection were to be set forth, it could only be shown to consist of the relation of Cause and Effect, and none other in the shape of ‘Tracing of the Tutorial Tradition’ and the like; as the activity of persons prompted by such traditions would be endless. And this relation of cause and effect has been indicated by the statement of the Purpose itself. For instance, when it has been shown that ‘this is the purpose of so and so’, it also becomes shown that ‘so and so is the cause of this’; if one thing does not accomplish another, the latter cannot be the purpose of the former; if it did, then it would lead to absurdities. Hence, inasmuch as the Connection is already got at by implication, it is not necessary to state it separately from the Subject and the Purpose; one thing deserves to be stated separately from another only when one is not understood (implied) by the statement of the other; for instance, as between the Subject and the Purpose, the mention of one does not imply the other. Nor is it possible that even on the mention of the Purpose, the said Connection should not be implied. Hence it is necessary to mention the Subject and the Purpose only, [Page 10.] That such is the Subject and such the Purpose has not been extracted as the meaning of any sentences in the Text; it has been explained by taking certain parts of the sentences and deducing from them the said idea. What the Sentence as a whole means is only that the said Compendium is being composed. Thus, inasmuch as the indication of the Subject and such other factors is got at from the Sentence only by way of implication, and that also as secondary factors,—there is nothing incongruous in their being thus expressed by the Sentence; there is an incongruity only when several factors are regarded as entering into the primary meaning of the Sentence, and not when a distinction is made between what is primary and secondary among the factors expressed.

Objection:—“When the Blessed Lord is the abode of illimitable good qualities, why should His eulogy be proclaimed only on the basis of the teaching of the ‘Intervolved Wheel of Causation’?”

There is no force in this objection; as such an objection could be urged against all eulogies. It can never be possible to declare the worshipful obeisance to any Person by indicating all his illimitable qualities; it has to be done through the indicating of only a part of those qualities; hence, in the present case, the obeisance could be stated either through the mention of the Teaching of ‘the Intervolved Wheel of Causation’, or in any other way; it would make no difference.

Even so, however, we proceed to explain the peculiar propriety in the obeisance as herein stated:—As a matter of fact, the Blessed Lord is regarded as the World-Teacher, because, by reason of the presence in Him of the qualities stated, he brings about Prosperity and the Highest Good; hence that same Teacher has to be mentioned as the goal to be reached by persons seeking for Prosperity and the Highest Good and finding their refuge in the Blessed Lord; and it is by the teaching of the doctrine of ‘the Intervolved Wheel of Causation’, that the Blessed Lord leads people to Prosperity and the Highest Good, For instance, from the teaching of the true doctrine of the ‘Intervolved Wheel of Causation’ follows the due comprehension of the sense of that doctrine; thence follows the right knowledge of such things as the Act, its Fruits, their Connection and so forth,—which knowledge is the means of attaining excellent states of existence,—and also the right understanding of the ‘Pudgala’, ‘Dharma’, the doctrine of ‘No-Soul’,—which understanding becomes the means of the attainment of the Highest Good, and comes about through the process of hearing the Teaching, pondering over it and meditating on. it;—on the appearance of this understanding, Ignorance, which is the cause of the cycle of Birth and Rebirth, ceases; on the cessation of Ignorance, the root of this Ignorance also disappears,—this root consisting of all Afflictions and all that conceals thengs to be known;—and on the disappearance of this obscuration, the Final Aim is attained. Thus it is that the doctrine of ‘the Intervolved Wheel of Causation’ forms the most important factor in the excellent teaching of the Blessed Lord; it is for this reason that the eulogy of the Lord has been declared through His being the promulgator of the Right Doctrine of the ‘Intervolved Wheel of Causation’,

This doctrine of the ‘Intervolved Wheel of Causation’ has been regarded by other philosophers as opposed to reason and also as having its contents such as are contrary to all valid Means of Cognition.—Hence it becomes necessary to refute these criticisms and thereby to show that what the Blessed Lord has taught is absolutely right; to this end it is necessary to refute the content of the Philosophies going to be described;—and for this purpose there is a statement of the qualifications and details of the doctrine of the ‘Intervolved Wheel of Causation—Such is the meaning of the six Introductory Verses as a whole.

