Śāntarakṣita on Two Kinds of Arguments for Self-Awareness

[Full title: Śāntarakṣita on Two Kinds of Arguments for Self-Awareness: sahopalambhaniyama and saṃvedana by Hiroko Matsuoka]

This is a revised and enlarged version of the paper entitled “Sho-shinjitsu-ron ni miru ukeisho-chishiki-ron-ronsho seiritsu no haikei” [Śāntarakṣita on Dharmakīrti’s Proof of Sākāratā], Indogaku bukkyōgaku kenkyū, 62.2 (2014) 983–979. A draft of this paper was presented at the XVIIth Congress of the International Association of Buddhist Studies, University of Vienna, Austria, August 18–23, 2014. I would like to express my gratitude for comments and help to Hideyo Ogawa, Toru Funayama, Birgit Kellner and Eli Franco, as well as to Chris Jensen and Tyler Neill for correcting the English.

Introduction:

In the last part of the Pratyakṣa chapter of his Pramāṇaviniścaya (PVin I 39,13–43,7), Dharmakīrti (c. 600–660)^[1] presents two kinds of arguments to prove self-awareness (svasaṃ-vedana). Since the theory of self-awareness that a cognition is aware of itself presupposes that an object and the cognition thereof are non-different; and hence the cognition of an object is nothing but the cognition of the cognition itself, the former is established on the basis of the fact that both are necessarily perceived together (sahopalambhaniyama);^[2] the latter is established on account of its essential nature of being a cognition (saṃvedana).^[3] Following Iwata (1991), I am going to call these two arguments the sahopalambhaniyama and saṃvedana arguments, respectively.

What led Dharmakīrti to develop these arguments? Concerning the sahopalambhaniya-ma argument, Iwata (1991: 20–24) examines how the argument could have been derived directly from the view that is presented by Dignāga (c. 480–540) in Ālambanaparīkṣā v. 6 and the Vṛtti thereon, namely, that an object-support (ālambana) for a cognition is a form within the cognition itself (antarjñeyarūpa). Taber (2010) argues that crucial elements of the argument are found in the Śūnyavāda chapter of Kumārila’s (c. 600–650) Ślokavārttika vv. 31–34. Concerning the saṃvedana argument, on the other hand, no attempts have yet been made to determine the details of its provenance.

The aim of this paper is to explore both of these issues equally, at the same time, namely with the help of the Bahirarthaparīkṣā chapter of the Tattvasaṅgraha. In this,

¹ For the date of Dharmakīrti I shall provisionally follow Frauwallner (1961: 137–139). This dating has been discussed by several scholars, most notably by Krasser (2012). He pointed out the common wordings like sattvānumāna in Bhāviveka’s (490/500–570) and Dharmakīrti’s works and an almost identical verse in Bhāviveka’s and Kumārila’s works. In his conclusion Krasser hypothesized that the time of activity of both Dharmakīrti and Kumārila is the middle of the sixth century. Krasser’s hypothesis is not fully accepted by scholars, e.g. by Watanabe (2014) and by Franco (2015–2018). This paper does not discuss the date of Dharmakīrti and Kumārila but attests to the chronological ordering of Kumārila and Dharmakīrti, namely, in that order. For the relationship between Kumārila and Dharmakīrti, see also Yoshimizu 2007 and Kataoka 2010.

Śāntarakṣita (c. 725–788), while discussing the sahopalambhaniyama and saṃvedana arguments, directly references Kumārila’s arguments aimed at proving that a cognition has an external entity for its object. In particular, I hope to provide evidence in favor of Śāntarakṣita’s view that Dharmakīrti was responding directly to Kumārila. In order to do this, I will first present Kumārila’s arguments in section 1, and then, in section 2, I will discuss the corresponding details of Śāntarakṣita’s refutation, which follows but also builds upon the arguments of his predecessor, Dharmakīrti. With this foundation in place, section 3 will provide one final piece of evidence in favor of Śāntarakṣita’s view, namely, that he sees in the dual nature of Dharmakīrti’s argumentation an attempt to refute the nirākāravādin’s view rather than to simply improve Dignāga’s theory of self-awareness.

1. Kumārila’s refutation of self-awareness

Kumārila is only one among many concerns for Śāntarakṣita. The Bahirarthaparīkṣā chapter of the latter’s TS is meant to establish the vijñānavāda theory of vijñaptimātratā or “mind-only.” According to Kamalaśīla (c. 740–795), author of the pañjikā commentary, this chapter is divided into two parts: in the first part, Śāntarakṣita establishes that an external object cannot exist independently of cognition (arthāyoga) (TS₂ 1964–1997); in the second part, he proves that cognition is devoid of the characteristics of being either grasped or grasper (grāhyagrāhakalakṣaṇavaidhurya), that is, that cognition consists in self-awareness (ātmasaṃvedana) (TS₂ 1998–2083). In this second part, Śāntarakṣita proceeds in three steps: first, he posits his own arguments denying the existence of external objects (bāhyārthaniṣedhaka) (TS₂ 1998–2049); secondly, he refutes arguments formulated by various realists such as Śubhagupta, Uddyotakara and Kumārila, to establish the existence of such objects (bāhyārthasādhaka) (TS₂ 2050–2077); and lastly, he presents the fundamental (maula) argument for establishing vijñaptimātratā (TS₂ 2078–2083).

While refuting the realist arguments, Śāntarakṣita cites verses from the Bṛhaṭṭīkā4 of Kumārila, corresponding to ŚV Śūnyavāda 172cd–177ab, which contain seven arguments for proving the existence of external objects (bāhyārthasādhaka) (TS₂ 2063–2067). In ŚV Śūnyavāda 172cd–177ab, after first presenting them earlier in the same chapter (verses 5–17), Kumārila then refutes vijñānavāda, more precisely, Dignāga’s arguments for self-awareness,^[4] by moving through the series of arguments in the same order as before.^[5] It is these seven arguments that we will examine in the current section 1. They can be classified into two groups according to the theses (pakṣa) that they support:

1) An object and its cognition are different (bhinna) from each other.

2) A cognition neither cognizes a part of itself (svāṃśa) nor is cognized by a part of itself.

These two groups closely relate to Dharmakīrti’s sahopalambhaniyama and saṃvedana arguments, respectively, as I will demonstrate below. The first group is discussed in section 1.1, and the second in section 1.2.

1.1 Arguing for the difference between an object and its cognition

The four arguments in this first group can be labeled as follows:

1. The tatsaṃvitti-asaṃvitti argument;
2. The tatparāmarśa-aparāmarśa argument;
3. The itaretaraparāmarśa-itaretarāparāmarśa argument;
4. The aikarūpyeṇa-ajñāna argument.

These arguments will now be discussed individually in the following sections.

1.1.1 The tatsaṃvitti-asaṃvitti argument

The tatsaṃvitti-asaṃvitti argument reads as follows:^[6]

The grasper (grāhaka) of color is different from the grasped [color] (grāhya) because the former is not perceived when the latter is perceived (tatsaṃvittāv asaṃvitteḥ), like the grasper of flavor, etc.

In ŚV Śūnyavāda 79,^[7] Kumārila explains that the tatsaṃvitti-asaṃvitti argument is based on the Bhāṣya of Śabara (6^th c.), where it is stated that it is only an object connected with the external world (bahirdeśasambaddha) that is perceived by sense-perception (pratyakṣa).^[8]

1.1.2 The tatparāmarśa-aparāmarśa argument

The tatparāmarśa-aparāmarśa argument is as follows:^[9]

The grasped [color] is different from [the cognition] that grasps it because the former is not necessarily recollected by one who recollects the latter, like the grasper of flavor, etc.

