Two Kinds of Causal Capacity: Sāmānyā śaktiḥ and Pratiniyatā śaktiḥ

1. Introduction

Dharmakīrti and his followers define real things as those that have some causal capacity (arthakriyāśakti), and consider those that cannot produce any effect, such as the universal (sāmānya) and the whole (avayavin), as merely conceptual constructions. In connection with this capacity, as is well known, they refer to the two kinds of causal capacity: sāmānyā śaktiḥ and pratiniyatā śaktiḥ.

According to the examination of these two kinds of causal capacity by modern scholars, Dharmakīrti and his followers consider external objects, such as jars (ghaṭa, water jar), to have two different causal powers: sāmānyā śaktiḥ and pratiniyatā śaktiḥ. The sāmānyā śaktiḥ is the causal power common to other objects of the same kind, and the pratiniyatā śaktiḥ is the causal power not common to any other object. For example, a jar has the causal power or capacity of containing water, which is common to other jars, but at the same time it has the unique power of producing its own particular perception as well. Of these, the sāmānyā śaktiḥ is regarded as the useful function for the fulfillment of human purposes, and is therefore not “causal capacity” in a strict sense. In contrast, the pratiniyatā śaktiḥ is regarded as the causal efficiency that real things have.^[1]

In addition to this, scholars have presented various other interpretations concerning these two notions. Some scholars understand the sāmānyā śaktiḥ to be related to common characteristics or universals (sāmānyalakṣaṇa) and the pratiniyatā śaktiḥ to be related to unique characteristics or particulars (svalakṣaṇa).^[2] Some scholars explain that the sāmānyā śaktiḥ belongs to the jar as a continuum (santāna) and the pratiniyatā śaktiḥ belongs to the jar as a momentary thing (kṣaṇa).^[3] Other scholars remark that the sāmānyā śaktiḥ belongs only to conventional existence (saṃvṛtisat), but that pratiniyatā śaktiḥ belongs to both conventional existence and ultimate existence (paramārthasat).^[4] And some attribute this theory to Prajñākaragupta, a commentator on Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttika (PV), and not to Dharmakīrti.^[5]

However the following questions arise: How can a jar have a causal capacity if it is regarded as a conceptual construction such as a universal or a continuum? How can conventional existence, such as the whole, have a causal capacity? Does the sāmānyā śaktiḥ represent a useful function for the fulfillment of human purposes? Did Dharmakīrti not advocate these two kinds of causal capacity? Previous studies have not yielded sufficient results concerning these matters or, rather, they seem to contain some misunderstandings. The aim of this paper is to clarify the Buddhist theory of the two kinds of causal capacity by rigorously reexamining various materials.

2. Pramāṇavārttika II 100–102 and commentaries

First of all, we shall examine Dharmakīrti’s PV II 100–102, where the theory of two kinds of causal capacity is presented. In order to prove the transmigration (saṃsāra) of living beings against materialists, Dharmakīrti explains that the mind is not crucially dependent on the body. Then, he examines whether the body, which is regarded as the direct cause of the mind by materialists, is a single entity, i.e. the whole (avayavin), or an aggregate of many parts. He denies the first alternative by pointing out that the whole never exists distinctly from parts, and concludes that the body is nothing but an aggregate of many parts. Next, he argues that, even if the body is an aggregate of many parts, it cannot be the direct cause of the mind.^[6]

In the context of his negation of the existence of the whole, Dharmakīrti refers to the causal capacity of atoms. According to him, a jar is nothing but an aggregate of many atoms, including color atoms. It can never be regarded as a whole. To this, the following objection is raised: “A jar as a whole exists distinctly from its parts, such as color atoms, because people appropriately use genitive expressions such as ‘the color and so on of a jar’ (ghaṭasya rūpādayaḥ), which indicates that there are different referents.”^[7]

Responding to this objection, Dharmakīrti explains that the atoms constituting a jar have two different kinds of causal capacity.

[1] Without implying the individual causal powers (śaktibheda) of the color and other [atoms that constitute a jar], the word “jar” (ghaṭa) [simply] serves to express the exclusion of those things that are not the cause of their common effects [such as containing water] (tatsamānaphala). Therefore, [despite the fact that a jar is not distinct from its parts, including color atoms,] coreferential expressions such as “*a color that is a jar” (rūpaṃ ghaṭaḥ) cannot be used.^[8]

[2] The individual causal powers of the [color and other atoms], which have their aggregate (tatsāmānya) [i.e. a jar] as a qualifier (upasarjana), are ex-pressed by [the genitive expression] “the color and so on of a jar” (ghaṭasya rūpādayaḥ).^[9]

According to Dharmakīrti, when referring to aggregated atoms we use the word “jar” to mean that they can cooperatively produce common effects such as containing water. It should be noted that the word tatsamānaphala (PV II 100c) is said to mean the effect common to all the constituents of the same jar, but not the effect common to all jars. Dharmakīrti seems to apply the theory of causal complex (hetusāmagrī ) to this case.

Each constituent atom has an individual causal power or capacity (śaktibheda) as well. The word “color” is used to define the unique power of the color atoms. Thus, each constituent atom of the same jar has two different kinds of causal capacity: one is the capacity common to all constituent atoms, and the other is the capacity not common to other kinds of atoms.

The word “jar” is used to mean the capacity common to all constituents of the same jar, without implying each individual capacity meant by a word such as “color.” Therefore, we use genitive expressions such as “the color of a jar” (ghaṭasya rūpam) and not coreferential expressions such as “*a color that is a jar” (rūpaṃ ghaṭaḥ).^[10] In this way, Dharmakīrti insists that a genitive expression such as “the color and so on of a jar” (ghaṭasya rūpādayaḥ) is used not because two different entities exist, viz. the whole and its parts, but because the parts have two different causal powers. This expression means that the atoms that can cooperatively produce common effects such as containing water also have individual powers, such as the power to produce a visual perception.^[11] By the word tatsāmānya (PV II 102b), Dharmakīrti does not mean universals such as “jarness” (ghaṭatva), but rather the commonness between the constituents with regard to cooperatively producing the same single effect. He means the aggregate (samudāya) of the atoms.^[12]

The commentators call these two kinds of causal capacity sāmānyā śaktiḥ and pratini-yatā śaktiḥ for example. Devendrabuddhi explains PV II 100 in his Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā (PVP) as follows:

[3] The color and other [atoms] have two kinds of causal capacity [viz. the common capacity and the specific capacity]. [Among these, the first one, i.e.] the common [capacity of the atoms] is, for instance, the capacity to [cooperatively] produce a [common] effect, such as containing water, which the color and other atoms forming a jar have. [The second one, i.e.] the specific [capacity] is, for instance, the capacity to [separately] produce a specific effect, such as a visual cognition. … There are many substances [in this world]. [However, when one says the word ghaṭa] it serves to exclude those things which are not the cause of a single effect, such as containing water, e.g. a tree (vṛkṣa), among them. Why [is the word ghaṭa used in this manner]? It is because the word ghaṭa is conventionally agreed to mean those atoms which have the causal power to cooperatively produce a single effect [such as containing water]. Intending to say that multiple things [i.e. color and other atoms] have the single [common] capacity [to produce a single effect, such as containing water], one uses the singular word ghaṭaḥ in accordance with conventional agreement. Therefore, the singular word can be used to refer even to multiple things without inconsistency.^[13]

Devendrabuddhi distinguishes between the two kinds of causal capacity with the respective terms “the common capacity” (sāmānyā śaktiḥ) and “the specific capacity” (pratiniyatā śaktiḥ).^[14] According to him, both of them belong to the color and so on (rūpādi) that constitute a jar, and not to a jar that can be regarded as the whole or as conventional existence. Namely the color atoms that constitute a jar together with other atoms have both the causal capacity common to other constituent atoms and the causal capacity not common to other kinds of constituent atoms. The common capacity is for producing a single effect, such as containing water, cooperatively with other atoms, and therefore it is common to other constituent atoms such as “smell” atoms.^[15] On the other hand, the specific capacity is for producing a specific effect, such as visual cognition, and therefore it is not common to other kinds of constituent atoms such as smell atoms.

It is also significant that a singular expression is applicable to a plural referent. The assumption that a word in singular form must reflect its referent’s singularity is denied here. According to Devendrabuddhi, the singular expression ghaṭaḥ can be used to refer to the multiple atoms that can cooperatively produce a single effect. In this respect, the singular form corresponds to the single capacity or to the capacity of producing a single effect, not to a single referent.

Although a number of modern scholars have attributed the theory of two kinds of causal capacity to Prajñākaragupta, it is clear that before Prajñākaragupta, Devendrabuddhi had already explained Dharmakīrti’s theory using the terms sāmānyā śaktiḥ and pratiniyatā śaktiḥ.

Next, we turn to Prajñākaragupta’s explanation in his Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra (PVA).

[4] Without implying the individual powers that are separately fixed (pratiniya-taśaktibheda) for [each component of a jar], like color [atoms], the word “jar” (ghaṭa) is used to mean their causal power of [cooperatively] producing one and the same [effect], such as containing water (samānodakadhāraṇaśakti). Therefore, a coreferential expression such as “the color and so forth are a jar” (rūpādayo ghaṭaḥ) cannot be used.^[16] Thus, intending to define some causal power of the aggregate (samudāyaśakti), we use such an aggregate-word (sa-mudāyaśabda) [like the word “jar”]. … [Then, the following question may be raised:] How is the [non-coreferential] expression “the color and so on of a jar” (rūpādayo ghaṭasya) used? [We answer this as follows: It is used to] mean that each of those things that can cooperatively produce a common effect, i.e. containing water, can separately produce its own specific effect, such as visual cognition.^[17]

We should notice that Prajñākaragupta paraphrases the common capacity as “the causal power of the aggregate” (samudāyaśakti) here. This makes it clear that the common capacity is a causal capacity of the aggregated atoms.

As for the pratiniyatā śaktiḥ, Śākyabuddhi gives a more detailed explanation in his Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā (PVṬ):

[5] The sentence “The specific [capacity] is, for instance, …” [in PVP] can be explained as follows: Color [atoms] can produce [their specific] effect, visual cognition, and smell [atoms] can produce [their specific] effect, olfactory cognition. In the same way, for the other [types of atoms, such as taste atoms, their specific capacity] should be mentioned in accordance with their own cognition.^[18]

The pratiniyatā śaktiḥ has been understood by scholars to mean a unique power belonging to a certain object, such as a jar, to produce its own particular perception. However, this passage clearly shows that, in the case of a jar, the pratiniyatā śaktiḥ is the causal capacity that is separately fixed for each type of cause; this belongs to each constituent atom. For example, the color atoms of a jar have the causal capacity of producing a visual sensation, which is separately fixed for the color atoms, and the smell atoms of a jar have the causal capacity of producing an olfactory sensation, which is separately fixed for the smell atoms.