The meaning of the component parts of the Introduction is now going to be explained:—Throughout the Introduction, beginning with the words ‘Prakṛtīśobhayātmādivyāpārarahitam, etc.’, the construction is ‘He Who propounded the doctrine of the Intervolved Wheel of Causation, which is rahita, free, from all such notions as those of Prakṛti and the rest.’,—The term ‘prakṛti’ stands for the Primordial Matter, which has been postulated by the Sāṃkhyas, as constituted of Sattva (Harmony), Rajas (Energy) and Tamas (Inertia);—‘Īśa’ stands for God.—‘Ubhaya’ stands for both of these (Matter and God);—‘Ātmā’, ‘Soul’, stands for the One Personality who creates and destroys the world, as also for the Personalities other than this who are born and reborn;—‘Ādi’ is meant to include such supposed entities as Time and the rest;—the ‘vyāpāra’, ‘functioning’, of these, stands for the causal efficiency of these.—The doctrine is ‘free’ from this; that is, it admits of no functioning of the said supposed entities. To this effect, there is the following assertion of the Blessed Lord—‘This sprout has not been produced by itself, nor by both, nor by God, nor has it evolved out of Primordial Matter, nor has it been dependent upon several causes, nor has it come about without cause’,—This points to the section on examination of the doctrines of ‘Primordial Matter’, of ‘God’, of ‘Both Matter and God’, of ‘No Cause’, of ‘Sound’, of ‘Spirit’ and of ‘Soul’ (under Chapters 1 to 7, below).

Question—“The above-described Intervolved Wheel of Causation that the Lord taught,—is it something permanent, lasting?”

Answer—Not so; it is mobile, impermanent, i.e, momentary; what is meant is that anything not momentary cannot he ‘mobile’, On this point there is the following declaration by the Blessed Lord—‘All embellishments are momentary; how can there be any action by things that are impermanent? Mere Being is said to be their sole function as well as Cause’,—This points to the section on the Permanence of Things (Chapter 8, below).

Objection;—“If this is so, then the Intervolved Wheel of Causation cannot be regarded as the basis of any adjustments regarding Act, its Fruit and the Connection between them, and such otherngs; as ex hypothesi, the said Wheel is mobile (momentary).”

The answer is supplied by the second line of the first verse of the Text—‘Kama, etc.’, ‘It is the basis of such notions as Actions, etc.’—What the Text means is that this shall be explained later on. In this connection ‘Actions’ are good and bad, their ‘fruits’ are desirable and undesirable, and the ‘connection’ between them is that of the product and the produced (cause and effect); the ‘notion’ of this is its adjustment, usage, arrangement.—The term ‘ādi’ (‘and the rest’) in the Text includes all such notions as those of Remembrance, Recognition, Uncertainty, Certainty, the Following up of a self-appointed Task, Eagerness for perceptible things, Cessation of such eagerness, the Relation of Cause and Effect, the Cogniser of these, the Means of Cognition, Bondage, Emancipation and so forth. The said ‘Wheel’ is the ‘basis’ of all these;—such is the analysis of the compound.—To this effect there is the following declaration of the Blessed Lord—“O Bhikṣus the Action is there, the Fruit is there, but the Actor is not found,—apart from the ‘indication’ (Saṅketa) of the ‘Principles and Practices’ (Dharmas),—who renounces these ‘Sensorial Phases’ (Skandhas) and takes up others. So that it is due to the indication of the ‘Principles and Practices’ that a certain thing comes about when another thing iṣ there (as its cause),”—This points to the Chapter on Actions, their Fruits and the Connection between these (Chapter 9, below).—This Intervolved Wheel of Causation should be understood as appertaining to the Sensorial Phases (Skandhas), ‘Phenomena’ (Dhātus) and the ‘Receptacles’ (Āyatanas); as it is these that are produced by the Intervolved Wheel of Causation.—(1)

[Text 2.] Question—“There are many such things as Substance, Quality, Movement and the rest; why does not the Wheel of Causation apply to these?”