According to ŚV Śūnyavāda 82–85,^[10] the tatparāmarśa-aparāmarśa argument is also based on Śabara’s Bhāṣya. Śabara argues that there are cases where one remembers a cognition that occurred in the past, without at the same time remembering what one cognized.^[11]

The tatparāmarśa-aparāmarśa argument is undoubtedly directed against a point made by Dignāga in Pramāṇasamuccaya I v. 11cd and the Vṛtti thereon. There, Dignāga argues that a cognition has both characteristics (dvirūpatā), namely, both the characteristic of being the grasped and that of being the grasper, and that such a cognition is cognized by itself (svasaṃvedyatā). He claims that these two points are to be accepted on the basis of the empirical fact that both grasper and grasped are remembered afterwards (smṛter uttarakālam PS I 11c).^[12]

1.1.3 The itaretaraparāmarśa-itaretarāparāmarśa argument

The itaretaraparāmarśa-itaretarāparāmarśa argument is as follows:^[13]

The two (i.e., the grasped and the grasper) are mutually different (bhinna) [be-cause one is not recollected when the other is recollected (itaretaraparāmarśa itaretarāparāmarśāt)],^[14] like flavor [and color],^[15] etc.

Pārthasārathi (10^th c.) comments that each of the two is remembered by excluding the other (parasparaparihāreṇa).^[16] The point is that the recollection of an object cannot simultaneously be the recollection of its cognition and vice versa. Whatever is an object is not a cognition, and whatever is a cognition is not an object. These two properties exclude each other.

1.1.4 The aikarūpyeṇa-ajñāna (bhedopalambhana) argument

The aikarūpyeṇa-ajñāna argument is as follows:^[17]

[The two (i.e., the grasped and the grasper) are mutually different] because they are not perceived as identical (aikarūpyeṇājñānāt),^[18] like another [mental] continuum (santānāntara) and the cognition thereof.

Importantly, this aikarūpyeṇa-ajñāna argument is reformulated by Umbeka (8^th c.) as follows:^[19]

Blue and the cognition thereof are different (bheda) from each other because they are perceived separately (bhedopalambhanāt).

Here Umbeka is drawing a contrast between the aikarūpyeṇa-ajñāna argument and Dhar-makīrti’s sahopalambhaniyama argument, the latter of which is formulated as follows:

PVin I 54ab:

sahopalambhaniyamād abhedo nīlataddhiyoḥ /

Blue and the cognition thereof are not different (abheda) [from each other] because they are necessarily perceived together (sahopalambhaniyamāt).

According to Umbeka,^[20] Kumārila’s aikarūpyeṇa-ajñāna argument is thus a counter-argument to Dharmakīrti’s sahopalambhaniyama argument. This represents the opposite of Śāntarakṣita’s interpretation, namely that the latter argument of Dharmakīrti is actually responding to the former by Kumārila. We will return to this point later.

1.2 Arguing against self-awareness

Kumārila goes on to formulate the following arguments of the second group to establish that a relation between the grasped and the grasper never exists within a cognition.^[21]

1) The jñāna-utpatti argument against a cognition grasping a part of itself;

2) The jñāna-utpatti argument against a cognition being grasped by a part of itself;

3) The jñānatva argument.

1.2.1 The two jñāna-utpatti arguments

These two arguments have a same logical reason and are thus treated as a pair.

The jñāna-utpatti argument against a cognition grasping a part of itself is as follows:^[22]

A cognition does not grasp a part of itself (svāṃśa) because it is produced from a cognition (jñānotpatteḥ), like a power of [cognition] itself (svaśakti).

The jñāna-utpatti argument against a cognition being grasped by a part of itself is as follows:^[23]

A cognition is not grasped by a part of itself because it is produced from a cognition, like a power of [cognition] itself.^[24]

Within the framework of the vijñānavāda,^[25] one may say the following: What is meant by the word svaśakti is a latent impression (vāsanā).^[26] The latent impression is produced from a cognition (jñānotpatti) and devoid of both the property of being grasped and that of being grasper.^[27] Now, a cognition arises from its immediately preceding condition, which is a cognition (samanantarapratyaya).^[28] Whatever arises from a cognition can neither be grasped nor grasper, so that a cognition can neither be grasped or grasper with respect to a part of itself (svāṃśa).

1.2.2 The jñānatva argument

The jñānatva argument is as follows:^[29]

The cognition of Caitra does not cognize the grasped part of the cognition occurring in [Caitra] himself^[30] because it is a cognition [itself] (jñānatvāt), like [the cognition] occurring in another body [e.g., of Maitra].^[31]

It is clear that the cognition of Maitra does not apprehend the cognition of Caitra, which also implies that the cognition of Maitra does not apprehend a part of the cognition of Caitra. In the same manner, the cognition of Caitra does not apprehend a part of the cognition of Caitra himself. This is attributed to the fact that the respective cognitions of Caitra and Maitra equally have the property of being cognitions.

In other words, this argument is based on what it means to be a cognition (jñānatva). This will also be of importance for understanding the development of Dharmakīrti’s saṃvedana argument and will be taken up again below.

2. Śāntarakṣita’s defense of self-awareness

Let us now examine how Śāntarakṣita rebuts all the arguments Kumārila formulated in ŚV Śūnyavāda 172cd–177ab.

2.1 The sahopalambhaniyama argument

Śāntarakṣita commences his refutation of the first group of arguments as follows:

TS₂ 2068:

apṛthag vedanāt pūrvaṃ tasyaiva^[32] pratipāditāt /
aikarūpyāparijñānaparyanteṣu na siddhatā //

Since [the non-difference between an object and its cognition]^[33] has already been explained as based on [the logical reason of] not being separately cog-nized, [all the reasons] up to the reason “not being perceived as identical” have [the fault of] being unestablished.

According to Kamalaśīla,^[34] with the expression apṛthag vedanāt “because they are not cognized separately,” Śāntarakṣita refers to the reason sahopalambhaniyamāt “because they are necessarily perceived together,” of Dharmakīrti’s sahopalambhaniyama argument. Since this argument establishes the non-difference between an object and the cognition thereof, all the four reasons in Kumārila’s first group of arguments are to be considered unestablished (asiddha).

It is to be noted, in passing, that Śāntarakṣita reformulates the sahopalambhaniyama argument earlier in the TS as follows:^[35]

TS₂ 2029–2030:

yatsaṃvedanam eva syād yasya saṃvedanaṃ dhruvam /
tasmād avyatiriktaṃ tat tato vā na vibhidyate //
yathā nīladhiyaḥ svātmā dvitīyo vā yathoḍupaḥ /
nīladhīvedanaṃ cedaṃ nīlākārasya vedanam //

If a cognition of X is necessarily a cognition of Y, X is not different from Y, or Y does not differ from X. Just as the cognition’s own essence [is not different from the cognition of blue, or the cognition of blue does not differ from the cognition’s own essence], or just as the second moon [is not different from the first one, or the first moon does not differ from the second one]. And this cognition of the form of blue (nīlākāra) is [necessarily] a cognition of the cognition of blue (nīladhī ). [Therefore, the form of blue is not different from the cognition of blue, or the cognition of blue does not differ from the form of blue.]

As noted by Umbeka, Dharmakīrti’s sahopalambhaniyama argument basically has the reverse factors of the aikarūpyeṇa-ajñāna argument. Namely, the property to be proved (sādhyadharma) is “being non-different [from each other]” (abheda) rather than “being different [from each other]” (bhinna), and the logical reason is “being necessarily per-ceived together” (sahopalambhaniyama) rather than “not being perceived as identical” (aikarūpyeṇājñāna) or “being perceived separately” (bhedopalambhana). In Dharmakīrti’s treatment, this is the main argument corresponding to Kumārila’s first group, meaning that, if Dharmakīrti’s treatment is later than Kumārila’s, then the aikarūpyeṇa-ajñāna argument is being taken to imply or speak for the other three arguments of the first group, namely, the tatsaṃvitti-asaṃvitti, tatparāmarśa-aparāmarśa, and itaretaraparāmarśa-itaretarāparāmarśa arguments.