Accordingly, the term pratiniyatā śaktiḥ is used from the viewpoint that these different roles are performed by different constituents of the same aggregate.^[19]

The above examination of the commentaries makes it clear that in PV II 100–102, Dharmakīrti introduced the theory of two kinds of causal capacity to account for non-coreferential expressions such as ghaṭasya rūpādayaḥ (the color and so on of a jar) without admitting the existence of a whole. Dharmakīrti believes that these two words are used to refer to the two different types of causal capacity, of which both belong to the aggregated atoms. Namely, the word ghaṭa (jar) is used to mean their common capacity, and the word rūpādi (color and such) is used to mean their specific capacities. The non-coreferential expression can be made because the word ghaṭa simply means the common capacity without implying any specific capacity. And besides, the singular word ghaṭasya can be used to refer to the multiple aggregated atoms because they commonly have a single effect.

3. Dharmakīrti’s other works

Next, we will examine whether this concept of two kinds of causal capacity is found in Dharmakīrti’s other works. I would like to show here that there are several passages related to this concept.

When discussing the relationship between words and the causal capacity of objects in PV I and in his auto-commentary (PVSV), Dharmakīrti explicates the causal capacities of the respective causes and their complex.^[20] He explains that the reason why a single word is applied to a plural referent is because manifold things share the capacity of producing a single effect. According to him, someone who wants to simplify one’s practical action can collectively designate such manifold things by using a single word in conformity with verbal conventions.^[21] Dharmakīrti classifies such manifold things as one of three types: 1) aggregate (samūha), 2) continuum (santāna), and 3) a particular state (avasthāviśeṣa).^[22]

Of these, he illustrates the case of an aggregate using the example of a jar as follows:

[6] In the case where an entire set of causes produces some single effect [e.g. containing water], a worldly person, who thinks that there is no use to express the differences among them because all of them have no difference in this respect, uses a single word, e.g. “jar” (ghaṭa), to refer to all of them at once. Though they are all [ultimately] distinct from their respective homologues and heterologues, [we conventionally consider] there to be no difference among them for the reason that, in terms of their causing that single effect, they are equally differentiated from others [that do not contribute to the production of that effect]. Therefore, all of them are understood by the single word “jar” without distinguishing one from another.^[23]

[7] [Question: If you insist that a jar is nothing but an aggregate of color and other atoms and reject that a jar as the whole (avayavin) exists distinctly from its parts, how do you explain a non-coreferential expression such as “the color and so on of a jar” (ghaṭasya rūpādayaḥ)? Answer:] In that case, even if the genitive expression “the color and so on of a jar” is used, [it does not indicate that a jar exists distinctly from color and so on]. It simply means that the color and other [atoms together] have the nature of a jar. In other words, this means that [the color and other atoms] can [cooperatively] produce a [single] effect such as “a specific way of containing water” (udakadhāraṇaviśeṣa).^[24] Those [atoms] are known to have the nature to produce an effect [e.g. visual sensation] common (sāmānyakārya) to other atoms of the same kind, and are established by the words “the color and so on” (rūpādi). But [when the words are used with the modifier “of a jar” (ghaṭasya)] those atoms are specified by the specification that indicates that they can produce a specific effect (viśiṣṭakārya) [e.g. containing water] as well. Such things are meant by the words “the color and so on of a jar” (ghaṭasya rūpādayaḥ). However, in the case [of the word ghaṭa], distinctly [from the color and other atoms], there does not exist any substance [such as a whole] having characteristics just as you described them, because such a substance cannot be perceived at all. Moreover, the reason why the singular word ghaṭaḥ is used [for a plurality of things] is because it refers to their capability of cooperatively producing a single effect [such as containing water], or, rather, just because it depends on the verbal convention (saṃketa).^[25]

A jar should be regarded as a complex of multiple atoms, and not as a single whole. Each of the constituent atoms of the same jar is differentiated from its respective homologues and heterologues. However, the atoms are all equally differentiated from other atoms that are not constituents of the jar, in respect to their contributions to the production of the same single effect. Therefore, the constituent atoms are conventionally regarded as non-different, and are referred to by the single word “jar.”

Moreover, the word rūpādayaḥ (the color and so on) refers to those atoms that have different causal powers to produce their specific effects, such as visual perception. These causal powers are common to other atoms that are not constituents of the jar. But in the expression ghaṭasya rūpādayaḥ, the atoms are identified by the specification indicating that they can produce another effect, e.g. containing water, and the atoms that are meant are those which are the constituent atoms of a jar.^[26]

It should be noted that Dharmakīrti mentions here another reason why the singular word ghaṭaḥ is used. He adds that the usage of words is dependent on verbal conventions. This solution seems preferable to him. In this respect, it is not absolute that words correspond to the causal capacity of objects. This point will be examined again below.

The theory of the two kinds of causal capacity is clearly found in these passages of PVSV. There, unlike what we find in PV II, an effect such as visual cognition is regarded as a common effect (sāmānyakārya) in that it is common to atoms of the same kind that do not constitute the jar, and an effect such as “containing water” is regarded as a specific effect (viśiṣṭakārya) in that it is not common to other atoms that do not constitute the jar. However, what he intends to explain here is the same as in PV II.

In the Hetubindu (HB), Dharmakīrti illustrates the two different aspects of causal capacity using the example of the production of a jar.

It should be noted that here he argues about the causes of the production of a jar, viz. a lump of clay, a potter, strings, etc., and not about the constituents of a jar, such as the color atoms.

[8] [Objection:] If a single effect [i.e. a visual sensation] is produced by the cooperative causes, viz. a visual organ and so on, each of which is differen-tiated from others in its essence, then effects would not differ in accordance with the difference of the cause. [Answer:] There is no such fault, because the specific features effectuated by the contribution of causes cannot be mixed together since the causes differ amongst themselves according to their respec-tive essences and separately contribute to different features of the [effect].

For example, a jar, made by some cooperative causal factors, viz. a lump of clay, a potter, strings, etc., has [the following different features given by them]: [Firstly, the jar has] the essential feature [of being made of clay], by which it is differentiated from non-clay things such as trees. This feature is given by its material cause, i.e. a lump of clay. [Secondly,] the jar, a product of clay, has another essential feature, a certain characteristic form, by which it is differenti-ated from other [products of clay]. This second feature is given by its maker, i.e. the potter. [Thirdly,] the jar, which is a product of clay and has a characteristic form, has still another essential feature by which it is differentiated from other clay things having a characteristic form, such as a jar made with a potter’s wheel. This third feature is given by its instrumental cause, i.e. the strings. In this way, [there is no confusion of effects]. The essential feature of being made of clay is [given by the clay], not by the potter. The essential feature of a characteristic form is [given by the potter], not by the clay. Moreover, although the scope or range of the specific efficiencies of these two, i.e. clay and a potter, are different from each other, a certain individual thing affected by them, i.e. a certain jar, is [identical, but] not different in its essence. For if it were not identical, a specific form and clay [of the same jar] would not appear together because they would be essentially different from each other.^[27]

A jar is produced by the contribution of causal factors, viz. a lump of clay, a potter, strings, etc. Each of them contributes to the production of the same jar in one way or another. In this respect, they all have the same single effect. However, each causal factor has its own scope or range as well. For example, a lump of clay contributes to the jar’s feature of being made of clay. The potter contributes to the jar’s feature of a specific form. In this respect, every causal factor has its own specific effect as well. Thus, in the case of a causal complex, every cause has two aspects: one is that it produces the same single effect cooperatively with others, and another is that it produces its own specific effect. These two aspects are also illustrated using the example of a visual perception.^[28]

Here Dharmakīrti explains that, in the case of a causal complex, each cause has two kinds of capacity. This is close to the explanation that each constituent atom of a jar has two kinds of causal capacity, or rather his explanation of atoms’ two kinds of causal capacity is based on his theory of causal complexes. It is clear that he regards aggregated atoms as a kind of causal complex.

The common capacity of aggregated atoms is explained in the Vādanyāya (VN) as follows:

[9] Moreover, only the multiple [atoms], including color [atoms], that cooper-atively produce a single effect [e.g. containing water] should be referred to by the single word ghaṭaḥ. There is no need to assume an object other [than the atoms as being a referent of the word ghaṭa]. This is because even multiple things can produce a single effect, as is seen in the case of visual organs and so on. … In that case, if we, referring to multiple things that contribute toward the same purpose collaboratively or separately,^[29] use one word in order to express that they are such things, what kind of problem would occur? Because an aggregate word (samudāyaśabda) is used to mean their causal capacity [to produce a single effect], there is no inconsistency in the singular form. The one and the same (eka) causal power belongs to the things that accompany each other, but not to the things that are separate from each other. Therefore, when an aggregate word is used to refer to one aggregate, the singular word ghaṭaḥ is [used for the referent].^[30]

The constituents of the same jar operate simultaneously and produce a single effect, such as containing water. All of them contribute to the single effect in one way or another. This type of causal capacity of the constituents is considered similar to the capacity of a causal complex to produce a visual perception. To express that they are such things, one uses the single word ghaṭa in the singular form. It is considered an aggregate word (samudāyaśabda).^[31] Here again, it is clear that Dharmakīrti refers to a common capacity in order to explain the singular expression of the aggregate, which he regards as one kind of causal capacity of a causal complex.^[32]

As we have seen, the theory of two kinds of causal capacity is clearly found in Dharma-kīrti’s works. He consistently argues that each cause of a causal complex has two different kinds of capacity.^[33]

We are now at the stage of evaluating earlier studies. The following points should be made: First, in the case of a jar, the common capacity is the causal capacity of the constituent atoms to produce a single effect cooperatively with each other, but not the causal capacity of the jar, which is common to all jars.^[34] On the other hand, the specific capacity is the causal capacity of each constituent atom to produce its own specific effect, such as visual perception, but not the causal capacity of the jar to produce its own perception, which is not common to other jars. Second, these two kinds of causal capacity both belong to the same element of a complex, for example, in the case of a jar, to the same constituent atoms, such as the color atoms. Therefore, it is not incorrect to say that these two belong to the respective things. Third, when discussing the expression “the color and so on of a jar,” Dharmakīrti introduces the theory of two kinds of causal capacity in order to explain the usage of such expressions without admitting a whole. Therefore, he can never say that a common capacity belongs to a conventional existent (saṃvṛtisat), such as a whole. Fourth, it has been reported that whereas a specific capacity belongs to real things, viz. particulars (svalakṣaṇa), momentary things (kṣaṇa) and so on, a common capacity belongs to conceptually constructed things, viz. common characteristics or universals (sāmānyalakṣaṇa), the continuum (santāna) and so on. However, it is clear that these both belong to real things. Conceptual construction does not have any causal capacity.^[35] Fifth, the “fulfillment of a human’s purpose,” which is reported to be the meaning of the word arthakriyā, is not mentioned in Dharmakīrti’s explanation of common capacity. Common capacity and specific capacity are both causal capacities to produce an effect.

