Reverberations of Dharmakirti’s Philosophy

by Birgit Kellner | 2020 | 264,305 words

This page relates ‘Jitari’s Vijnaptimatratasiddhi’ of the study on the philosophy of Dharmakirti (6th century) and his predecessor Dignaga (5th century). This collection of articles reflects philosophical currents in India, China and Tibet during their time and investigates the Buddhist theories of Pramana (“instruments of trustworthy awareness”).

Jitāri’s Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi

(By Junjie Chu)

I would like to express my sincere thanks to Prof. Ernst Steinkellner for his effort to make it possible for me to read the manuscripts in Beijing, and to Prof. Eli Franco for his establishing a research project on Jitāri’s works in the University of Leipzig supported by the German Research Foundation. I am also indebted to Prof. Franco for many valuable suggestions on an earlier version of this paper. My special thanks go to Prof. Birgit Kellner who carefully read this paper and made numerous suggestions which allow for great improvements in both content and language. I am also very grateful to the German Research Council (DFG) for a substantial grant for the abovementioned research project.


As we have reported elsewhere,[1] the newly available manuscripts of Jitāri’s (fl. 940–980)[2] contain a number of hitherto unknown works, one of them is the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi. This is a short philosophical treatise that become accessible through two manuscripts of the Sanskrit text.[3] In this treatise, Jitāri tries to establish the Yogācāra doctrine of the cognitive manifestation of the objects and refutes the “externalism” (bahirarthavāda) around this central topic.[4] The basic ideas he presents can be found in Dharmakīrti’s works and commentaries on them, for instance, PV 3.320–337 and the commentaries ad loc.

At the beginning of the treatise, Jitāri divides the externalists into two groups, according to their opinions on whether awareness possesses the image of object or not, i.e., the sākārajñānavādins and the nirākārajñānavādins, with a short outline of the position held by each group. Jitāri’s refutation, however, focuses mainly on the nirākārajñānavādin-branch. The discussion is initiated with a formal reasoning (prayoga) aiming to prove his main thesis that all things that become manifest (pra√kāś)–i.e., that appear in consciousness–are cognition, which has the nature of self-manifestation. This is followed by the refutation of various objections that claim the reason in Jitāri’s prayoga is invalid in one of the three usually recognized ways, that is, by being unestablished (asiddha), inconclusive (anaikāntika) or contradictory (viruddha).

In the context of countering the attack that the reason is “inconclusive,” Jitāri embarks on an excursus and refutes the opponent’s thesis that the manifestation of the external object in cognition is caused by cognition. He does so by negating all four logically possible propositions with regard to the relationship between manifestation and the object. Jitāri concludes that the manifestation of the object is merely the cognition’s self-manifestation.

After establishing that the reason is not inconclusive, in the final section, Jitāri replies to further objections against the thesis of cognition’s self-manifestation raised from the perspective of non-Buddhist as well as Buddhist systems.

In the following, I will present an analysis of Jitāri’s discussions with the aim of summarizing the main points.

1. The bahirarthavāda position with regard to the image of the object

After dividing the bahirarthavādins into sākārajñānavādins and nirākārajñānavādins at the beginning of the VMS, Jitāri describes the position of those bahirarthavādins who favor sākārajñānavāda with regard to the image of the object as follows:

All this is only the cognition which appears with the image of [object-things of the five senses respectively, such as] white color, singing voice, fragrant smell, sweet taste and [tangible] roughness; however, the external (bāhyaḥ) object-thing having a [physical] body established as entirely different from [its] product, the cognition, does not appear in its own form.[5]

The position described here is similar to that of the Sautrāntika. As it is well-known, the Sautrāntika is a strong proponent of sākārajñānavāda.[6]

Jitāri then summarizes the position of those bahirarthavādins who favor nirākārajñānavāda as follows:

Our cognition is devoid of image [of object]; the external object possesses the image, and is perceptible, for this object is apprehended by perception as connected to the external world (bahirdeśa).[7]

This refers evidently to the Mīmāṃsā system,[8] which is the major advocate of the nirākāra-vāda among the non-Buddhist systems, and probably the main opponent functioning as interlocutor in this treatise. On the other hand, among Buddhist systems, the Vaibhāṣika is usually regarded as nirākāravādin, with Śubhagupta as the main representative in the sources available to us. As we will see below, Śubhagupta is quoted and refuted by Jitāri. The Yogācāra system, as it is attested in many sources, is divided into two sub-systems, the sākā-ravijñaptimātratāvādin and nirākāravijñaptimātratāvādin. Ratnākaraśānti is a spokesman of the latter.[9] But, needless to say, as a nirākāravijñaptimātratāvādin, Ratnākaraśānti could not have been the target of Jitāri’s refutation, since he is not a bāhyārthavādin.