2.2 Refutations of the tatsaṃvitti-asaṃvitti and tatparāmarśa-aparāmarśa arguments

After collectively refuting Kumārila’s first group of arguments, Śāntarakṣita discusses the tatsaṃvitti-asaṃvitti and tatparāmarśa-aparāmarśa arguments individually.

2.2.1 Refutation of the tatsaṃvitti-asaṃvitti argument

To begin with, the logical reason of this argument is unestablished (asiddha). In order to show this, Śāntarakṣita cites PVin I 54cd with slight modification and further argues.^[36]

TS₂ 2073:

aprasiddhopalambhasya nārthavittiḥ prasidhyati /^[37]
tan na grāhyasya saṃvittir grāhakānubhavād ṛte //^[38]

For someone whose perception is not established, the cognition of the object is not established. Therefore, there is no cognition of the grasped without an experience of the grasper.

The point is that an object can be established, in Dharmakīrti’s words, as perceived only when the cognition of an object is perceived. It cannot be the case that the cognition is not perceived when its object is perceived.

In the tatsaṃvitti-asaṃvitti argument, Kumārila has increased the scope of the reason that a cognition is not cognized when its object is cognized on the basis of the statement in Śabara’s Bhāṣya that only an object as connected with the external world (bahirdeśasamba-ddha) is perceived.

In connection with this statement, Śāntarakṣita points out that what is perceived is not always an external object, and thereby argues that Kumārila’s reason is inconclusive (anaikāntika).

TS₂ 2074:

asvasthalocanair dṛṣṭaṃ tathā pītādy avekṣyate /
vispaṣṭaṃ40 grāhakāṃśāc ca saṃvedyaṃ na tathā param //

[Unreal objects like] yellow, etc., that are seen by someone with an eye-disease are vividly (vispaṣṭam) perceived in that way [i.e., connected with the external world],^[39] and they are not perceived [separately (niṣkṛṣṭam)] from the grasping part.^[40] Likewise for another [i.e. yellow as seen by someone with healthy eyes].^[41]

Needless to say, in the case of an erroneous cognition, someone with an eye-disease perceives an object that is not externally existent.

2.2.2 Refutation of the tatparāmarśa-aparāmarśa argument

In attacking the tatparāmarśa-aparāmarśa argument, Śāntarakṣita begins by saying the following:

TS₂ 2075:

alakṣitaviśeṣā ca grāhyarūpe44 ca sā smṛtiḥ /
sarvato bhinnarūpe tu na sābhyāsādyasambhavāt //

A recollection by which a particular is not observed occurs with respect to an object to be grasped. But it does not occur with respect to an object distinguished from all others since habituation (abhyāsa) and the other [causal factors for ascertainment] are not possible.

According to Kamalaśīla,^[42] an individual entity cannot be remembered because recollection (smṛti) is not capable of having an individual for its object, unlike perception. A perception of an individual entity can cause the perceiver to determine (adhyavasāya) that the object is an individual if one of several causal factors for ascertainment (niścayahetu) is present: a [state of] habituation due to similar situations (tathāvidhābhyāsa), acuity [of cognition] (pāṭava), or the [difference in] degree of proximity (pratyāsattitāratamya). There are no such causal factors for ascertainment in the case of recollection, which means that its objects will always be determined as universals instead of particulars.

Now, if recollection has only a universal character for its object, how could the object be remembered?^[43]

Śāntarakṣita answers the question by saying the following:

TS₂ 2076:

gṛhīta iti ko’py evaṃ nānyathā smaraṇaṃ bhavet /
śuddhasphaṭikasaṅkāśe vidyate47 smaraṇaṃ na ca //

Otherwise, there could be no recollection as in the form “Something was grasped.” And there is no recollection [of a grasper]^[44] like a pure crystal.

There is no recollection of a cognition like a colorless transparent crystal that is not marked with the form of its object. Even if there is a case where, after cognizing a certain object, one cannot remember the object in a specific way, it does not follow that one is remembering a cognition which grasped no object.

Śāntarakṣita concludes that the logical reason presented in PS I 11c is established whereas that of the tatparāmarśa-aparāmarśa argument is not.

2.3 The saṃvedana argument

Śāntarakṣita then continues on to refute the arguments of group 2 as follows:

TS₂ 2077:

kambupītādivijñānair hetvoḥ^[45] paścimayor api /
anaikāntikatā vyaktaṃ dig eṣānyatra sādhane //

In view of the cognition of a yellow conch-shell and the like, the latter two logical reasons are clearly inconclusive (anaikāntika). This is the way to deal with the other reasons [to prove the existence of an external object, too].^[46]

Like in TS₂ 2074,^[47] Śāntarakṣita here gives as an example of an erroneous cognition in order to point out that the logical reasons of the two jñāna-utpatti arguments and of the jñānatva argument are all inconclusive.

To explain, suppose that there occurs a cognition of yellow with reference to a white conch-shell. The erroneous cognition cognizes the form (ākāra) of yellow, which is a part of the cognition and which has no counterpart in the external world.^[48] If a continuum of cognitions is accepted, then the erroneous cognition must be presumed to arise from an immediately preceding cognition. Alternatively, the cognition, which is identical with the form of yellow, is cognized by the grasping part of the erroneous cognition.^[49]

It is to be noted that, according to Kamalaśīla,^[50] the other (anyat) cognition, that is, the non-erroneous cognition, also deviates from “not cognizing a part of [cognition] itself.” Even the cognition of a white conch-shell or that of someone with healthy eyes also cognizes a part of the cognition, which means that every cognition cognizes itself.

This reminds us of Dharmakīrti’s saṃvedana argument which was reformulated by Śāntarakṣita as follows:

TS₂ 2032:

saṃvedanam idaṃ sarvaṃ na cārthāntaragocaram /
saṃvedanasvabhāvatvāt^[51] svātmasaṃvedanaṃ yathā //

Every cognition does not have for its object anything other [than the cognition itself] because it has the essential nature of a cognition, like the cognition of one’s own self.

According to Dharmakīrti as well as Śāntarakṣita, no cognition cognizes any object distinct from the cognition itself because its essential nature is that of a cognition.

For both Dharmakīrti and Kumārila, the essential nature of a cognition is being that which illuminates (prakāśaka).^[52] What is illuminated, however, differs for each: the cogni-tion itself or an external object, respectively. Therefore, the same logical reason “being a cognition itself” or “having a cognition as its essence” will yield opposite implications; for Kumārila, a cognition never cognizes a part of the cognition (svāṃśa), whereas for Dharmakīrti, it never cognizes anything different from the cognition.

Thus, in the same way as was the case with the aikarūpyeṇa-ajñāna and sahopala-mbhaniyama arguments (cf. section 2.1), here too, Dharmakīrti seems to have reversed only the properties to be proved of the jñānatva argument and then let this imply the other two jñāna-utpatti arguments of the second group.

3. Against nirākāravāda

Lastly, let us consider how Śāntarakṣita regards the function of the sahopalambhaniyama and saṃvedana arguments.

After reformulating the saṃvedana argument, he states:

TS₂ 2034:

śuddhasphaṭikasaṅkāśam arthākārair anaṅkitam /
yair iṣṭaṃ vedanaṃ kaiścid idaṃ tān prati sādhanam //

Both^[53] of these [arguments] are addressed to those who maintain that a cogni-tion is not marked with the form of its object, being like a pure crystal.