4. Dignāga’s Pramāṇasamuccaya (-vṛtti) I 4cd

As is shown above, the specific capacity (pratiniyatā śaktiḥ) is, for instance, the causal power of the color atoms of a jar to produce a visual perception, or the causal power of the smell atoms of the same jar to produce an olfactory perception. However, the single atom or the atoms separately situated can never produce a sense perception. Only when gathered together can homologous atoms produce sensations, which is their single effect. Hence, in this respect, an atom’s capacity for producing a sense perception collaboratively with other homologous atoms can be regarded as a kind of common capacity (sāmānyā śaktiḥ).

As is well known, such commonness or similarity of the aggregated atoms is referred to by Dignāga in the Pramāṇasamuccaya and in his auto-commentary (PS(V)). He defines perception as cognition that is free from conceptualization and insists that its object is the particular (svalakṣaṇa). This leads to the following two questions: (1) Why is sense perception, which grasps aggregated atoms as one, free from conceptualization? (2)

Why is it stated in the Abhidharma treatise that sense perceptions do not have particulars as their object with respect to the particular characteristics of the substantial elements (dravyasvalakṣaṇa)?^[36]

[10] [Objection:] If you insist that aggregated atoms are not conceptually ac-cepted as one by perception, then why is it stated [in the Abhidharma treatise] that five groups of sensation have aggregated [atoms] as their objects? And besides, why is it stated [in the Abhidharma treatise] that these [groups of sensation] have particulars as their object with respect to the particular charac-teristics of the sense spheres (āyatanasvalakṣaṇa), but not to the particular characteristic of the substantial elements (dravyasvalakṣaṇa)? [Answer:]

In the [above Abhidharma passages], [perception that is directed] toward its particular object [in respect to the particular characteristic of the sense sphere] is stated to have a sāmānya as its object [with respect to the particular characteristic of the substantial elements], because it is produced by many substantial elements [i.e. atoms]. (4cd)

[Perception that occurs] in its own sense sphere is stated to have a sāmānya as its object [with respect to the particular characteristic of the substantial elements], because it is produced by many substantial elements [i.e. atoms], but not because the different [atoms] are conceptually accepted as non-different from each other.^[37]

Answering the two questions, Dignāga explains that sense perception is produced by multiple atoms. According to him, sense perception is said to have aggregated atoms as its object not because it conceptually grasps aggregated atoms as one, but because it is produced by the aggregated atoms. Therefore, it is free from conceptualization. Moreover, its object is said to be sāmānya in respect to dravyasvalakṣaṇa, not because it has a conceptualized object, but because it is produced by aggregated atoms rather than by a single atom.

The idea that multiple things cooperatively produce a single effect is basically the same as the idea of sāmānyā śaktiḥ. Consequently, it is reasonable to suppose that the atom’s efficiency in producing a sense perception collaboratively with other homologous atoms can be regarded as a kind of common capacity.

It should be noted that the aggregated atoms that produce a single sense perception are called sāmānya here. The word means neither universals nor commonness in this context. It is being used in a similar fashion as is the word sāmānya in the compound tatsāmānya (PV II 102b. See [2]). The aggregated atoms themselves that commonly have the sāmānya śaktih can also be called sāmānya.^[38]

Moreover, it is significant that Dignāga refers here to two kinds of particular (sva-lakṣaṇa): particulars concerning the sense spheres (āyatanasvalakṣaṇa) and particulars concerning substantial elements (dravyasvalakṣaṇa). The aggregated atoms are regarded as svalakṣaṇa with respect to the former, and as sāmānya, which as mentioned above means “aggregate,” with respect to the latter. The aggregated atoms have two different aspects. In the first aspect, for example, the color atoms are differentiated from other types of atoms such as smell atoms. The color atoms never produce olfactory sensations. The ability of the aggregated atoms is limited and separately defined in each type. This ability is nothing but the specific capacity (pratiniyatā śaktiḥ) mentioned by later Buddhists. On the other hand, in the second aspect, the aggregated atoms are differentiated from a single atom that cannot produce any sense perception by itself.^[39] This aggregate’s ability of cooperatively producing a single effect can be regarded as a kind of common capacity, as mentioned above. In this way, Dignāga’s idea that the aggregate becomes the object of sense perception can be interpreted in relation to the theory of two kinds of causal capacity. However, he does not directly mention the two different kinds of causal capacity of atoms. We can safely say that the groundwork for the theory of the two kinds of causal capacity was prepared by Dignāga.^[40]

In fact, Dharmakīrti’s argument concerning the two kinds of causal capacity in PV II arises in the context of the explanation that aggregated atoms have special features for producing their own cognition, unlike a single atom or atoms that are situated separately.^[41]

The theory of causal complex, according to which multiple things can cooperatively produce a single effect, seems to be one of the most important foundations for his epistemology and ontology.

5. Is causal capacity absolute?

As we have seen above, Dharmakīrti additionally remarks in PVSV ([7]) that the usage of words is dependent on verbal conventions. Judging from this, it is not absolute that words must correspond to the causal capacity of objects. There are similar comments in his other works.

For example, in the Vādanyāya, after explaining the correspondence between words and causal powers, Dharmakīrti states the following:

[11] However, we [Buddhists] never stick to [our explanation of the relationship between words and causal powers] because [words simply] operate to denote or connote their objects fixed by a verbal convention as the verbal convention governs.^[42]

This passage clearly shows that Dharmakīrti does not overly stress his theory of two kinds of causal capacity. It is not absolute for him. He ultimately thinks that words are dependent only on verbal conventions.^[43]

In PV I and PVSV Dharmakīrti demonstrates that the relationship between words and objects is not intrinsic but extrinsic because it is based only on the verbal conventions established by humans. According to him, the different forms of words do not have any relation to external objects. For example, the words dārāḥ (pl., wife), ṣaṇṇagarī (sg., six cities) and so on do not correspond to their referents in number.^[44]

Dharmakīrti also makes a sarcastic comment about the false view that words are strongly connected to external objects as follows:

[12] Words, which can produce no appearance of external things and which can merely be causes of conceptual cognition in accordance with preceding repeated experiences, operate to denote or connote objects, depending only on human intentions. Nevertheless, [some linguists and philosophers seri-ously] consider the application of words to objects, and determine real things separately in accordance with words. They just display their own ignorance.^[45]

In the ultimate sense, words themselves do not have any direct relation to external objects. Words can be used to denote or connote objects and are dependent only on the speaker’s will. Words can also produce no appearance of external things.^[46] Nevertheless, many thinkers attempt to find the applications of words in external objects, and to determine external objects in accordance with words. According to Dharmakīrti, they should feel deep regret for their follies.^[47]

Interestingly, in this context, he presents the objection that a singular word can be used to refer to multiple things because it signifies their causal capacity to produce one and the same effect.

He refutes this objection by pointing out that capacity never exists apart from real being.

[13] [Objection:] Such [aggregated] things [including houses, humans, and so on] share the same capacity for [producing] some [single effect]. This [capacity] is the grounds [for the singular word nagaram (a city)]. [Answer:] This is not correct because capacity is not different from the things themselves. Or, if [the capacity] were different, [it would not be dependent on the thing] because the capacity, which cannot be assisted by anything, is not dependent on [the thing]. Or, if the capacity (C1) could be assisted [by another capacity (C2)], the capacity (C2) assisting the capacity (C1) would be different [from the capacity (C1), and capacity (C2) should be assisted by still another capacity (C3)]. In this way, a series of capacities would be infinite, and therefore we would not understand [the capacity at all]. Or, if the [capacity (C2)] is not different [from capacity (C1)], the first one (C1) would not be different from the thing. Therefore, this [objection] is a matter of indifference [to us].^[48]

We should notice that what is refuted by Dharmakīrti here is exactly the same as his own theory of sāmānyā śaktiḥ. Here he has turned around and is criticizing the causal capacity. According to this passage, causal capacity never exists in reality, it can only be a conceptual construction. Dharmakīrti denies the realistic view of causal capacity.^[49] This reminds us of the fact that he denies causal capacity from the viewpoint of the ultimate truth in PV III.^[50] The theory of two kinds of causal capacity cannot ultimately contribute to satisfactorily explaining the application of words to referents. It is only used as a conventional theory for the philosophical argument. Dharmakīrti presents his argument only by tentatively accepting that words have some relation to the external world. From the viewpoint of the ultimate truth, he holds that how words are used depends merely on verbal conventions established by humans and never reflects reality. Furthermore, he rejects the realistic view of causal capacity. Several concepts are introduced to explain worldly affairs and these concepts have some consistency. However, they are just conceptual constructions and are not absolute. We should not adhere to them.^[51]

6. Conclusion

In conclusion, I would like to state the following five points:

1. In the example of a jar, two kinds of causal capacity belong to the constituent atoms of the jar, such as the color atoms, but neither to the jar as a whole (avayavin) nor to the jar as a continuum (santāna).

2. In the case of the color atoms of the jar, common capacity (sāmānyā śaktiḥ) is their causal capacity to produce a single effect, such as containing water, cooperatively with other kinds of atoms of the same jar; specific capacity (pratiniyatā śaktiḥ) is their causal capacity to produce their own specific effect, such as visual perception.

3. The capacity of the color atoms to produce a visual perception is regarded as the specific capacity in comparison to other kinds of atoms, such as smell atoms. However, it can be regarded as the common capacity in the sense that only aggregated atoms can have this capacity.

4. The theory of two kinds of causal capacity is advocated by Dharmakīrti throughout his works. The groundwork for this theory was prepared by Dignāga.

5. When discussing the expression “the color and so on of a jar,” Dharmakīrti intro-duces the theory of two kinds of causal capacity in order to explain the expression without admitting a whole. However, he does not stick exclusively to this theory. He finally abandons the theoretical explanation of the relationship between words and objects and adopts the view that words are just dependent on the verbal conventions established by humans. From the viewpoint of the ultimate truth, causal capacity is also merely a conceptual construction.

References and abbreviations

AJP; AJPSV Anekāntajayapatākā; Anekāntajayapatākāsvopajñavyākhyā: Anekāntajaya-patākā by Haribhadra Sūri. With his own commentary and Municandra Sūri’s supercommentary, ed. Hiralal R. Kapadia. 2 vols. Baroda 1940, 1947.