The answer is given by lines 1 and 2 of Text 2, beginning with the term ‘guṇa, etc.’, ‘It is devoid of all such concepts as Quality, etc.’—The term ‘guṇa—... samavāya’ is a Copulative Compound;—the term ‘jāti’, ‘universal’, includes both kinds of Universal, the Higher (Wider) as well as the Lower (Narrower);—the term ‘ādi’, ‘and so on’, includes the (1) ‘Specific Individuality’ subsisting in ultimate substances (as postulated by the Vaiśeṣika), (2) also those characteristics which some people describe as distinct from the things possessing those characteristics,—e.g. the character of ‘Being’ as subsisting in all the Six Categories (of the Vaiśeṣika), the character of being apprehended by all such Means of Cognition as bring about the apprehension of existing things, and so forth. The compound between the term ‘guṇa.,, samavāya’ and ‘upādhi’ is Karmadhāraya, one between the qualification and the qualified [the ‘upādhi’ being the qualified, and the preceding term the qualification];—of these upādhis, concepts, [in the shape of Substance, etc.] the wheel is devoid; i.e. it is free from all this. In regard to this, the Blessed Lord has declared as follows:—“O Brāhmaṇa! All is All; i.e. the five ‘Skandhas’ (Five Sensory Phases), the twelve ‘Āyatanas’ [Twelve Sensory Receptacles—consisting of Mind, five Sense-organs and the external objects apprehended by these six], and the eighteen ‘Dhātus’ [Elements or Ingredients, consisting of the aforesaid twelve, along with the six elements of Visual Sensation, Auditory Sensation, Olfactory Sensation, Gestatory Sensation, Tactile Sensation, Mental Sensation].”—This points to the Section on the Examination of the Six Categories (Chapters 10 to 15).

Question—“In the absence of the said concepts, how does the Intervolved Wheel of Causation become the object of Verbal Expression and Conception? And when it does not become the object of these two, it cannot be spoken of; as a matter of fact Verbal Expression and Conception cannot operate apart from the concepts in question. How then is it that the Blessed Lord has propounded it?”

[Page 12.] The answer to this is contained in the second line of Text 2, beginning with the word ‘āropita’, ‘It is amenable, etc.’.—The compound ‘āropita, etc.’ is to be explained as follows—‘āropita ākāra’ is the imposed or assumed form; and this ‘assumed form’ is the character of the Wheel of Causation, as forming the object of Verbal Expression and Conception; i.e. that which forms the subject of the Wheel of Causation is that which is amenable to Verbal Expression and Conception in an assumed (superimposed) form.—The term ‘pratyaya’ (Cognition) here should be understood in the sense of the particular form of Cognition which appears in the form of a verbal concept,—as is indicated by the proximity of the term ‘verbal expression’, specially as these two are invariably associated in regard to any single object. Thus the sense of the Text comes to this—Though the said concepts are not there (in the Wheel), yet through the fact that things are always perceived as distinguished from each other, the Conception is understood to appertain to something external; so that the amenability to Verbal Expression, in the form of invariable association, is present (in the said Wheel). In reality, however, it is not amenable to Verbal Expression, because all sorts of Conceptual Content have disappeared from it. But, just as the denotation of words is admitted in common parlance as something nice, though not justified by reason,—in the same manner, with a view to introducing the True Teaching, the Blessed Teacher, closing his eyes, in the manner of the elephant, to the true character of things, sought to express the true idea, through a sort of illusion; and this simply because there is no other way of doing it.—Even though the form of the denotation of words is really superimposed upon it (as an illusion), yet, by reason of invariable association, it becomes indirectly related to the thing to be spoken of, and thus becomes the means of expressing it; and the thing, thus expressed, does become manifested, by virtue of the powers of the Teachers; hence there is no chance of being deceived (regarding the true nature of the thing spoken of).—This is what has been thus declared by Tāyin—“By whichsoever name is a Phenomenon (or Entity or Manifestation) spoken of,—this Phenomenon does not really exist there; such is the phenomenal character of all phenomena—(2)