That is, according to Śāntarakṣita (as understood by Kamalaśīla, see n. 57) both the sahopa-lambhaniyama and saṃvedana arguments are meant to prove self-awareness (svasaṃvid), which, stated from a different perspective, is the same as proving that a cognition is marked with the form of its object (sākāratā).^[54] Those who claim that a cognition is not marked with the form of its object (nirākāratā) are none other than nirākāravādins represented by Kumārila.

Thus, according to Śāntarakṣita, Dharmakīrti’s aim in including both of these argu-ments is not to prove svasaṃvid or sākāratā yet again after it had already been proved (siddhasādhana) by the other of the two, as suggested by Śubhagupta;^[55] indeed, it would not be appropriate, given the rules of debate, for Dharmakīrti to offer two arguments for the same thing only for the sake of improving upon the position laid out by Dignāga. Rather, as Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla helpfully point out, these two arguments must be meant for refuting nirākāravāda; after all, in refuting an opposing position, it is indeed permitted to adopt as many approaches as might be necessary.

4. Concluding remarks

According to Śāntarakṣita, the reason Dharmakīrti developed his arguments is to defend Dignāga’s theory of self-awareness against the attack by Kumārila. In order to counter Dignāga’s arguments for dvirūpatā and svasaṃvedyatā respectively, Kumārila had argued that an object and its cognition are different from one another on the basis of the fact that they are perceived differently (bhedopalambhana), and, secondly, that a cognition never cognizes a part of itself on the basis of its essential nature of being a cognition (jñānatva).

Accordingly, Dharmakīrti formulated the sahopalambhaniyama and saṃvedana arguments as counter-arguments against these arguments by Kumārila.

Although it is unacceptable to the ŚV-commentators such as Umbeka, Śāntarakṣita’s interpretation of the relation among the various arguments given in PS I, ŚV Śūnyavāda and PVin I is reasonable. This is because, although it is clear that Kumārila, in his exhaustive detail, was attempting to refute Dignāga’s arguments from multiple perspectives, it should also be apparent from the dual nature of Dharmakīrti’s argumentation that he himself was also responding to a challenge. To do so, Dharmakīrti simply reversed the factors of the aikarūpyeṇa-ajñāna and jñānatva arguments in particular, implying that–from his perspective–these two arguments would also cover the other five arguments which Kumārila employed. If Dharmakīrti thereby successfully boiled down these discussions to their essential issues, this could then represent a rather elegant response to Kumārila’s detailed challenge.

References and abbreviations

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D sDe dge edition of the Tibetan bstan’gyur: sDe dge Tibetan Tripiṭaka bsTan’gyur–preserved at the Faculty of Letters, University of Tokyo, ed. J. Takasaki, Z. Yamaguchi, and Y. Ejima. Tshad ma 1–20. Tokyo 1981–1984.

Kā Kāśikā: The Mīmāṃsāślokavārttika with the Commentary Kāśikā of Sucaritamiśra, ed. K. Sāmbaśiva Śāstrī. Trivandrum 1926–1943.

NR Nyāyaratnākara: Mīmāṃsāślokavārttikam. Varanasi: 1898.

P Peking edition of the Tibetan bstan’gyur: The Tibetan Tripiṭaka, Peking Edition, ed. D.T. Suzuki. Tokyo/Kyoto 1955–1961.

PS I Pramāṇasamuccaya, chapter 1 (Pratyakṣa), ed. E. Steinkellner. https://www.oeaw.ac. at/fileadmin/Institute/IKGA/PDF/forschung/buddhismuskunde/dignaga_PS_1.pdf, last visited 09-08-2019.

PSV Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti: See PS I.

PV I Pramāṇavārttika, ch. 1 (Svārthānumāna): See PVSV.

PV III Pramāṇavārttika, ch. 3 (Pratyakṣa): See PVV.

PVA Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra: Pramāṇavārtikabhāshyam or Vārtikālaṅkāraḥ of Prajñāka-ragupta: Being a commentary on Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārtikam, ed. R. Sāṅkṛ-tyāyana. Patna 1953.

PVAṬS II Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāraṭīkā Supariśuddhā, ch. 2 (Pratyakṣa): Tibetan transla-tion, D 4226 me 1–328a7; P 5723 me 1–436a8 (Vol. 135, pp. 77–252).

PVin I, II Pramāṇaviniścaya, chapters 1 (Pratyakṣa)–2 (Svārthānumāna): Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇaviniścaya: Chapters 1 and 2, ed. E. Steinkellner. Beijing/Vienna 2007.

PVSV Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti: The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti, the first chapter with the autocommentary, text and critical notes, ed. R. Gnoli. Rome 1960.

PVV Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti: Ācārya-Dharmakīrteḥ Pramāṇa-vārttikam ācārya-Manora-thanandikṛtayā vṛttyā saṃvalitam, ed. R. Sāṅkṛtyāyana. Appendix to Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society 24–26 (1938–1940).

ŚBh Śābarabhāṣya: See Frauwallner 1968.

ŚV Ślokavārttika: ŚVV=ŚVT=ŚVM.

ŚVM Ślokavārttika: See TṬ. ŚVT Ślokavārttika: See Kā. ŚVV Ślokavārttika: See NR.

T Tibetan translation of TS(P) (in cases where D and P have identical readings).

TS(P) Tattvasaṅgraha/-Pañjikā: TS(P)J=TS(P)Pa=TS(P)1=TS(P)2

TS(P)1 Tattvasaṅgraha/-Pañjikā: Tattvasaṅgraha of Śāntarakṣita with the Commentary of Kamalaśīla, ed. E. Kṛṣṇamācārya. 2 vols. Baroda 1926.

TS(P)2 Tattvasaṅgraha/-Pañjikā: Tattvasaṃgraha of Ācārya Shāntarakṣita with the Com-mentary “Pañjikā” of Shrī Kamalashīla, ed. D. Śāstri. 2 vols. Varanasi 1968.

TSD Tattvasaṅgraha, Tibetan translation, D 4266 ze 1–133a6.

TSJ Jaisalmer Ms of the Tattvasaṅgraha, no. 377. In A Catalogue of Manuscripts in Jaisalmer Jain Bhandaras, comp. Muni Jambūvijayajī. Delhi/Jaisalmer 2000, 40.

TSP Tattvasaṅgraha, Tibetan translation, P 5764’e 1–159a5.

TSPa Pāṭāṇa Ms of the Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā, no. 6679. In Catalogue of the Manuscripts of Pāṭāṇa Jain Bhaṇḍāra, comp. Muni Jambūvijayajī. 3 vols. Ahmedabad 1991, vol. 1, p. 199.

TSPD Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā, Tibetan translation, D 4267 ze 133b1–’e 331a7.

TSPJ Jaisalmer Ms of the Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā, no. 378. In A Catalogue of Manuscripts in Jaisalmer Jain Bhandaras, comp. Muni Jambūvijayajī. Delhi/Jaisalmer 2000, 40. TSPP Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā, Tibetan translation, P 5765’e 159b2–ye 495a7 (Vols. 138–139, pp. 200–164).

TSPPa Pāṭāṇa Ms of the Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā, no. 6680. In Catalogue of the Manuscripts of Pāṭāṇa Jain Bhaṇḍāra, comp. Muni Jambūvijayajī. 3 vols. Ahmedabad 1991, vol. 1, p. 199.

TṬ Tātparyaṭīkā: Ślokavārttikavyākhyā Tātparyaṭīkā of Uṃveka Bhaṭṭa, ed. S. K. Rā-manātha Śāstrī. Madras 1971.

Secondary literature

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Bhatt 1962 G. P. Bhatt, Epistemology of the Bhāṭṭa School of Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā. Varanasi 1962.

Franco 2015–2018 E. Franco, Xuanzang’s Silence and Dharmakīrti’s Dates. Wiener Zeit-schrift für die Kunde Südasiens LVI–LVII (2015–2018) 117–141.