AK; AKBh Abhidharmakośa; Abhidharmakośabhāṣya: Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam of Vasubandhu, ed. Prahlada Pradhan. Patna^[52] 1967,^[53] 1975.

AKV Abhidharmakośavyākhyā: Sphuṭārthā Abhidharmakośavyākhyā. The work of Yaśo-mitra, ed. Unrai Wogihara. Tokyo 1936, 1971, 1989.

Bae 2011 Bae Gyeong-a, Prajñākaragupta ni okeru kotoba no imiron [The Semantics of Prajñākaragupta]. Journal of Indian Buddhist Studies 59-2 (2011) 90–93.

Chu 2008 Junjie Chu, On Dignāga’s Theory of the Object of Cognition as Presented in PS(V). Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 29-2 (2008) 211–253.

Dreyfus 1997 Georges B. J. Dreyfus, Recognizing Reality. Dharmakīrti’s Philosophy and Its Tibetan Interpretations. Albany 1997.

Dunne 2004 John D. Dunne, Foundations of Dharmakīrti’s Philosophy. Boston 2004.

Funayama 2012 Toru Funayama, Ninshikiron–Chikaku no riron to sono tenkai [Episte-mology: the theory of perception and its development]. In: Ninshikiron to ronrigaku. Tokyo 2012, 91–120.

Hattori 1968 Masaaki Hattori, Dignāga, On Perception, being the Pratyakṣapariccheda of Dignāga’s Pramāṇasamuccaya. Cambridge, Massachusetts 1968.

HB Hetubindu, Sanskrit text reconstructed in: Dharmakīrtis Hetubindu. Teil I: Tibetischer Text und rekonstruierter Sanskrit-text, ed. Ernst Steinkellner. Wien 1967.

HBṬ Hetubinduṭīkā: Hetubinduṭīkā of Bhaṭṭa Arcaṭa with the Sub-commentary Entitled Āloka of Durveka Miśra, ed. Pandit Sukhlalji Sanghavi and Muni Shri Jinavijayaji. Baroda 1949.

Inami 2000 Masahiro Inami, astu yathā tathā. In: Indian Culture and logic. Dr. Hiromasa Tosaki Felicitation Volume. Fukuoka 2000, 359–397.

Inami 2012 Masahiro Inami, Nishu no ingakōryoku–sāmānyā śakti to pratiniyatā śakti–[Two Kinds of Causal Capacity: sāmānyā śakti and pratiniyatā śakti]. Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies (Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū) 61-1 (2012) (82)–(87). Inami 2013 Masahiro Inami, Pramāṇavārttika Pramāṇasiddhi-shō no kenkyū (12) [A Study of the Pramāṇasiddhi Chapter of Pramāṇavārttika (12)]. Bulletin of Tokyo Gakugei University, Division of Humanities and Social Sciences II 64 (2013) 89–114.

Inami 2014 Masahiro Inami, Pramāṇavārttika Pramāṇasiddhi-shō no kenkyū (13) [A Study of the Pramāṇasiddhi Chapter of Pramāṇavārttika (13)]. Bulletin of Tokyo Gakugei University, Division of Humanities and Social Sciences II 65 (2014) 71–94. Inami and Tillemans 1986 Masahiro Inami and Tom J. F. Tillemans, Another Look at the Framework of the Pramāṇasiddhi Chapter of Pramāṇavārttika. Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens XXX (1986) 123–142.

Katsura 1983 Shoryu Katsura, Dharmakīrti no ingaron [Dharmakīrti’s Theory of Causal-ity]. Nanto Bukkyo 50 (1983) 96–114.

Katsura 1984 Shoryu Katsura, Dharmakīrti’s Theory of Truth. Journal of Indian Philos-ophy 12 (1984) 215–235.

Katsura 2002 Shoryu Katsura, Sonzai towa nanika–Dharmakīrti no shiten [On What There Is: From Dharmakīrti’s Point of View]. Bulletin of Research Institute for Buddhist Culture Ryukoku University 41 (2002) 263–275.

Katsura 2012 Shoryu Katsura, Bukkyō-ronrigaku no kozō to sono igi [The Structure of Buddhist Logic and its Significance]. In: Ninshikiron to ronrigaku. Tokyo 2012, 3–48. Mikogami 1978 Esho Mikogami, Mono ni sonawaru fuhenteki-kinō to tokushuteki-kinō [Sāmānyā śakti and Pratiniyatā śakti: Dharmapāla, Dharmakīrti, and Prajñākaragupta]. Bulletin of Research Institute for Buddhist Culture, Ryukoku University 17 (1978) 1–15.

Mikogami 1979 Esho Mikogami, Some Remarks on the Concept of Arthakriyā. Journal of Indian Philosophy 7 (1979) 79–94.

Much 1991 Michael T. Much, Dharmakīrtis Vādanyāya. Teil II Übersetzung und An-merkungen. Wien 1991.

Nagatomi 1967/68 Masatoshi Nagatomi, Arthakriyā. Adyar Library Bulletin 31–32 (1967/ 68) 52–72.

NVin; NVinV Nyāyaviniścaya; Nyāyaviniścayavivaraṇa: Nyāyaviniścayavivaraṇa of Vādi-rājasūri, the Sanskrit Commentary on Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅkadeva’s Nyāyaviniścaya, ed. Mahendra Kumar Jain. 2 vols. Delhi 1944.

PS I; PSV I Pramāṇasamuccaya, Chapter I; Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti Chapter I: Sanskrit text reconstructed by Ernst Steinkellner. https://www.oeaw.ac.at/fileadmin/Ins titute/IKGA/PDF/forschung/buddhismuskunde/dignaga_PS_1.pdf, last visited 10-12-2016.

PSṬ Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā: Jinendrabuddhi’s Viśālāmalavatī Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā, Chapter 1, Part 1: Critical Edition, ed. E. Steinkellner, H. Krasser, and H. Lasic. Beijing/Vienna 2005.

PV I; PVSV Pramāṇavārttika, Chapter I (=Svārthānumāna); Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti: The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti, the First Chapter with the Autocommentary. Text and Critical Notes, ed. Raniero Gnoli. Roma 1960.

PV II, IV Pramāṇavārttika, Chapter II (=Pramāṇasiddhi), Chapter IV (=Parārthānumāna): Yusho Miyasaka, Pramāṇavārttikakārikā (Sanskrit and Tibetan). Acta Indologica 2 (1972). [The Pramāṇasiddhi Chapter is treated as Chapter I in Miyasaka’s Edition.]

PV III Pramāṇavārttika, Chapter III (=Pratyakṣa). Sanskrit text in: Tosaki 1979.

PVA Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra: Pramāṇavārtikabhāshyam or Vārtikālaṅkāraḥ of Prajñāka-ragupta. (Being a commentary on Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇa-vārtikam), ed. Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana. Patna 1953.

PVmsH A Sanskrit manuscript of Pramāṇavārttika (from the collection kept by Hemarāja Śarman) printed in: Birgit Kellner and Francesco Sferra, A Palm-leaf Manuscript of Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttika from the Collection kept by the Nepalese rājaguru Hemarāja Śarman. Manuscripta Buddhica 1 Sanskrit texts from Giuseppe Tucci’s Collection Part I, ed. F. Sferra. Roma 2008.

PVP Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā, Tibetan translation. D No. 4217. P No. 5717.

PVSVṬ Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛttiṭīkā: Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛttiṭīkā of Karṇakagomin, ed. Rahula Sāṅkṛityāyana. Ilāhābād 1943.

PVṬ Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā (Śākyabuddhi), Tibetan translation. D No. 4220. P No. 5718.

PVV(M) Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti (Manorathanandin): Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttika with a commentary by Manorathanandin, ed. Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana. The Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society XXIV, XXV, XXVI (1938–40).

PVV(R) Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti (Ravigupta) ad PV II, Tibetan translation. D No. 4224; P No. 5726.

Sakurabe 1969 Hajime Sakurabe, Kusharon no kenkyū kai-kon-hon [A Study of Abhidha-rmakośa: the chapters on elements and faculties]. Kyoto 1969.

SP Sambandhaparīkṣā: Vādanyāyaprakaraṇa of Acharya Dharmakīrti with the Com-mentary Vipañcitārthā of Acharya Śāntarakṣita and Sambandha-parīkṣā with the commentary of Acharya Prabhāchandra, ed. Swami Dwarikadas Shastri. Varanasi 1972.

Tosaki 1979 Hiromasa Tosaki, Bukkyō-ninshikiron no kenkyū, jōkan [A Study of Buddhist Epistemology, vol. I]. Tokyo 1979.

TR Tarkarahasya, ed. H. Yaita. In: Hideomi Yaita, Three Sanskrit Texts from the Buddhist Pramāṇa-Tradition. Narita 2005.

TS; TSP Tattvasaṃgraha; Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā: Tattvasaṃgraha of Ācārya Śāntarakṣita with the Commentary ‘Pañjikā’ of Shri Kamalashīla, ed. Swami Dwarikadas Shastri. 2 vols. Varanasi^[54] 1968,^[55] 1981.

Ui 1958 H. Ui, Jinna chosaku no kenkyū. Tokyo 1958.

Vādarahasya Vādarahasya (also called Udayananirākaraṇa, author unknown), ed. R. Pandhey. New Delhi 1984.

Vetter 1964 Tilmann Vetter, Erkenntnisprobleme bei Dharmakīrti. Wien 1964.

Vibh Vibhūticandra’s Note to Manorathanandin’s PVV. Sanskrit text edited in the footnotes of the Appendix to the Sāṅkṛtyāyana’s edition of PVV(M).

Vibhāṣā Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣāśāstra, Chinese translation (阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論). Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō (大正新修大蔵経), vol. 27, No. 1545.

VN Vādanyāya: Dharmakīrtis Vādanyāya. Teil I Sanskrit-Text, ed. Michael T. Much. Wien 1991.

VNṬ Vādanyāyaṭīkā (Vinītadeva), Tibetan translation. D No. 4240; P No. 5737.

VNṬV Vādanyāyaṭīkā Vipañcitārthā (Śāntarakṣita): Vādanyāyaprakaraṇa of Acharya Dharmakīrti with the Commentary Vipañcitārthā of Acharya Śāntarakṣita and Sambandhaparīkṣā with the commentary of Acharya Prabhāchandra, ed. Swami Dwarikadas Shastri. Varanasi 1972.

Vora and Ota 1980 Pradyumna R. Vora and Shinkai Ota, A Translation of Pramāṇavārt-tika I and Svavṛtti (2). Bulletin of Saga Ryukoku Junior College 26 (1980) 1–19.

Yoshida 2011 Akira Yoshida, Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā dai-isshō (ad PS I 3c–5 & PSV) wayaku [A Japanese Translation of the Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā (ad PS I 3cd–5 & PSV)]. Journal of Indian and Tibetan Studies 15 (2011) 134–164.