[Text 3.] Question—“Is this (Wheel of Causation) a mere verbal jugglery indulged in on account of the paucity of valid reasons in support,—just as has been done by other philosophers assuming (without sufficient proof) their Categories? Or is there any valid reason for accepting it?” The answer that there is such valid reason is given in Text 3.—‘Spaṣṭa, etc.’, ‘It is definitely cognised, etc.’—The compound ‘Spaṣṭalakṣaṇa’ is Karmadhāraya, meaning ‘whose definition, character, is clear, i,e. well-defined’; the ‘clearness’ of the ‘definition’ is due to the fact that it is free from the three defects of being impossible (inapplicable), or too narrow or too wide; the definition of the Means of Right Cognition provided by other philosophers, on the other hand, is not ‘clear’; the Text therefore has characterised its own Means of Cognition as ‘clear’, Endowed with this character of being ‘dearly defined’ are the ‘two Means of Cognition’,—Sense-perception and Inference;—by these is the Wheel of Causationdefinitely cognised’; this will be explained under all the sections (as occasion presents itself). This also is approved by the Blessed Lord, who has declared thus—‘O Bhikṣus, my word should be accepted after due investigation, not merely through regard for me; just as gold is accepted as real only after heating, cutting and rubbing on the touch-stone’,—As regards Sense-perceptions, its definition is that it should be free from ‘mistake’ and ‘conceptual content’ or ‘determination’; this is exactly as declared by the Blessed Lord—who has said that ‘one who has the visual cognition cognises the Blue all right, but not as blue’; the phrase ‘cognises the Blue’ implies that the cognition does not apprehend an object other than its own, which indicates the fact of its being not mistaken (or wrong); and the other phrase ‘not as blue’ denies the presence in the Cognition of any connection with the definite name ‘blue which indicates the fact of its being non-conceptual or not-determinate (free from all association with words). As regards Inference, the definition of that also has been set forth by pointing out the nature of the Liṅga (Inferential Indicative, ‘Middle Term’, Probans); which has been thus set forth—‘The Liṅga, Probans, is that which is (a) never non-concomitant with the Probandum, and (b) which is definitely known,—only then does it become the means, of inferential cognition; this Probans, O Bhikṣus, is sometimes Constructive, in all cases it is Destructive Here the invariable concomitance of the Probans with the Probandum is clearly asserted. This same condition has been stated in the dictum that ‘The Probans is the basis of Inference, when it is characterised by invariable concomitance’; in this statement the Probandum has not been mentioned, because it is clearly indicated by the mention of the ‘invariable concomitance of the Probans’ (which can only be with the Probandum).—This Probans is divided into three kinds, distinguished according to such peculiarities as those of (1) nature, (2) effect and (3) nonapprehension; the Probans called ‘nature’ has been indicated by the term ‘Constructive’ in the phrase ‘O Bhikṣus, that which is Constructive’;—as for the Probans styled ‘Effect’ it has been illustrated in the following statement—‘The presence of Fire is known through Smoke, the presence of Water is known through the line of White Cranes flying above; and the Race (Gotra) of the Wise Bodhisattva is known through certain signs—Lastly, the Probans styled as ‘a particular form of non-apprehension’ has also been explained in course of the denial of mere Non-apprehension by itself being a Means of Cognition; this has been declared in the following words—‘O Bhikṣus, a Living Being cannot validly cognise a Living Being, or find a means of knowing it; if a Living Being validly cognises a Living Being, he becomes destroyed; I alone would cognise a Living Being, or someone else if he were like me’, Herein we have the denial of the validity of mere Non-apprehension in general in regard to things beyond the ken (of ordinary men); the sentence ‘I alone, etc.’ clearly shows the validity of particular cases of Non-apprehension.—All this points to those sections of the Text that deal with Sense-perception (Chap. 17), Inference (Chap. 18) and other Means of Cognition (Chap. 20).

Question—“This Intervolved Wheel of Causation,—is it concomitant with any such generic character as ‘being an entity’, as declared by the Syādvādins (Jainas)? Or is it entirely unmixed (pure) in its essence?—‘What if it is the one or the other?’—If it is concomitant with anything, then there would be a cross-division between the definition of the Wheel and that of Sense-perception and the rest;—there would also be the incongruity that the cause would cease to bring about the effect, as there would he no difference between the Cause and Effect; and in that case the Wheel would not be ‘definitely cognised by means of the two Means of Cognition’ (as stated in Text 3). Nor again, is it right to posit any such entity as the Intervolved Wheel of Causation; because even if it is entirely unmixed in its essence,—inasmuch as there would be no particular diversity among the auxiliary causes, there would be no possibility of its having any efficient activity (which is the characteristic of every entity); exactly as there is none in things admittedly nonproductive.”