Frauwallner 1961 E. Frauwallner, Landmarks in the History of Indian Logic. Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd-und Ostasiens 5 (1961) 125–48.

Frauwallner 1962 E. Frauwallner, Kumārila’s Bṛhaṭṭīkā. Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd-und Ostasiens 6 (1962) 78–90.

Frauwallner 1968 E. Frauwallner, Materialien zur ältesten Erkenntnislehre der Karma-mīmāṃsā. Wien 1968.

Iwata 1991 T. Iwata, Sahopalambhaniyama. Stuttgart 1991.

Kataoka 2010 K. Kataoka, Ninshiki-shudan to kekka tono taisho no soui: Kumārila to Dharmakīrti [Kumārila and Dharmakīrti on the potential problem of pramāṇa and phala having different objects]. Indogaku bukkyōgaku kenkyū 59.1 (2010) 418–412. Kataoka 2011 K. Kataoka, Kumārila on Truth, Omniscience, and Killing: Part 1: A Critical Edition of Mīmāṃsā-Ślokavārttika ad 1.1.2 (Codanāsūtra). Wien 2011.

Kataoka 2012 K. Kataoka, Jikoninshiki to nimen-sei: Dignāga ni okeru ninshiki no kozo [svasaṃvedana and dvairūpya: Cognitive Structure according to Dignāga]. Indogaku bukkyōgaku kenkyū 60.2 (2012) 1020–1013.

Kellner 2004 B. Kellner, Why Infer and not just Look? Dharmakīrti on the Psychology of Inferential Processes. In: The Role of the Example (dṛṣṭānta) in Classical Indian Logic, ed. S. Katsura, et al. Wien 2004, 1–51.

Kellner 2010 B. Kellner, Self-Awareness (svasaṃvedana) in Dignāga’s Pramāṇasamu-ccaya and -vṛtti: A Close Reading. Journal of Indian Philosophy 38 (2010) 203–231. Kellner 2011 B. Kellner, Self-awareness (svasaṃvedana) and Infinite Regresses: A Com-parison of Arguments by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. Journal of Indian Philosophy 39 (2011) 411–426.

Kobayashi 2001 H. Kobayashi, Prajñākaragupta no senzai inshō setsu [Prajñākaragupta’s Theory of vāsanā]. Indogaku bukkyōgaku kenkyū 50.1 (2001) 325–327.

Krasser 1999 H. Krasser, Dharmakīrti’s and Kumārila’s Refutations of the Existence of God: A Consideration of Their Chronological Order. In: Dharmakīrti’s Thought and Its Impact on Indian and Tibetan Philosophy, ed. S. Katsura. Wien 1999, 215–223.

Krasser 2012 H. Krasser, Bhāviveka, Dharmakīrti and Kumārila. In: Devadattīyam. Jo-hannes Bronkhorst Felicitation Volume, ed. F. Voegeli, et al. Bern 2012, 535–594.

Kyuma 1999 T. Kyuma, bheda and virodha. In: Dharmakīrti’s Thought and Its Impact on Indian and Tibetan Philosophy, ed. S. Katsura. Wien 1999, 225–232.

Matsuoka 2011 H. Matsuoka, Śāntarakṣita’s Interpretation of the sahopalambhaniyama Proof Re-examined. Indogaku bukkyōgaku kenkyū 59.3 (2011) 157–162.

Matsuoka 2014 H. Matsuoka, Sho-shinjitsu-ron ni miru ukeisho-chishiki-ron-ronsho seiritsu no haikei [Śāntarakṣita on Dharmakīrti’s Proof of Sākāratā]. Indogaku bukkyōgaku kenkyū 62.2 (2014) 983–979.

Mikogami 1986 E. Mikogami, Śubhagupta no Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā [Bāhyārthasiddhi-kārikā of Śubhagupta]. Ryūkoku daigaku ronshū 429 (1986) 2–44.

Taber 1986–1992 J. Taber, Further Observations on Kumārila’s Bṛhaṭṭīkā. Journal of Oriental Research 56–62 (1986–1992) 179–189.

Taber 2010 J. Taber, Kumārila’s Buddhist. Journal of Indian Philosophy 38.3 (2010) 279–296.

Teraishi 2002 Y. Teraishi, Ślokavārttika Śūnyavāda shō no kenkyū (6): Wayaku to Kaisetsu [A Study of the Ślokavārttika, Śūnyavāda chapter: A Japanese Translation with Exposition. Part 6]. Kyūshūryūkoku tankidaigaku kiyō 48 (2002) 153–174.

Watanabe 2002 T. Watanabe, Dharmakīrti no hininshiki ron: Sōhan kankei wo chūshin ni [Dharmakīrti’s Theory of “Non-Cognition” (anupalabdhi): From the Viewpoint of “Incompatibility” (virodha)]. Nanto bukkyō 81 (2002) 54–80.

Watanabe 2014 T. Watanabe, Buddhist Critiques of the Sāṅkhya Theory of Causality: Dharmakīrti and His Predecessors. Paper presented at the XII^th Congress of the

Hiroko Matsuoka 219 International Association of Buddhist Studies, University of Vienna, 18–23 August, 2014.

Yoshimizu 2007 K. Yoshimizu, Reconsidering the fragment of the Bṛhaṭṭīkā on insepara-ble connection (avinābhāva). In: Pramāṇakīrtiḥ, Papers Dedicated to Ernst Stein-kellner on the Occasion of his 70th Birthday, ed. B. Kellner, et al. Wien 2007, 1079–1103.

Concordance of passages cited

TS(P)2	TS(P)1	TS(P)J	TS(P)Pa	TS(P)P	TS(P)D	Citation of
k. 2029	k. 2030	103a3	37b10	89a6	74a4
k. 2030	k. 2031	103a4	37b10	89a7	74a4
k. 2032	k. 2033	103b2	37b12	89b2	74a6
695,14	570,4	P 211a7	P 232b16	P 162a3	P 123a1
k. 2034	k. 2035	103b2	37b12	89b2	74a7
696,11	570,23	P 211b2	P 233a5	P 162a3	P 123a7	BASK 87
696,14	570,26	P 211b3	P 233a7	P 162b5	P 123b1
k. 2063	k. 2064	105a4	38a12	90b5	75a7	ŚV Śūnyavāda 172cd–173ab
k. 2064	k. 2065	105a4	38a13	90b5	75a7	ŚV Śūnyavāda 173cd–174ab
k. 2065	k. 2066	105a5	38a13	90b6	75b1	ŚV Śūnyavāda 174cd–175ab
704,22	577,23	P 213a6	P 234b12	P 166b8	P 127a3
k. 2066	k. 2067	105a6	38a14	90b7	75b1	ŚV Śūnyavāda 175cd–176ab
705,11	577,26	P 213a7	P 234b14	P 167a2	P 127a4
705,12	577,26	P 213a7	P 234b14	P 167a3	P 127a5
k. 2067	k. 2068	105a6	38a14	90b7	75b2	ŚV Śūnyavāda 176cd–177ab
705,15	578,3	P 213a8	P 234b16	P 167a4	P 127a6
k. 2068	k. 2069	105b1	38a15	90b7	75b2
705,18	578,8	P 213a8	P 234b16	P 167a5	P 127a7
705,20	578,9	P 213a8	P 234b17	P 167a6	P 127a7
k. 2069	k. 2070	105b2	38a15	91a1	75b3	ŚV Śūnyavāda 79
k. 2070	k. 2071	105b2	38a16	91a1	75b3	ŚV Śūnyavāda 83
k. 2071	k. 2072	105b3	38a17	91a2	75b4	ŚV Śūnyavāda 84
k. 2072	k. 2073	105b3	38a17	91a3	75b4	ŚV Śūnyavāda 85cd (=TS2 2072ab)
k. 2073	k. 2074	105b4	38b1	91a3	75b5
TS(P)2	TS(P)1	TS(P)J	TS(P)Pa	TS(P)P	TS(P)D Citation of
k. 2074	k. 2075	105b5	38b1	91a4	75b5
706,23	579,9	P 213b3	P 235a7	P 167b7	P 127b7
706,25	579,11	P 213b4	P 235a8	P 167b8	P 128a1
707,7	579,14	P 213b5	P 235a10	P 168a2	P 128a2
k. 2075	k. 2076	105b5	38b2	91a5	75b6
707,14	579,23	P 213b7	P 235a13	P 168a6	P 128a5
k. 2076	k. 2077	105b6	38b3	91a5	75b6
707,22	580,2	P 213b7	P 235a16	P 168b2	P 128a7
707,24	580,7	P 213b8	P 235b1	P 168b3	P 128b1
k. 2077	k. 2078	105b6	38b3	91a6	75b7
708,6	580,10	P 214a1	P 235b2	P 168b5	P 128b2
708,7	580,12	P 214a1	P 235b3	P 168b6	P 128b3
708,10	580,15	P 214a2	P 235b4	P 168b8	P 128b5