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

Esho Mikogami was the first scholar to pay attention to the Buddhist theory of two kinds of causal capacity. He examined PV II 100–102 and Prajñākaragupta’s commentary and concluded that the sāmānyaśakti is the useful function possessed by things in our daily life and that it is related to the sāmānyalakṣaṇa; the pratiniyataśakti is the causal efficiency that gives rise to the perception of color, etc., and it is related to the svalakṣaṇa. Mikogami understood that these two correspond with the two meanings of arthakriyā as pointed out by Nagatomi 1967/68 (Mikogami 1978, 1979). After Mikogami’s study, Shoryu Katsura considered these two kinds of causal capacity several times. According to his first examination of this theory (Katsura 1983: 97–100), the pratiniyataśakti is the unique capacity that momentary existence has, and should be regarded as the primary meaning of the word arthakriyā. In contrast, the sāmānyaśakti is, for example, a pot’s capacity for containing water, something common to other pots, thus meaning “a useful function for the fulfillment of a human purpose.” It is related to the conceptual cognition of the universal or of the continuum. It is not causal capacity in a strict sense, and therefore should be regarded as the secondary meaning of the word arthakriyā. In this paper, Katsura concluded that the pratiniyataśakti is the causal capacity to produce a direct perception and the sāmānyaśakti is the causal capacity to produce an indirect or judgmental cognition. This understanding also appears in a later study published in English (Katsura 1984: 218–219).

[2]:

Mikogami 1978, 1979; Katsura 1983, 1984.

[3]:

Katsura 1983, 1984. See n. 1. Cf. Dreyfus 1997: 361; Funayama 2012: 109.

[4]:

Katsura 2012: 22–23 explains that Dharmakīrti classifies two kinds of causal capacity: one is the capacity to produce one’s own cognition, which belongs both to ultimate existence and to conventional existence, and the other is the capacity to fulfill human purpose, which belongs only to conventional existence.

[5]:

Katsura 2002 points out that because it was problematic whether a pot, which Dharmakīrti had explained as possessing the two kinds of causal capacity, could be regarded as an ultimate existence, Prajñākaragupta later explained that both of these capacities belong to atoms. According to Bae 2011: 92–93, Dharmakīrti thinks that the svalakṣaṇa has a causal capacity and the sāmānyalakṣaṇa has the ability to fulfill human purposes. Of these, Prajñākaragupta divides causal capacity into two kinds: common capacity and specific capacity.

[6]:

For an outline of PV II, see Inami and Tillemans 1986. On the details of the arguments in PV II 1–102, see my serial studies on PV II.

[7]:

See PVA 98,3–5: yadi tarhi nāvayavī rasādaya eva tadā na ghaṭasya rūpādaya iti bhavet / na hi bhavati rūpādīnāṃ rūpam / nāpi ghaṭasya vā ghaṭa iti paryālocanaṃ parasyāśaṅkyāha /…; PVV(R) D341b5–6, P195b1: gal te gzugs la sogs pa las tha dad pa’i yan lag can med na / de’i tshe bum pa dang gzugs la’di don gcig pa nyid du’gyur ba ma yin nam zhe na / ’dir smras pa /… Cf. PVṬ D160b5, P187a4: gal te bum pa’i gzugs zhes bya ba la sogs pa ldog pa ji ltar rung zhe na /…; PVSVṬ 271,15–16: yadi rūpādaya eva kevalā ghaṭo na tu tadvyatiriktaṃ dravyaṃ, kathan tarhi ghaṭasya rūpādaya iti vyatireka iti ced āha / … In connection with the theory that the genitive expression indicates the difference of referents, Dharmakīrti and his followers refer to the grammatical rule vyatireke ṣaṣṭhī . PVSV 36,5–6: na hi vyatireke ṣaṣṭhī bāhulye jasādaya ity etad api puruṣābhiprāyanirapekṣaṃ vastusaṃnidhimātreṇa svayaṃ pravṛttam / …; PVP D43b5–43b6, P49a7–b2: gal te ldan pa la sogs pa don gzhan ma yin pa de’i tshe / tha dad par rjod (rjod D; brjod P) par byed pa’i drug pas* tha snyad du byed par mi’gyur te / dper na’di’i gcig nyid ces bya ba la sogs pa lta bu yin na yang’gyur ba de’i phyir don gzhan yin no // sbyor ba ni gang zhig gang las tha dad par bstan pa de ni de las don gzhan yin te / dper na lha sbyin (lha sbyin D; lhas byin P) gyi spyi blugs lta bu’o // ldan pa la sogs pa yang bum pa la sogs pa (sogs pa P; sogs D) las tha dad par (par D; pas P) bstan pa yin no zhes bya ba ni rang bzhin gyi gtan tshigs yin par sems so // (*Vibh p. 46, n. 5: vyatirekaṣaṣṭhī /); PVṬ D80b3–4, P94b8–95a1: brda sprod pa pa la sogs pa sgra de lta bu rnams brjod par bya ba’i don dag la / ’jug *pa sems pa tha dad pa la ni drug pa’o / zhes bya ba la sogs pa gang yin pa dang / …; PVSVṬ 158,23–24: … evaṃ bhūtānāṃ śabdānāṃ vācyeṣv artheṣu yeyam pravṛtticintā vyatireke ṣaṣṭhyādaya ityādikā / …, etc. It can be interpreted that the word ghaṭasya refers to dravya and rūpādayaḥ to guṇas. Dharmakīrti already criticized the Vaiśeṣika system of ontology in PV II 89–96. According to him, dravya, guṇa, karman and so on are nothing but conceptual constructions; they do not exist distinctly from each other in the outer world.

[8]:

PV II 100–101ab: rūpādiśaktibhedānām anākṣepeṇa vartate / tatsamānaphalāhetuvyavacchede ghaṭaśrutiḥ // ato na rūpaṃ ghaṭa ity ekādhikaraṇā śrutiḥ /

[9]:

PV II 102a–c: rūpādayo ghaṭasyeti tatsāmānyopasarjanāḥ / tacchaktibhedāḥ khyāpyante. The passages [1] and [2] are translated in Mikogami 1978: 5, 1979: 81, and Katsura 2002: 269. In the Tarkarahasya (TR 24*,2–7), PV II 100–101 are quoted together with Vākyapadīya II 155: saṃsthānavarṇāvayavair viśiṣṭe yaḥ pravartate / śabdo na tasyāvayave pravṛttir upalabhyate //. In the Vādarahasya (also called Udayananirākaraṇa, author unknown.) pp. 50–51, PV II 97–102 are quoted and explained in reference to PVA.

[10]:

The word ghaṭa in the expression ghaṭasya rūpādayaḥ is regarded as a “term for an aggregate” (samudā-yaśabda). It is also considered a “generic term” (jatiśabda) depending on context. Dharmakīrti explains the difference between jatiśabda and samudāyaśabda in PV II 101cd: bhedaś cāyaṃ mato jātisamudā-yābhidhānayoḥ // [I tentatively adopt this reading of the Sanskrit text of PV II 101cd. See PVmsH 17v1; Ms. B of PVA 40b8.] “This difference [in implication] is found between ‘generic terms’ (jātyabhidhāna) and ‘terms for aggregate’ (samudāyābhidhāna), as well.” In PV II 98–99, Dharmakīrti has already explained the difference in implication between “words for property” (dharmaśabda) and “words for property-possessor” (dharmiśabda). According to him, the non-coreferential expression aṅgulyā yogaḥ (connection of a finger) is made because the property word yogaḥ (connection) is conventionally used to mean one property without implying other properties of the finger and its property-possessor, i.e. the finger. On the other hand, the coreferential expression yuktā’ṅgulī (a connected finger) is made because the property-possessor word yuktā (connected) is conventionally used to mean the property-possessor with the implied properties of the finger. The same is said of samudāyaśabda and jātiśabda. The word ghaṭa will be a samudāyaśabda in relation to the word that is used to refer to its constituents, such as colors. In this case, it is used to mean the common capacity of the constituents without implying their specific capacities. That is why non-coreferential expressions such as ghaṭasya rūpādayaḥ are used. On the other hand, it will be a jātiśabda in relation to the word that is used to refer to a particular jar and in contradistinction to words that are used to refer to other kinds of aggregates, such as trees. In this case, since it implies particulars or other aggregates that have the same capacity, a coreferential expression such as ghaṭaḥ suvarṇaḥ (a golden jar) can be made appropriately. Then the word ghaṭa can also be understood to indicate the capacity of containing water, which is common to all jars. However, it is clear that Dharmakīrti, in the context of refuting the existence of the whole, mentions the capacity of the constituent atoms of the same aggregate. See PVP D44b6–45a5, P50b3–51a3; PVA 98, 25–28; PVV(R) D342a4–5, P195b8–196a2; VNṬV 32,7–12.

[11]:

Dharmakīrti remarks that this explanation is also applicable to other cases. PV II 102d: vācyo’nyo’pi diśā’nayā // “Other [expressions such as ‘fragrance of sandalwood’ (candanasya gandhaḥ)] should be explained in this manner.” Cf. PVP D45b3–4, P51b1–2: phyogs’dis gzhan la’ang brjod par bya // dper na tsandan gyi dri zhes bya ba’di la yang / tsandan zhes bya ba’i rdzas cung zad kyang dri la sogs pa las tha dad pa ma yin pa lta bu’o // ’o na ci yin zhe na / dri du ma’i bdag nyid can las tsandan gyi rang bzhin gyi dri gang yin pa des de ltar ston par’gyur ro // (Parallel sentences are found in Haribhadra’s Anekāntajayapatākā. See AJP II 40,9–11: etena “candanasya gandha ity atrāpi na candanaṃ nāma gandhavyatiriktaṃ kiñcid dravyam asti / kiṃ tarhi? anekātmakasya gandhasya candanasvabhāvo yo gandhaḥ sa tathā nirdiśyate” iti yad ucyate parais tad api pratyuktam eva … /). Ravigupta uses the example “fragrance of a flower.” See PVV(R) D342b1–2, P196a6–8.