In answer to this objection, we have the second line of Text 3—‘Aṇīyasāpi, etc.’—‘It is not mixed up with the nature of anything else even in the slightest degree What is meant is as follows—It is the latter of the two alternatives that we accept; and yet there is no room for the objections that have been urged against it; this we shall explain later on. The compound ‘miśrībhūtāparatmakaḥ’ (in the Text) is to he analysed as—‘wherein the nature of anything else is not mixed up’; that is, wherein there is not the slightest trace of the character of anything else,—for instance, that of the Cause in the Effect and so forth.—‘In the slightest degree’,—even in the most subtle form,—and not only in the form of many such extensive entities as ‘Being’, ‘Knowable’ and so forth,—this is what is implied by the particle ‘api’, ‘even’, What is meant is that, if the form of a single entity were present in it, the entire world would enter into its essence. This the Author will explain later on. This is what has been thus declared by the Blessed Lord—‘How can the Sprout be eternal?—Since the Sprout is one thing and the Seed an entirely different thing. Verily the Sprout is not exactly the same thing as the Seed. So also is the Sprout unlike the Seed. Hence one thing (Seed) does not pass on into the essence of another thing’,—This points to the Chapter dealing with the Examination of Syādvāda (Chap. 20).—(3)

Question—“The Skandha (Sensorial Phase) and the rest, are pure and unmixed in nature; even so, do they always remain unchanged in their character?—as has been declared by some persons who hold all things to be real entities, passing from one phase into another?”

The answer that it is not so is provided by the word ‘Asaṅkrāntim’, ‘it admits of no translocation’ (Text 4). What is meant is that, if there were translocation (passing from one phase into another), then, inasmuch as everything (every cause) would always exist in its entirety, there would be no Effect or Product, and hence no possibility of any ‘Intervolved Wheel of Causation—The word ‘Asaṅkrānti’ (inthe Text) signifies ‘that wherein there is no translocation’—i.e. passing from phase to phase,—‘of the Skandha and other factors—[Page 14].—This has been declared by the Blessed Lord in the following words—‘When the Eye is produced, it does not come out from anything else;—when it is destroyed, it does not return to anything else; what happens, O Bhikṣus, is that the Eye, not having been in existence, comes into existence,—and having been in existence, it ceases to exist—This points to the Chapter dealing with the Examination of the Three Points of Time (Chapter 21 of the Text).

Question—“Then does it exist only at the time that it is actually seen? As declared by the Cārvāka (Materialist)—‘Whence can there be any coming again for that which has been burnt and ceased to exist?’”

The answer is supplied by the Text in the word ‘anādyantam’, ‘it is without beginning, without end’; the compound being analysed as ‘that whose beginning and end are not’, This also has been pointed out by the Blessed Lord—‘O Bhikṣus, the cycle of Births has no end and no beginning, etc. etc.’;—in this quotation the term ‘avara’ stands for end, and ‘agra’ for beginning; hence the negation of these two is what is spoken of as ‘anavarāgra’, This has been so asserted with reference to people who have not taken to the Noble Path; for those who have taken to the Noble Path, the Cycle of Birth has actually ceased. It is in view of this that it has been declared that—‘For the childish person who knows not the true Dharma, the path of Birth and Rebirth is a long one—This points to the Section dealing with the Examination of the Philosophy of the Lokāyatas (Chapter 22 of the Text).

Question—“Is this Intervolved Wheel of Causation of the nature of an external object? Or has it a purely subjective existence?”

AnswerIt is like the reflected image and other things (Text). This shows that it has a purely subjective existence. The sense therefore is that this has a purely subjective existence,—just like the Reflected Image, Whirling Fire-Circle, the Fanciful City in the Sky and such other fanciful things. This has been thus declared by the Blessed Lord—‘The external thing, as fancied by childish people, does not exist, it is only the Mind which, tossed about by Impressions, bears the semblance of the object and thus becomes operative—This points to the Chapter on the Examination of the External World (Chap, 23, Text).