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

For the date of Dharmakīrti I shall provisionally follow Frauwallner (1961: 137–139). This dating has been discussed by several scholars, most notably by Krasser (2012). He pointed out the common wordings like sattvānumāna in Bhāviveka’s (490/500–570) and Dharmakīrti’s works and an almost identical verse in Bhāviveka’s and Kumārila’s works. In his conclusion Krasser hypothesized that the time of activity of both Dharmakīrti and Kumārila is the middle of the sixth century. Krasser’s hypothesis is not fully accepted by scholars, e.g. by Watanabe (2014) and by Franco (2015–2018). This paper does not discuss the date of Dharmakīrti and Kumārila but attests to the chronological ordering of Kumārila and Dharmakīrti, namely, in that order. For the relationship between Kumārila and Dharmakīrti, see also Yoshimizu 2007 and Kataoka 2010.

[2]:

PVin I 54ab: sahopalambhaniyamād abhedo nīlataddhiyoḥ // See also PV III 332–336; 387–397.

[3]:

PVin I 42,3: saṃvedanam ity api tasya tādātmyāt tathāprathanam, na tad anyasya kasyacid ātmasaṃve-danavat / tato’pi na tad arthāntare yuktam / See also PV III 326–329.

[4]:

See section 1.1.2.

[5]:

See Bhatt 1962 and Teraishi 2002: 153–154 for a detailed structural analysis of the Śūnyavāda chapter.

[6]:

ŚV Śūnyavāda 172cd–173ab: tasmād yad grāhakaṃ rūpe tadgrāhyāt tasya bhinnatā // tatsaṃvittāv asaṃvitte rasādigrāhakaṃ yathā / TS₂ 2063: atha yad grāhakaṃ rūpe tadgrāhyāt tasya bhinnatā / tatsaṃvittāv asaṃvitte rasādigrāhakaṃ yathā // (tasmād ŚV: atha TS; grāhakaṃ ŚVM, ŚVT, TS: bhāsakaṃ ŚVV; rūpe TS: rūpaṃ ŚV.) Here as well as in the following, “ŚV” is in the reporting of variants used as a shorthand for all three editions ŚVV, ŚVT and ŚVM.

[7]:

ŚV Śūnyavāda 79: sa bahirdeśasambaddha ity (ŚBh 28,17 on 1.1.4. See n. 9.) anena nirūpyate / grā- hyākārasya saṃvittir grāhakānubhavād ṛte // TS₂ 2069: sa bahirdeśasambaddha ity anena nanūcyate /

[8]:

ŚBh 28,17 on 1.1.4: syād etat–evaṃ yady arthākārā buddhiḥ syāt / nirākārā tu no buddhiḥ, ākāravān bāhyo’rthaḥ / sa hi bahirdeśasaṃbaddhaḥ pratyakṣam upalabhyate / grāhyākārasya saṃvittir grāhakānubhavād ṛte // (nirūpyate ŚV: nanūcyate TS.)

[9]:

ŚV Śūnyavāda 173cd–174ab: grāhyaṃ tadgrāhakād bhinnaṃ tatparāmṛśatā yataḥ // na parāmṛśyate’vaśyaṃ rasādigrāhakaṃ yathā / TS₂ 2064: grāhyaṃ tadgrāhakād bhinnaṃ tatparāmṛśatā yataḥ / na parāmṛśyate’vaśyaṃ rasādigrāhakādivat // (-kād bhinnaṃ ŚVM: -kāc caivaṃ ŚVT TS: -kāc caiva ŚVV; yathā ŚV: -kādivat TS) As for TS₂ 2064, the reading -kāc caivaṃ attested in TSJ and TSPa (and also chosen for the editions TS1 and TS₂) is here emended to bhinnaṃ following ŚVM.

[10]:

ŚV Śūnyavāda 82–85: na pūrvaṃ jñāyate buddhir ity (ŚBh 30,5 on 1.1.4. See n. 12.) atraitad vadiṣyate / grāhakasyaiva saṃvittir lakṣyate grahaṇe kvacit // na smarāmi mayā ko’pi gṛhīto’rthas tadeti hi / smaranti grāhakotpādaṃ grāhyarūpavivarjitam // tasmād abhinnatāyāṃ ca grāhye’pi smaraṇaṃ bhavet / grāhakasmṛtinirbhāsāt tatrāpy eṣaiva gṛhyate // tad atyantāvinābhāvān (ŚVT; tadatyantā- ŚVM ŚVV) naikākāraṃ hi jāyate // anvayavyatirekābhyāṃ siddhaivaṃ bhinnatā tayoḥ // TS₂ 2070–2072 correspond to 83–84 and 85cd: na smarāmi mayā ko’pi gṛhīto’rthas tadeti ca / smaranti grāhakotpādaṃ grāhyarūpavivarjitam // tasmād abhinnatāyāṃ ca grāhye’pi smaraṇaṃ bhavet / grāhakasmṛtisadbhāve tatra tv evaiṣa gṛhyate // anvayavyatirekābhyāṃ siddhaivaṃ bhinnatā tayoḥ / evaṃ ca hetavo’py ete prasiddhāḥ sādhyadharmiṇi // (83b hi ŚV: ca TS; -pādaṃ grāhya- ŚVM ŚVT TS: -pādagrāhya- ŚVV; -smṛtinirbhāsāt- ŚVT ŚVV; -smṛtir nirbhāsā ŚVM; -smṛtisadbhāve TS; tatrāpy eṣaiva ŚV: tatra tv evaiṣa TS; gṛhyate ŚVT ŚVV TS; dṛśyate ŚVM.)

[11]:

ŚBh 30,5 on 1.1.4: na tu pūrvaṃ jñāyate / bhavati hi kadācid etad yaj jñāto’rthaḥ san “ajñāta” ityucyate /

[12]:

PSV I 5,1 on PS I 11cd (verse parts from PS are printed in bold): smṛter uttarakālaṃ ca (PS I 11c) dvairūpyam iti sambandhaḥ / yasmāc cānubhavottarakālaṃ viṣaya iva jñāne’pi smṛtir utpadyate tasmād asti dvirūpatā jñānasya svasaṃvedyatā ca // kiṃ kāraṇaṃ na hy asāv avibhāvite // (PS I 11d) na hy ananubhūtārthavedanasmṛtī rūpādismṛtivat / See the most recent studies of PS(V) I 11 by Kellner (2010) and by Kataoka (2012).