[12]:

It seems to me that Manorathanandin’s explanation is of doubtful accuracy. PVV(M) 48,4–5 (=Ms 10a7–b1): tatsāmānyopasarjanā ghaṭatvasāmānyaviśeṣitās teṣāṃ rūpādīnāṃ śaktibhedā rañjanāda-yaḥ khyāpyante / Cf. PVP D45a7–b3, P51a6–b1: bum pa yi ni gzugs sogs shes // tha snyad byed pa na / de’i spyi nye bar byas pa can yin / bum pa’i spyi nye bar byas pa’i bye brag de’i nus pa’i khyad par gang la yod pa zhes bya bar tshig rnam par sbyar ro // de’i nus pa’i khyad par te / gzugs la sogs pa de dag gi so sor nges pa’i nus pa’i khyad par ci’dra ba de’dra ba ston par byed do // bum pa la sogs pa gsal ba’i khyad par la yod pa can gzugs la sogs pa mig gi rnam par shes pa la sogs pa’bras bu so sor nges pa can gyi bdag nyid bum pa’i khyad par gyi sgras rnams par gcod par byed de / chu’dzin pa la sogs pa’i khyad par can gyi rang bzhin ston par byed ces bya ba’i don to //; PVV(R) D342a7–b1, P196a4–6: bum pa’i gzugs la sogs pa zhes brdar btags pa’dis ni bum pa’i spyi de khyad par du dmigs kyis’ger ba gang yin pa’i gzugs la sogs pa de rnams kyi nus pa so sor nges pa’i bye brag mig gi rnam par shes pa skyed par byed par ston te // gzugs la sogs pa chu len pa la sogs pa’i dgos pa can zhes bya ba’i tha tshig go //

[13]:

PVP D44b1–5, P50a5–b2: gzugs la sogs pa’i nus pa ni (pa ni D; pa’i P) rnam pa gnyis te / spyi’i ni dper na bum pa’i dbyibs can dag chu la sogs pa’dzin pa la sogs pa’i’bras bu byed pa’i nus pa lta bu’o // so sor nges pa’i ni dper na mig gi rnam par shes pa la sogs pa’i’bras bu byed pa’i nus pa lta bu’o //* … rdzas du ma yod na yang gzugs la sogs de dag gi (gi Corr.; gis DP) chu la sogs pa’dzin pa la sogs pa’i ’bras bu gcig gang yin pa de’i rgyu ma yin pa shing la sogs pa gang yin pa de bzlog pa’i phyir’jug par’gyur ro** // ci’i phyir zhe na / ’bras bu gcig byed par nus par bstan pa’i phyir*** / de ltar brdar byas pa nyid kyi phyir ro // gzugs la sogs pa mang po dag la yang / nus pa gcig yod pa de brjod par’dod pa la / brda’i rjes su byed pas bum ba zhes bya ba’i tshig gcig la’gal ba yod pa ma yin no // (*Cf. Vibh p. 48, n. 1: dvidhā rūpādīnāṃ śaktiḥ sāmānyā yathā ghaṭāder udakāharaṇādi[-janikā?] / pratiniyatā ca cakṣurvijñānādijanikā / **Cf. TR 23*,29–25*,1: teṣām eva rūpādīnāṃ1 sādhāraṇaṃ yat phalam udakāharaṇam, tatra ye hetavo na bhavanti, ghaṭasanniveśe’navasthitā2 rūpādayaḥ, tebhyo vyavacchede ghaṭaśrutiḥ / [1Yaita’s correction ghaṭādīnāṃ should be disregarded. 2-sanniveśenāvasthitā Yaita.] ***Cf. Vibh p. 47, n. 4: … ekakāryakā(a)raṇaśaktikhyāpanāya /) Interestingly, parallel sentences to this passage are quoted in Haribhadra Sūri’s Anekāntajayapatākā. AJP Vol. II, 36, 6–9: syād etat–si-ddhasādhanam etad uktam eva naḥ pūrvācāryaiḥ–“dvividhā hi rūpādīnāṃ śaktiḥ sāmānyā pratiniyatā ca / tatra sāmānyā yathā ghaṭasanniveśinām udakādyāharaṇādikāryakaraṇaśaktiḥ, pratiniyatā yathā cakṣurvijñānādikāryakaraṇaśaktir iti” / atrocyate … Esho Mikogami focused on this passage of AJP in his studies; however he did not notice that it has certain parallels to Devendrabuddhi’s commentary. See Mikogami 1978: 2, 1979: 80. Similar sentences to this PVP passage are also found in Ravigupta’s commentary. PVV(R) D341b7, P195b3: gang gi phyir bum pa la gnas pa’i gzugs la sogs pa’i nus pa ni gnyis te / chu len par byed pa dang so sor nges pa’i mig la sogs pa’i rnam par shes pa skyed par byed pa’o //

[14]:

The word pratiniyatā śaktiḥ literally means “the causal capacity separately fixed for each [type of cause].”

[15]:

Haribhadra Sūri, in his auto-commentary on AJP, explains the Buddhist theory of two kinds of causal-ity as follows: AJPSV 36,24–28: tatra sāmānyā śaktiḥ yathā ghaṭasanniveśināṃ rūpādīnāṃ udakā-dyāharaṇādikāryakaraṇaśaktiḥ, yataḥ sarvair eva ghaṭair etat kriyate / pratiniyatā tu rūpādīnāṃ śaktir yathā cakṣurvijñānādikāryakaraṇaśaktir iti / rūpaṃ hi cakṣurvijñānam eva janayati, na rasā-divijñānam; evaṃ rasādayo’pi rasādivijñānāny eveti / According to this passage, he understands that the common capacity of color and so on is the capacity common to all jars. Judging from the context of PV II, it is clear that this is a misunderstanding.

[16]:

As pointed out by Katsura 2002: 270, Prajñākaragupta additionally remarks that expressions such as rūpādayaḥ ghaṭāḥ and rūpādīnāṃ ghaṭaḥ are accepted by people who have learned the Buddhist system of knowledge and have arrived at correct understandings, but not by ordinary people who blindly follow other systems of knowledge. According to Prajñākaragupta, someone who has learned the Buddhist theory will be convinced that a jar is nothing but the color and other atoms that have the causal capacity of producing their common effect, such as containing water, or that a jar is the color atoms and so on, which are arranged in a specific shape to produce such an effect. See PVA 98,17–21.

[17]:

PVA 98, 13–17: rūpādīnāṃ pratiniyataśaktibhedam anākṣipya teṣu samānodakadhāraṇaśaktyākṣepeṇa ghaṭaśrutiḥ pravartate / tato na rūpādayo ghaṭa iti samānādhikaraṇatā / ata eva samudāyaśaktivi-vakṣāyām ayaṃ samudāyaśabdaḥ / … kathaṃ tarhi rūpādayo ghaṭasyeti vyapadeśaḥ / udakāhara-ṇasādhāraṇakāryā rūpādipratyayajananasamarthāḥ pratyekam ity arthaḥ / Cf. Mikogami 1978: 6, 1979: 84. As pointed out by Mikogami, this passage of PVA is quoted together with PV II 100–102 and criticized in NVinV ad NVin I 9.

[18]:

PVṬ D110b6–7, P135a7–8: so sor nges pa ni dper na mig gi rnam par shes pa zhes bya ba la sogs pa la / gzugs ni’bras bu mig gi rnam par shes pa byed par nus pa yin la / dri ni sna’i rnam par shes pa byed par nus pa yin no // de bzhin du gzhan dag gi (gi Corr.; gis DP) yang rang gi rnam par shes pa la ltos (ltos D; bltos P) nas brjod par bya’o //

[19]:

The specific capacity of a color atom is often explained by commentators to be the causal capac-ity to produce visual sensation. However, in explaining the specific capacity of a color atom, a few commentators refer to the causal capacity for coloring things such as clothes. Cf. PVV(M) 47,12: ghaṭa-vyapadeśabhājāṃ rūpādīnām avāntararañjanādiśaktibhedānām anākṣepeṇa …; PVV(M) 48,5–6: … teṣāṃ rūpādīnāṃ śaktibhedā rañjanādayaḥ khyāpyante / ghaṭavyapadeśaviṣayasamudāyāntargataṃ rañjanakṣamarūpaṃ niṣkṛṣyocyata ity arthaḥ /; TSP ad TS 323: vividhāḥ nānāprakārāḥ arthakriyāḥ rūpādīnāṃ paryāyāṇāṃ samānāsamānabhedāt tatra samānā jalasaṃdhāraṇādilakṣaṇāḥ asamānā vastrarāgalocanādijñānotpādalakṣaṇāḥ …; HBṬ 98,22–23: ghaṭenodakāharaṇaṃ kriyate, rūpādibhiḥ punar vastrarāga* (Corr.; vasturāga S) iti kāryabhedaḥ / It has been explained by modern scholars that specific capacity means the causal capacity to produce sense perception. However, this is not strictly true. The capacity to produce sense perception must be understood as a typical example of the specific capacity.

[20]:

The passages of PV I and PVSV dealt with here have been explained in Vetter 1964: 110–112, Dunne 2004: 353–360, and Katsura 2002: 271–272, and translated in Vora and Ota 1980.

[21]:

See PV I 137–138; 141–142.

[22]:

As is well known, these three were argued as being non-existent by Dignāga in his Qu yin jia she lun (取因假設論*Upādānopādāyaprajñaptiśāstra). See Ui 1958.

[23]:

PVSV 68, 7–13: ye samastāḥ kiṃcid ekaṃ kāryaṃ kurvanti teṣāṃ tatra viśeṣābhāvād apārthikā viśeṣacodaneti sakṛt sarveṣāṃ niyojanārtham ekam ayaṃ lokaḥ śabdaṃ teṣu niyuṅkte ghaṭa iti / te’pi sajātīyād anyataś ca bhedāviśeṣe’pi tatprayojanāṅgatayā tadanyebhyo bhidyanta ity abhedāt tato’viśeṣeṇa pratīyante /

[24]:

It should be noted that the example of common capacity is expressed by the word udakāharaṇaviśeṣādi—“Containing water” regarded as the effect means a specified effect, not a general one. Namely, the common capacity is, for example, a certain jar’s capacity for containing water in its particular way, but not the capacity to contain water which is common to all jars. It is clear that, in this respect, the under-standings of modern scholars should be corrected. Haribhadra Sūri, a Jaina philosopher, made a similar misunderstanding. See n. 15. The expression with the word viśeṣa is also found in the commentaries on Dharmakīrti’s works. See VNṬV 25,27–28: bahavo rūpagandha-rasasparśā udakadhāraṇaviśeṣādikā-ryanirvartanasamarthatvād …; PVA 98,21: yataḥ saṃniveśaviśeṣād udakadhāraṇaviśeṣaḥ /

[25]:

PVSV 68, 13–18: tatra ghaṭasya rūpādayo ity api ghaṭasvabhāvā rūpādaya udakadhāraṇaviśeṣādikāryasamarthā iti yāvat / sāmānyakāryasādhanaprasiddhenātmanā rūpādiśabdaiḥ prasiddhā viśiṣṭakārya-sādhanākhyena viśeṣeṇa viśiṣṭās ta evam ucyante / na punar atrānyat kiṃcid yathāvarṇitalakṣaṇaṃ dravyam asti tasya tādṛśasyānupalambhāt / ekavacanam api tadekaśaktisūcanārthaṃ saṃketaparatantraṃ vā /