Having thus shown that the īntervolved Wheel of Causation is entirely free from the webs of the fanciful assumption of things that have no existence, the Author sums up the whole idea in the words ‘Sarvaprapañca, etc.’, ‘It is absolutely free from the whole lot of fantasies’; that is, it is free from the whole lot of fantastic notions, like the idea of Primordial Matter being the cause of things and so forth.

Question—“Has this doctrine been realised by other teachers also,—like Viṣṇu, Śiva, Hiraṇyagarbha and the rest?”

Answer—Not so; it has not been apprehended by others; as a matter of fact, all other philosophical systems lay stress upon wrong notions of the Soul, and it is the Blessed Lord alone on whom this enlightenment has dawned. This is what the Text means. This the Author will explain in the course of all the sections of his work.—(4)

Question—“Was this doctrine of the Intervolved Wheel of Causation apprehended by the Blessed Lord by Himself and then promulgated? Or did he promulgate it on the basis of the Veda which is regarded by others as revealed (not the work of any Person)?—As declared by the followers of Jaimini—‘Thus as regards things that are beyond the reach of the Senses, there is no Person who has seen them directly; hence that man alone knows them rightly who knows them through the Eternal Word

The answer to this is—Not so; ‘Svatantraśrutiniḥsaṅgaḥ’—‘independently of any self-sufficient revelation’ (Text 5). The term ‘Self-sufficient revelation’ stands for the Veda whose authority is said to be self-sufficient,—that is the Eternal Word;—‘niḥsaṅga’ is one who is not dependent upon, not depending upon it, i.e. seeing things directly by himself;—the Lord Himself promulgated the Doctrine of the Intervolved Wheel of Causation. As a matter of fact, there is no sentence or assertion that has not emanated from a Person; as has been declared by the Blessed Lord—‘These Great Sages, the Ānandapaurāṇas (Denizens of the Blissful Regions?) are the authors of the Vedas and the promulgators of the Mantras What the Author means is that he is going to explain this later on.—This points to the Section dealing with the Examination of the Self-sufficient Authority of the Revelations (contained under Chapter 19 of the Text).

Question—“For the Blessed Lord who had attained all his own ends, what was the need for promulgating this Doctrine of the Intervolved Wheel of Carnation?”

Answer—With a view to bringing about the Welfare of the World (Text 5). ‘Welfare of the World’ is what is good for the world; this ‘Good’ consists in the destruction of all Afflictions and Illusion, brought about by the due comprehension of the Right Doctrine of the Intervolved, Wheel of Causation;—the desire to bring this about is what is meant by the ‘view to bring about’;—this is the cause that led to the promulgation of the said Doctrine.

Question—“How is it known that the Lord had the desire to bring about the welfare of the world?”

Answer—‘Supreme mercy having entered into His very soul through long innumerable cycles’ (Text 5). The compound is to be analysed thus:—‘He whose supreme mercy’—‘Mahādayā’—entered into His very essence,—(sātmībhūtā)—through long (analpaiḥ) innumerable cycles (kalpāsaṅkhyayaiḥ). This ‘supreme mercy’ of the Blessed Lord is inferred from the fact that He did not renounce the work of doing good to other people, even though He had attained all His own ends.—(5)

[Page 15.] Question—“What did this Person do—who had this supreme mercy entered into His very soul?”