[13]:

ŚV Śūnyavāda 174cd (quoted in TS₂ 2065ab): dvayaṃ paraspareṇaiva bhinnaṃ sādhyaṃ rasādivat //

[14]:

Kā 163,12 on ŚV Śūnyavāda 174cd: itaretaraparāmarśa itaretarāparāmarśāt… / NR 226,4 on ŚV Śūnyavāda 174cd: parasparaparihāreṇa parāmarśāt … / TSP2 704,22 on TS₂ 2065: ekataraparāmarśe saty aparasyāparāmarśanāt / (aparasyāparāmarśanāt em. following TSP1: aparāmarśanāt TSPJ, TSPPa. The edition TSP2 emends to aparaparāmarśanāt, the Tibetan translation T has gzhan mi rtog pa’i phyir ro.) Cf. TṬ 281,18 on ŚV Śūnyavāda 174cd: hetudṛṣṭāntau tāv eva /

[15]:

NR 226,4 on ŚV Śūnyavāda 174cd: rūparasavad iti /

[16]:

For the concept of virodha, see Bandyopadhyay 1988, Kyuma 1999 and Watanabe 2002.

[17]:

ŚV Śūnyavāda 175ab: aikarūpyeṇa vājñānāt santānāntarabuddhivat / TS₂ 2065cd: aikarūpyeṇa vā-jñānāt santānāntarabuddhivat // (vājñā- TS: cājñā- ŚVM: vijñā- ŚVT, ŚVV; aikarūpyeṇa TSJ, ŚV: ekyarūpeṇa TSPa, also adopted in the editions TS1 and TS₂.)

[18]:

Cf. Kā 163,15 on ŚV Śūnyavāda 175ab: grāhyaṃ grāhakād bhinnaṃ tena sahaikarūpyeṇājñānāt / “The grasped is not different from the grasper because the former is not perceived as identical with the latter.”

[19]:

TṬ 282,9 on ŚV Śūnyavāda 175ab: nīlabuddhyor iti dharmitvam, paraspareṇa bheda iti sādhyo dha-rmaḥ / nīlam idam iti bhedopalambhanād iti hetuḥ /

[20]:

TṬ 282,11 on ŚV Śūnyavāda 175ab: abhedasādhakasya sahopalambhasya, paroktasya vā sahopala- mbhaniyamād ity asyāsiddhatām anenāha /

[21]:

TṬ 282,12 on ŚV Śūnyavāda 175cd–177ab: idānīm ekavijñānasambandhinor dharmayor grāhyagrāha-kabhāvo nāstīti yad uktam, tatra prayogam āha–jñānaṃ svāṃśaṃ na gṛhṇātīti /

[22]:

ŚV Śūnyavāda 175cd (quoted in TS₂ 2066ab): jñānaṃ svāṃśaṃ na gṛhṇāti jñānotpatteḥ svaśaktivat //

[23]:

ŚV Śūnyavāda 176ab (quoted in TS₂ 2066cd): grāhyatvapratiṣedhaś ca dvayahīnā hi vāsanā / (grāhyatvaprati- TS; grāhyavat prati- ŚVM; grāhyatvaṃ prati- ŚVV; hi vā- ŚVM TS; dvivā- ŚVT ŚVV) “[For the same reason,] there is also the negation of [a cognition] being grasped [by a part of itself]. For, a latent impression (vāsanā) is devoid of both [the property of being the grasped and that of the grasper].” TṬ 282,13 on ŚV Śūnyavāda 176a: jñānaṃ svāṃśaṃ na gṛhṇāti na vā svāṃśena gṛhyate … / NR 226,10 on ŚV Śūnyavāda 176a: jñānaṃ svāṃśaṃ na gṛhṇāti nāpi svāṃśena gṛhyate /

[24]:

See TSP2 705,11 on TS₂ 2066c: tadyathā–jñānāṃśo na jñānagrāhyaḥ / jñānād utpannatvāt / tadvat vāsanāvat / “A part of cognition is not grasped by the same cognition because it is produced from a cognition, like that [power of itself], namely, like a latent impression.”

[25]:

According to Sucarita (10th c.), Kumārila formulates the jñāna-utpatti arguments from the standpoint of the “old” Buddhist who regards a latent impression (vāsanā) as distinct from a cognition (jñā-nātiriktavāsanā). On the other hand, the “modern” Buddhist holds that a latent impression is not distinguished from the immediately preceding cognition (samanantarajñāna) itself. Kā 163,27 on ŚV Śūnyavāda 175cd–176ab: etac ca cirantanabauddhābhiprāyeṇa jñānātiriktavāsanāpakṣe sthitvoktam iti draṣṭavyam / na tūpādānāparanāmno viśiṣṭāt samanantarajñānād anyāṃ kāñcid vāsanām arvācīnā manyante // For Prajñākaragupta (c. 750–810), a latent impression is not the power produced from the preceding cognition (pūrvavijñānajanitā śaktiḥ), but the immediately preceding cognition itself (samanantaravijñānātmabhūtā). PVA 356,6: vāsaneti hi pūrvavijñānajanitāṃ śaktim āmananti vāsa-nāsvarūpavidaḥ /; PVA 356,23: [na ca] samanantaravijñānātmabhūtā vāsaneṣyate // As Kobayashi (2001: 327) has pointed out, Yamāri (c. 1000–1060) refers to a discrepancy in the views of Dharmottara (c. 740–800) and Prajñākaragupta on whether a latent impression is distinct from the immediately preceding cognition or not. PVAṬS II (D 259a4; P 347b7): de ltar na re zhig slob dpon chos mchog la sogs pas’dod pa’i bag chags kyi phyogs la yang pha rol pos brjod pas nyes pa bsal nas rang gi’dod pa brjod pa ni de ma thag pa’i zhes bya ba’o // See also PVin I 43,14–44,2 for Dharmakīrti’s theory of the latent impression.

[26]:

TṬ 282,14 on ŚV Śūnyavāda 175d: śloke svaśaktiśabdena vāsanām āha /

[27]:

Kā 163,25 on ŚV Śūnyavāda 176b: na ca sādhyavikalo dṛṣṭāntaḥ / dvayahīnavāsanābhyupagamāt / bauddhānāṃ hi svāṃśaṃ na gṛhṇāti / na ca tena gṛhyate / NR 316,17 on ŚV Śūnyavāda 176b: vāsa-nāvat / sā hi svāṃśaṃ na gṛhṇāti, nāpi svāṃśena gṛhyate iti / TSP2 705,12 on TS₂ 2066cd: katham asminn anantare prayogadvaye (emendation following TSP1: prayogādvaye TSPJ, TSPPa (also adopted in TSP2); cf. gtan tshigs gnyis po… la T) ’pi sādhyadharmānvito dṛṣṭāntaḥ siddha ity āha–dvayahīnā hi vāsaneti / dvayena grāhyagrāhakatvena /

[28]:

Kā 163,20 on ŚV Śūnyavāda 175d: jñānotpatter iti hetuḥ / tad dhi samanantarapratyayād utpadyata iti bauddhā manyante /

[29]:

ŚV Śūnyavāda 176cd–177ab (quoted as TS₂ 2067): caitrajñānaṃ tadudbhūtajñānāṃśagrāhyabodhakam // jñānatvān na bhaved yadvat tasya dehāntarodbhavam /

[30]:

Kā 164,9 on ŚV Śūnyavāda 176cd–177ab: caitrajñānaṃ dharmi // taccaitrodbhūto yo jñānāṃśo grāhyas tasya bodhakaṃ na bhavatīti sādhyam /

[31]:

TSP2 705,15 on TS₂ 2067: yadvat tasya caitrajñānodbhūtajñānāṃśasya maitrādidehāntarodbhavaṃ jñānam //

[32]:

tasyaiva em. (de nyid T): tad atra TSJ, TSPa (adopted in TS1 and TS₂).