[26]:

Cf. PVṬ D160b7–161a2, P187a7–b1: ’dir don ni’di yin te / gzugs la sogs pa’i sgra thams cad kyi gzugs la sogs pa bsgrub par bya ba’i’bras bu tsam gyi (gyi P; gyis D) nus pa dang ldan pa’i gzugs la sogs pa khyad par med par bstan cing / bum pa’i sgras kyang khyad par du byas pa’i’bras bu dang ldan pas / snam bu la sogs pa’i rang bzhin dag las tha dad pas khyad par du byas pa’i gzugs la sogs pa bstan to // de bas na bum pa’i gzugs la sogs pa zhes bya ba la sgra gnyis kyi bya bas spyi dang khyad par gyi rnam pa’i blo skye ba’i [phyir] spyi dang khyad par gyi dngos po la tha dad pa’i rten can gyi drug pa sbyor ba yin no // = PVSVṬ 271,20–24: ayam atrārthaḥ / rūpādiśabdā rūpādīn rūpasādhyakāryamātraśaktiyuktān aviśeṣeṇa pratipādayanti / ghaṭaśabdas tu viśiṣṭakāryaśaktiyogena paṭādisvabhāvebhyo’pi rūpādibhyo bhedena viśiṣṭān rūpādīn āha / ato ghaṭasya rūpādaya iti śa-bdadvayavyāpāreṇa sāmānyaviśeṣākārabuddhyutpatteḥ sāmānyaviśeṣabhāvo vyatirekavibhaktiś ca (-vibhaktiś ca M100b3; -vimatiś ca S) prayujyata iti /

[27]:

HB 9, 13–10, 4: bhinnasvabhāvebhyaś cakṣurādibhyaḥ sahakāribhya ekakāryotpattau na kā-raṇabhedāt kāryabhedaḥ syād iti cet, na yathāsvaṃ svabhāvabhedena tadviśeṣopayogatas tadupayogakāryasvabhāva-viśeṣāsaṅkarāt, yathā mṛtpiṇḍakulālasūtrādibhyo bhavato ghaṭasya mṛtpi-ṇḍād amṛtsvabhāvebhyo vṛkṣādibhyo bhinnaḥ svabhāvaḥ kulālāt tasya eva mṛdātmanaḥ sataḥ saṃsthā-naviśeṣātmatayā tadanyebhyo bhinnaḥ sūtrāt tasya eva mṛtsaṃsthānaviśeṣātmanaś cakrāder vibhaktaḥ svabhāvo bhavati; tad evaṃ na kulālān mṛtsvabhāvatā, na mṛdaḥ saṃsthānaviśeṣaḥ; na ca tayoḥ śaktiviśeṣaviṣayabhedo’pi tajjanita-viśeṣabhedasya kāryasya svabhāvabhedaḥ, mṛtsaṃsthānayor apa-rasparātmatayā saṃsthānamṛdrūpābhyāṃ tayor apratibhāsanaprasaṅgāt / This passage is examined and translated in Katsura 1983: 104–105.

[28]:

HB 10,19–11,9. See Katsura 1983: 106.

[29]:

The words saha pṛthag vā are understood in various ways by the commentators. In Vinītadeva’s understanding, these words mean the two different kinds of causal capacity, viz. the common capacity and the specific capacity (see VNṬ D164b3–6, P59b1–4). However, in this understanding, the words pṛthag vā seem incompatible with the word ekaprayojanāḥ. In contrast, in Śāntarakṣita’s understanding, Dharmakīrti has added the words pṛthag vā due to his intention of saying that “every” component of a complex contributes to producing a single effect. (See VNṬV 31,8–30. Here Śāntarakṣita mentions two different understandings and refutes both.) In this understanding, the words seem compatible with the word ekaprayojanāḥ, but Śāntarakṣita dares to ignore the contrasting meanings of the two words, viz. saha and pṛthag. My tentative understanding is that Dharmakīrti intends to say here that multiple things can collaboratively produce a single effect and can separately contribute to the different features of that single effect.

[30]:

VN 6, 19–7, 4: ghaṭa ity api ca rūpādaya eva bahava ekārthakriyākāriṇa ekaśabdavācyā bhavantu, kim arthāntarakalpanayā / bahavo’pi hy ekārthakāriṇo bhaveyuś cakṣurādivat / … tatra ye’rthāḥ saha pṛthag vā ekaprayojanās teṣāṃ tadbhāvasthāpanāya [hy] ekaśabdo* niyujyate yadi, kiṃ syāt / tada-rthakriyāśaktisthāpanāya niyuktasya samudāyaśabdasyaikavacanavirodho’pi na asty eva / sahitānāṃ sā śaktir ekā na pratyekam iti samudāyaśabda ekasmin samudāye vācya ekavacanaṃ ghaṭa iti / [*-sthāpanāyaikaśabdo (?); -sthāpanāya hy ekaśabdo Much’s ed., -khyāpanāya hi ekaśabdo Śāstri’s ed.] See Much 1991: 17–18.

[31]:

The word ghaṭa is a jātiśabda (generic term) under certain circumstances. See n. 11. In the Vādanyāya, Dharmakīrti explains that jātiśabda is related to causal capacity as well. The plural word vṛkṣāḥ (trees) is used for plural trees to mean the different causal powers of trees for producing different effects, whereas the singular word vṛkṣaḥ (a tree) is used for the same trees to mean the causal power of trees for cooperatively producing a single effect. See VN 7,5–7. Śāntarakṣita refers to ekapratyavamarśa as the single effect produced by the plural trees. See VNṬV 32,17–18.

[32]:

In the Vādanyāya, while explaining that conceptual cognition and verbal expression cannot establish any real existence of the objects corresponding to them, Dharmakīrti points out that some words are used to refer to non-existent things, past things, future things, and so forth, and that some singular words are used to refer to plural things that produce a single effect, and some plural words are used to refer to a single thing that produces different effects. See VN 6,1–8. Dharmakīrti points out that although we can treat something as real on the basis of its efficiency, its unity or plurality is not dependant on its efficiency. See VN 8,17–20.

[33]:

Haribhadra Sūri attributes the theory to “ancient masters” (pūrvācārya). See n. 13. According to his auto-commentary, the expression “ancient masters” refers to Dharmapāla, Dharmakīrti, and so forth. AJPSV Vol. II, 36,23: … pūrvācāryaiḥ dharmapāladharmakīrtyādibhiḥ … Mikogami (1978: 3, 1979: 81–82) refers to the relevant passage of the Cheng Weishi Lun (成唯識論). However, it seems to me that this passage is irrelevant to this theory. After Dharmakīrti, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla deal with the theory of two kinds of causal capacity in criticizing the Jaina view of the two aspects of ātman, viz., dravya (substance) and paryāya (mode). See TS 323; TSP 154,6–1. (Cf. HBṬ 98,14–102,18.) There, Kamalaśīla explains that aggregated atoms have two different causal powers: the causal power to cooperatively produce a common effect such as containing water, and the causal powers to separately produce different effects such as coloring clothes. It is noted that Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla use the word arthakriyā here. In this context this word seems to be used simply to mean “producing effect.” See Inami 2014: Appendix I.

[34]:

The capacity of multiple things to cooperatively produce a single effect should be rigorously distinguished from their capacity to produce similar effects separately. The resemblance of the different effects is conceptually constructed. (Cf. PVSV 56,12–14: yad apy udakāharaṇādikam ekaṃ ghaṭādikāryaṃ tad api pratidravyaṃ bhedād bhidyata eveti naikaṃ bhedānāṃ kāryam asti /) Of course we may think, as Dharmakīrti explains in PVSV, that the different effects can produce a single result, i.e. “a single comprehensive judgement” (ekapratyavamarśa), namely, that there is no difference among them. (Cf. PVSV 57,1–3: tad api pratidravyaṃ bhidyamānam api prakṛtyaikapratyavamarśasyābhedāvaskandino hetur bhavad abhinnaṃ khyāti /) However, as long as the single effect is the judgement that there is no difference among them, non-difference is judged by the conceptual cognition. Thus Dharmakīrti mentions that each effect appears as if it were not different from other effects (abhinnaṃ khyāti). The concept of ekapratyavamarśa is introduced to interpret the commonality or identity of different things by pointing out that they have a common single effect (ekakaryatā). But it should be noted that the single effect, ekapratyavamarśa, is in itself the conceptual judgement of identity. In addition, the term ekapratyavamarśa has been understood by some scholars to mean “a judgement of sameness.” But eka- does not mean “sameness,” but instead means “single” or “one and the same.” Here Dharmakīrti intends to say that different things produce a single effect.

[35]:

A continuum does not have any capacity to produce an effect because it is nothing but a conceptual construction. Of momentary elements arising in a series, the element immediately before its effect, affected by the preceding elements, is regarded as producing the effect. Or, rather, all momentary elements arising in a series are thought to contribute to producing a single effect. In the latter case, the multiple momentary elements arising in a series share the ability of producing a single effect. This leads us to understand that these momentary elements also can be regarded as a kind of causal complex. They are, so to speak, a complex of the multiple causes situated in different times. Such different momentary elements share a commonality in that they collaboratively produce a single effect, not that the effects of momentary elements resemble each other. The resemblance of different things is due to a conceptual judgement. It should be added that the momentary elements arising in a series have a commonality in that they all are based on the same single cause or on the same single complex of causes. Dharmakīrti explains that the momentary rice plants arising in a series share a commonality in that all of them are dependent on the same single seed, and therefore they are mentioned in a single word śāli (a rice plant) in accordance with the verbal convention. Thus, many different things can have a commonality, either in their having a single common effect (ekakāryatā) or in their having the same single complex of causes (ekasāmagyadhīnatva). This is also true for the commonality of spatially different things. But, care must be taken not to conclude that Buddhists regard united things as a single entity. They do not mean that multiple things can be regarded as a single entity, but simply that such multiple things have a single effect or a single cause. Cf. PVSV 68, 18–21: tathā ye hetuphalaviśeṣabhūtāḥ kiṃcid ekaṃ sādhayanti sādhyante vā te’pi sakṛt pratyayārthaṃ vrīhyādiśabdaiḥ kṛtasaṃketāḥ kathyanta iti pūrvavad vācyam /; PVA 188,7: ekasāmāgryadhīnatvāt samudāyaprakalpane / ekakāryatvayogena yatra tatreti kalpanā //

[36]:

Cf. AKBh1 7,20–21 = AKBh2 7,22–24 ad AK I 10d: nanu caivaṃ samastālambanatvāt sāmānyaviṣayāḥ pañca vijñānakāyāḥ prāpnuvanti na svalakṣaṇaviṣayāḥ / āyatanasvalakṣaṇaṃ praty ete svalakṣaṇavi-ṣayā iṣyante na dravyasvalakṣaṇam ity adoṣaḥ /; Vibhāṣā 655a26–b7: 問十一觸中極多縁幾發生身 識。有作是説、一一別縁發生身識、以十一種相用増故。有餘師言、極多縁五發生身識、謂 四大種滑等隨一。復有説者、總縁十一、亦生身識。問豈不五識唯取自相境耶。答自相有二種、一事自相、二處自相。依事自相説縁十一種觸生於身識。依處自相説五識身取自相境。是故無過。如是説者、縁十一事亦生身識。如縁色處二十種事亦、生眼識。此亦應爾。故五識身通縁總別而無五識取共相過。多事自相一識能縁然不明了。; 65a12–15: 問云何身識縁共相境以五識身縁自相故。答自相有二種、一事自相、二處自相。若依事自相説者五識身亦縁共相。若依處自相説則五識唯縁自相。See Sakurabe 1969: 154.