Answer—‘Who propounded, etc.’.—The term ‘who’, though a common pronoun, stands here for the Blessed Lord Buddha; as no one else possesses the qualities described.—The Doctrine of the Intervolved Wheel of Causat ion;—this term ‘pratītyasamutpāda’ stands for the doctrine that the ‘utpāda’, ‘causation’ or ‘origination’ of the Skandhas (Sensory Aggregates or Phases) and otherngs takes place—‘pratītya’, i.e. on the basis of, Causal Ideations; that is to say, who declared the Sensory Aggregates and other things to have been produced on the strength of Causal Ideations. Though the term ‘Samutpāda’ (Origination or Causation) seems to have a negative (or exclusive) connotation, yet what is really meant to be expressed by the term is the positive entity produced (by the Ideation), but viewed as excluding other aspects of it.—Or, the term ‘Samutpāda’ may be construed as ‘Samutpadyate’, that which is produced, the Product,—the term being formed with the ‘Ghañ’ affix in the active sense, according to Pāṇini’s SūtraKṛtyalyuṭo bahulam (3.3.113)—and this term ‘Samutpāda’ thus explained is compounded with the term ‘pratītya’, according to Pāṇini’s SūtraSup-supā (2.1.4)’, or according to the rule governing such compounds as ‘Mayuravyaṃsaka (2.1.72)’,—Or the term ‘Samutpāda’ may be taken by itself, not compounded with any other term.—What is expressed by all this is the fact that the Blessed Lord has the fully equipped power of bringing about the welfare of others. So that what the phrase ‘who propounded the said Doctrine of the Wheel of Causation’ means is that the Lord has acted towards the bringing about of the welfare of others. And what constitutes his action towards bringing about the welfare of others is this same teaching to others regarding the right path towards Heaven and Final Emancipation.—This has been thus declared—‘The act has to be done by yourselves, the Blessed Ones are only expounders’.

The equipment of this capacity to bring about the welfare of others consists of the capacity for the direct vision of Dharma and Supreme Mercy. Even a merciful Person, if he is devoid of the knowledge of Truth, would be unable to teach the Truth; and, on the other hand, even though one may possess the true knowledge of things, if he happen to be devoid of mercy, he would either give no teaching at all, or, even when teaching, might give such teaching as is harmful. Hence in the Blessed Lord, are present both these—Knowledge and Mercy—as equipment of His capacity to bring about the welfare of others. That He is possessed of the capacity for direct vision of Dharma has been indicated by the term (in the Text) ‘independently of any self-sufficient revelation’; and the presence of Supreme Mercy has been indicated by the term ‘Supreme mercy having entered into His very Soul’,

Question—“As a matter of fact, this Right Doctrine of the Intervolved Wheel of Causation has been taught also by other Persons—such as Bodhisattvas and Saints; what peculiar excellence then does this constitute in the Blessed Lord Himself?”

Answer—He is the Greatest of Expounders. Though it is true that the said Saints and others also have expounded the Doctrine of Intervolved Wheel of Causation, yet the Supreme Lord is the ‘Greatest’ among them. The other persons could have no capacity to expound the said doctrine, except by reason of the fact that the essence of Dharma had been taught by the Supreme Lord.—Or the Supreme Lord—and none others—can be the ‘Greatest’, because He represents the highest stage in the ascending scale of the presence of Excellences and the absence of Defects; the others not being so.—By thus pointing out the fact of the Blessed Lord being superior to the Saints and others, it is made clear that the Lord was equipped with a specially efficient intellect,—this efficiency consisting in the destruction of all Dispositions, Afflictions and Ignorance regarding all cognisable things. If it were not for this, in what way would He be superior to other Saints? It is with a view to this that the Author has added the epithet ‘That Omniscient Person’ (Text 6). This points to the Chapter dealing with the proof for the existence of the Omniscient Being (under Chapter 2 on ‘God’ and Chap. 24).

Question—“What is it that is going to be done after bowing to the Omniscient Person?”

Answer—TheCompendium of True Doctrinesis going to be composed, The ‘True Doctrine’ meant are all those that have been mentioned as the accompaniments of the Doctrine of the Intervolved Wheel of Causation; as these alone are not wrong;—the bringing together of these doctrines, which lie scattered, within a small compass is what is spoken of as ‘Saṃgraha’, ‘Compendium’; and as this brief resume is dealt with in a book, the book itself is spoken of as the Compendium; just as the poem dealing with the Abduction of Sita is called the Sītā-haraṇa (Sita’s Abduction).—Or, the term ‘Tattvasaṃgraha’ may be explained as the book itself, in the sense that ‘it deals, rightly and completely, with the True Doctrines’,—Is being composed;—the Present Tense has been used in reference to the time taken by the act of composing, from beginning to its completion.—(6)

End of Introductory Section.

Footnotes and references:

1.

These quotations are not traceable in the well-known Nyāyabindu of Dharmakīrti. Bib. Ind, Edition. The second quotation therefore cannot be understood, nor Its bearing upon the present discussion.

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