[33]:

TSP2 705,20 on TS₂ 2068: abhedasya nīlataddhiyoḥ prasādhitatvāt… / See n. 58.

[34]:

TSP2 705,18 on TS₂ 2068: apṛthag vedanād iti nīlataddhiyoḥ sahopalambhaniyamāt / apratyakṣopa-lambhasya nārthadṛṣṭiḥ prasidhyati // (= PVin I 54cd) ity ataḥ svasaṃvitprasādhanena pratipāditād abhedasya nīlataddhiyoḥ prasādhitatvād aikarūpyāparijñānaparyantā hetavo na siddhāḥ // (For nīlata-ddhiyoḥ sahopalambhaniyamāt in the quotation TSP cf. PVin I 54ab.)

[35]:

See Matsuoka 2011 for the interpretation of TS₂ 2029–2030.

[36]:

See Kellner 2011 for a comparison of the two different arguments for self-awareness that are presented in PS(V) I 11d–12 and PVin I 54cd.

[37]:

This is a quotation of PVin I 54cd, with aprasiddhopalambhasya nārthavittiḥ TS: apratyakṣopalambhasya nārthadṛṣṭiḥ PVin, which reads “For someone who does not perceive perception, the perception of the object is not established either” (trans. Kellner 2011: 420). For the further discussion with PVin I 54cd as Dharmakīrti’s argument of infinite regress, see Kellner 2011.

[38]:

grāhyasya… // TS; ŚV Śūnyavāda 79cd.

[39]:

TSP2 706,23 on TS₂ 2074: vispaṣṭam ity atra chedaḥ / tatheti yathā satyābhimataṃ pītādi bahirde-śasambaddhaṃ vispaṣṭam upalabhyate tathā kāmalādyupahatanayanopalabdham api samīkṣyate / (vispaṣṭam ity TSPJ (gsal por nges pa zhes bya ba T): nikṛṣṭam ity TSPPa; both editions TSP1 and TSP2 have niṣkṛṣṭam ity.)

[40]:

TSP2 706,25 on TS₂ 2074: grāhakāṃśāc ca saṃvedyaṃ neti chedaḥ / grāhakāṃśād iti niṣkṛṣṭaṃ ity adhyāhāryam /

[41]:

TSP2 707,7 on TS₂ 2074: tathā param iti satyābhimatam api pītādi /

[42]:

TSP2 707,14 on TS₂ 2075cd: etad uktaṃ bhavati–na tāvad vikalpasya yathāvasthitavastugrahaṇa-sāmarthyam / tasyāvastuviṣayatvāt / kevalaṃ tathābhūtapadārthānubhavabalād yatraivārthitvādayo niścayahetavaḥ santi tatra tadākārādhyavasāyī smārtaḥ pratyayo nirviṣaya eva / paramārthataḥ svapra-tibhāse’narthe’rthādhyavasāyena pravṛtter bhrānta eva sarvo jāyate / tasya tv adhyavasāyavaśena viṣayavyavasthā na paramārthataḥ / na ca grāhyādhyavasāyaḥ smṛter api vidyate / kevalaṃ tathāvi-dhābhyāsapāṭavapratyāsattitāratamyādikāraṇābhāvād alakṣitaviśeṣā bhavati / yena smaraṇāntarād viśiṣyate / Variant readings: yatraivā- TSPJ, adopted in TSP1 and TSP2 (gang kho na la T): yathaivā- TSPPa; paramārthataḥ n.e. T; -ābhyāsapāṭavapratyāsattitāratamyādi- em. Cf. tasya kāraṇam abhyā-saḥ pratyāsattis tāratamyabuddhipāṭavaṃ cetyādi / TSP2 244,18 on TS₂ 587: -ābhyāsapāṭavādar apratyāsattitāratamyādi- [sic] or -ābhyāsapāṭavader apratyāsattitāratamyādi- [sic] TSPJ, TSPPa. The editions TSP1 and TSP2 read -ābhyāsapāṭavāder apratyāsattitāratamyādi-, T reads goms pa gsal ba gzhan myur ba dang ches myur ba la sogs pa’i. The emphasized part corresponds to PVin II 46,7: svapratibhāse’narthe’rthādhyavasāyena pravartanāt. See also PVSV 31,16–32,12 on PV I 58 for Dharmakīrti’s explanation of causal factors for ascertainment (niścayapratyaya). I referred to Kellner’s (2004) descriptions of PVSV 32,5–12 for the translations of niścayahetu, tathāvidhābhyāsa, pāṭava, pratyāsattitāratamya.

[43]:

TSP2 707,22 on TS₂ 2076: syād etat–katham avasīyate grāhyādhyavasāyo’trāsti smṛter ity āha–gṛhīta ityādi /

[44]:

TSP2 707,24 on TS₂ 2076: na cāpi kevalo grāhyākārānaṅkitamūrtitayā grāhakaḥ śuddhasphaṭikasa-ṅkāśaḥ smaryate /

[45]:

hetvoḥ em. with TS₂ (gtan tshigs… gnyis po T): hetoḥ TSJ (adopted in TS1), heto [sic] TSPa.

[46]:

TSP2 708,10 on TS₂ 2077d: eṣā dig ity anyatrāpi bahirarthasādhane paropanyaste eṣā dūṣaṇadik /

[47]:

See section 2.2.1.

[48]:

TSP2 708,6 on TS₂ 2077: tathā hi–yathā yadi pītaśaṅkhādijñānaṃ jñānotpannam api sat svāṃśaṃ pītādyākāraṃ gṛhṇāti / (tathā hi yathā TSPJ: yathā TSP2: ’di ltar na T; n.e. TSPPa, TSP1.)

[49]:

TSP2 708,7 on TS₂ 2077: yathā ca jñānam api sat jñānāṃśasya pītāder grāhyasya bodhakaṃ bhavati /

[50]:

TSP2 708,7 on TS₂ 2077: tathānyad apīti vyabhicāritā hetvoḥ /

[51]:

For saṃvedanasvabhāvatvāt TSJ, TSPa (adopted in TS2, cf. also rig pa’i rang bzhin nyid kyi phyir TSPP, rig pa’i rang bzhin nyid kyis rig TSPD), TS1 emends to saṃvedanaṃ ca nīlasya.

[52]:

PV III 329: prakāśamānas tādātmyāt svarūpasya prakāśakaḥ / yathā prakāśo abhimatas tathā dhīr ātmavedinī //; TS₂ 2081a: vijñānatvaṃ prakāśatvam … / ŚV Śūnyavāda 187ab quoted in TS₂ 2017ab: prakāśakatvaṃ bāhye’rthe śaktyabhāvāt tu nātmani /

[53]:

TSP2 696,14 on TS₂ 2034d: idam iti dvividham api sādhanaṃ nirākāravādinaṃ prati yatas tena na siddhasādhyatā /

[54]:

The logical reasons sahopalambhaniyama and saṃvedana are collectively called svasaṃvitprasādhana or sākāratāsiddhisādhana by Kamalaśīla. TSP2 695,14 on TS₂ 2032: dvitīyam api sākāratāsiddhaye sādhanam āha–saṃvedanam idam ityādi / TSP2 705,20 on TS₂ 2068: ataḥ svasaṃvitprasādhanena pratipāditād abhedasya nīlataddhiyoḥ prasādhitatvāt… / See n. 34.

[55]:

In BASK 87 Śubhagupta points out that the saṃvedana argument is not valid because it proves what is already proved (siddhasādhana) by the sahopalambhaniyama argument. BASK 87 is quoted in TSP2 696,11 on TS₂ 2034: sākārajñānapakṣe ca tannirbhāsasya vedyatā / tasyābhede ca saṃsādhye siddhasādhanatā bhavet //