[37]:

PS(V) I 4cd: kathaṃ tarhi sañcitālambanāḥ pañca vijñānakāyāḥ, yadi tad ekato na vikalpayanti / yac cāyatanasvalakṣaṇaṃ praty ete svalakṣaṇaviṣayā na dravyasvalakṣaṇam iti / tatrānekārthajanyatvāt svārthe sāmānyagocaram // 4 // anekadravyotpādyatvāt tat svāyatane sāmānyaviṣayam uktam, na tu bhinneṣv abhedakalpanāt / Dharmakīrti explains this passage of PS(V) as follows: “Owing to the connection with other things, [i.e., other atoms], atoms that are different [from their own previous moments] arise. They are said to be ‘aggregated’ (sañcita). They are causes of the production of [sensual] cognition [unlike previous ones]. Such a special characteristic of the atoms does not occur without other atoms [connected with them]. Therefore, since the object is not limited to a single [atom], [but rather to aggregated atoms], the perceptual cognition is said to have a universal [in the sense of aggregated atoms] as its object.” (PV III 194–196.) Cf. PSṬ 44,12–45,5; PSṬ 45,11–1. See Hattori 1968: 26–27, 88–91; Tosaki 1979: 294–298; Dunne 2004: 98–113; Chu 2008: 212–215; Yoshida 2011: 152–156, etc.

[38]:

In Tibetan logic, the word spyi is considered to have three different meanings: 1) tshogs spyi, 2) rigs spyi, and 3) don spyi. Of these, 1) tshogs spyi seems to be related to the aggregate called sāmānya by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. See Dreyfus 1997: 107–109.

[39]:

Jinendrabuddhi (and perhaps Dignāga as well) regards a single atom as dravyasvalakṣaṇa, unlike Yaśomitra, who explains that the dravyasvalakṣaṇa means, for example, specific colors, such as blue. See PSṬ 45,14–46,3; AKV 28,10–16.

[40]:

Before Dignāga, it was debated in the Abhidharma tradition whether multiple things can be perceived at once through a single cognition. See Vibhāṣā 63c22–25; 64a11–25. Dignāga insists in this respect that aggregated atoms are grasped at once through a single perception. Following Dignāga’s insistence, Dharmakīrti holds that even different aggregates of atoms are grasped through a single cognition. Not only color atoms of the same kind (e.g. blue atoms) are grasped through a single cognition, but also color atoms of different kinds (e.g. blue, yellow and red atoms). This is how Dharmakīrti develops his argument of citrādvaita in PV III.

[41]:

PV II 86cd–87: aviśeṣād aṇutvāc ca na gatiś cen na sidhyati // 86 // aviśeṣo viśiṣṭāṇām aindriyatvam ato’naṇuḥ /etenāvaraṇādīnām abhāvaś ca nirākṛtaḥ // 87 // See Inami 2013.

[42]:

VN 7, 8–9: asmākan tu sāṃketikeṣv artheṣu saṃketavaśād vṛttir ity anabhiniveśa eva /

[43]:

See VNṬV 32,25–26: saṃketavaśāc chabdānām bahuvacanāntānāṃ dārāḥ sikatāḥ pādā gurava ityā-dinā’saty api bahutve’bhidheyasya vṛttiḥ / tathā saty apy anekatve ṣaṇṇagarī ṣaṭpūlī vanam ityādinaika-vacanāntānāṃ vṛttir ity anabhiniveśa eva / ko hi nāma sacetanaḥ puruṣābhiprāyamātrādhīnavṛttiṣu śabdeṣv abhiniveśaṃ kartum utsahata iti bhāvaḥ / Cf. PV IV 116a–c: saṃketasaṃśrayāḥ śabdāḥ sa ca icchāmātrasaṃśrayaḥ / nāsiddhiḥ śabdasiddhānām …

[44]:

See PV I 67: dārāḥ ṣaṇṇagarītyādau bhedābhedavyavasthiteḥ / khasya svabhāvaḥ khatvaṃ cety atra vā kiṃ nibandhanam //

[45]:

PVSV 36, 9–12: vācyeṣu puruṣāyattavṛttīnāṃ śabdānām avastusaṃdarśināṃ yathābhyāsaṃ vikalpa-prabodhahetūnāṃ pravṛtticintā tadvaśād vastuvyavasthāpanaṃ ca kevalaṃ jāḍyakhyāpanam /

[46]:

A similar argument is found in Śāntarakṣita’s Tattvasaṃgraha. TS 570: ṣaṣṭhīvacanabhedādi viva-kṣāmātrasaṃbhavi / tato na yuktā vastūnāṃ tatsvarūpavyavasthitiḥ // See Inami 2014: Appendix II.

[47]:

Prajñākaragupta also argues that there is no exact correspondence between words and external objects, pointing out that every language has inconsistencies in grammatical rules. Furthermore, he severely criticizes those who insist that Sanskrit is the only perfect language. Cf. PVA 99,3–12. See Inami 2014: note 22.

[48]:

PVSV 37, 9–14: tathābhūtānāṃ kvacid arthe’bhinnā śaktir asti sā nimittam iti cet / na / śakter vasturūpāvyatirekāt / vyatireke vānupakāryasya pāratantryāyogāt / upakāre vā śaktyupakāriṇyā api śakter vyatireka ity anavasthiter apratipattiḥ / tadavyatireke vā ādyāyām api prasaṅga iti yat kiṃcid etat /

[49]:

As is well known, Dharmakīrti denies the realistic view of the relation in the same manner in Samba- ndhaparīkṣā. See SP vv. 4–5.

[50]:

See Inami 2000.

[51]:

Cf. PV III 209: idam vastubalāyātaṃ yad vadanti vipaścitaḥ / yathā yathā’rthāś cintyante viśīryante tathā tathā // 209 //

[52]:

The present paper is a revised English version of a Japanese publication entitled “Nishu no ingakōryoku–sāmānyā śakti to pratiniyatā śakti–” [Two Kinds of Causal Capacity: sāmānyā śakti and pratiniyatā śakti] (=Inami 2012). Almost all of the passages from Indian texts being treated here were translated into Japanese in another paper entitled “Pramāṇavārttika Pramāṇasiddhi-shō no kenkyū (13)” (=Inami 2014). I would like to express my gratitude to Prof. Tom J. F. Tillemans for correcting the English of the present paper.

[53]:

Esho Mikogami was the first scholar to pay attention to the Buddhist theory of two kinds of causal capacity. He examined PV II 100–102 and Prajñākaragupta’s commentary and concluded that the sāmānyaśakti is the useful function possessed by things in our daily life and that it is related to the sāmānyalakṣaṇa; the pratiniyataśakti is the causal efficiency that gives rise to the perception of color, etc., and it is related to the svalakṣaṇa. Mikogami understood that these two correspond with the two meanings of arthakriyā as pointed out by Nagatomi 1967/68 (Mikogami 1978, 1979). After Mikogami’s study, Shoryu Katsura considered these two kinds of causal capacity several times. According to his first examination of this theory (Katsura 1983: 97–100), the pratiniyataśakti is the unique capacity that momentary existence has, and should be regarded as the primary meaning of the word arthakriyā. In contrast, the sāmānyaśakti is, for example, a pot’s capacity for containing water, something common to other pots, thus meaning “a useful function for the fulfillment of a human purpose.” It is related to the conceptual cognition of the universal or of the continuum. It is not causal capacity in a strict sense, and therefore should be regarded as the secondary meaning of the word arthakriyā. In this paper, Katsura concluded that the pratiniyataśakti is the causal capacity to produce a direct perception and the sāmānyaśakti is the causal capacity to produce an indirect or judgmental cognition. This understanding also appears in a later study published in English (Katsura 1984: 218–219).

[54]:

The present paper is a revised English version of a Japanese publication entitled “Nishu no ingakōryoku–sāmānyā śakti to pratiniyatā śakti–” [Two Kinds of Causal Capacity: sāmānyā śakti and pratiniyatā śakti] (=Inami 2012). Almost all of the passages from Indian texts being treated here were translated into Japanese in another paper entitled “Pramāṇavārttika Pramāṇasiddhi-shō no kenkyū (13)” (=Inami 2014). I would like to express my gratitude to Prof. Tom J. F. Tillemans for correcting the English of the present paper.

[55]:

Esho Mikogami was the first scholar to pay attention to the Buddhist theory of two kinds of causal capacity. He examined PV II 100–102 and Prajñākaragupta’s commentary and concluded that the sāmānyaśakti is the useful function possessed by things in our daily life and that it is related to the sāmānyalakṣaṇa; the pratiniyataśakti is the causal efficiency that gives rise to the perception of color, etc., and it is related to the svalakṣaṇa. Mikogami understood that these two correspond with the two meanings of arthakriyā as pointed out by Nagatomi 1967/68 (Mikogami 1978, 1979). After Mikogami’s study, Shoryu Katsura considered these two kinds of causal capacity several times. According to his first examination of this theory (Katsura 1983: 97–100), the pratiniyataśakti is the unique capacity that momentary existence has, and should be regarded as the primary meaning of the word arthakriyā. In contrast, the sāmānyaśakti is, for example, a pot’s capacity for containing water, something common to other pots, thus meaning “a useful function for the fulfillment of a human purpose.” It is related to the conceptual cognition of the universal or of the continuum. It is not causal capacity in a strict sense, and therefore should be regarded as the secondary meaning of the word arthakriyā. In this paper, Katsura concluded that the pratiniyataśakti is the causal capacity to produce a direct perception and the sāmānyaśakti is the causal capacity to produce an indirect or judgmental cognition. This understanding also appears in a later study published in English (Katsura 1984: 218–219).