2. Formal reasoning proving cognition’s self-manifestation

In the VMS, Jitāri indeed does not pay much attention to the sākārajñānavāda-branch of the bahirarthavāda, saying that the sākārajñānavādins are not in conformity with the whole set of the generally established convention and they do not provide anything except some pieces of false determination.[10] So, he concentrates himself on the refutation of the nirākārajñānavāda-branch of the bahirarthavāda.

He starts his refutation by setting forth a formal reasoning:

What becomes manifest [in cognition] is cognition [itself], just as the concep-tual construction of a blue thing; and [a sensory object] like visible matter becomes manifest [in cognition, therefore, it is cognition with the image of object]. This is a reason of essential property.[11]

The main body of the treatise is actually a proof that the reason used in this reasoning is valid. As Jitāri does in many other works, the proof takes on the form of replies to various objections that claim the reason to be fallacious according to the Dharmakīrtian threefold typology of the “pseudo-reason” (hetvābhāsa): (1) unestablished (asiddha); (2) contradictory (viruddha), and (3) inconclusive (anaikāntika).[12]

At first, Jitāri declares that, in the formal reasoning, the proving factor (sādhana), i.e., “becoming manifest,” is not unestablished, because it is proved by perception as existent in respect to the property-bearer (dharmin), i.e., a “[sensory object] like visible matter.”[13] That means, for the reason he uses, the condition of pakṣadharmatā is satisfied. In reply to the objection that the property-bearer is unestablished either for the internalist who regards it as internal, or for the externalist who regards it as external, Jitāri argues that the property-bearer, visible matter, is nothing but the exclusion of non-visible-matter. Its properties of being internal or external that are the subject of disagreement, are characterized with two further different exclusions (i.e., the exclusion of being internal and the exclusion of being external, respectively). However, this disagreement does lead to the non-establishment of the property-bearer, because this property-bearer is established by perception; and in no inference is the property-bearer regarded as particularized to the certain property that is subject to controversy, so that it would incur the criticism of non-establishment.[14]

Then, Jitāri points out further that the reason, “becoming manifest,” is not contradictory, because it is found among the similar cases. He explains: A proving factor becomes contradictory when it is pervaded by what is opposed to the factor to be proved (sādhya);[15] and a pervaded factor (vyāpya) should never come forth without pervading factor (vyāpaka), otherwise it would not be pervaded (tadabhāvaprasaṅgāt). So, the reason, insofar as it is contradictory, does not occur in the similar cases.[16]

But the opponent does not agree with this, arguing that the proving factor “becoming manifest” cannot be found in the similar instance, because cognition is not perceptible; for, when an object is cognized, the cognition is known through inference.[17] Here Jitāri obviously refers to the position of Śabara of the Mīmāṃsā system; in fact, he makes use of the Śābarabhāṣya verbatim, incorporating literally the passage in question.[18] Dharmakīrti refutes this opinion in PV 3.460ff.[19] From his externalist’s point of view, Jitāri’s opponent says that, in a cognitive event, we perceive merely the object alone that is the externally existent thing like something blue, which becomes manifest in cognition as blue when we perceive it. Apart from this no other object can be perceived, for the grasping subject cannot be perceived in the way “I experience the internal cognition” (āntaraṃ jñānam anubhavāmīti). That is to say, the opponent does not accept the Buddhist theory that cognition of an object can be perceived through self-awareness, like the awareness of sensations such as pleasure; as it is explained by Dignāga.[20] Jitāri’s refutation of this objection is in fact a proof of the existence of the experience of cognition of an object-referent. He argues that even if you do not have an ascertaining awareness (pratipatti) in the form “I experienced the cognition,” you cannot prove that the experience of the cognition does not exist. To support this, he quotes a verse from the Tattvasaṅgraha: The name is not equal to the characteristics (rūpa) of things, so it is not the case that the things whose characteristics have been completely apprehended (parijñāta) [through perception] remain unknown so long their name is unknown.[21]

Jitāri argues further: If the experience of the cognition of an object-referent would not exist at all, then the pure conceptual awareness of an object like a pot, perceived as arising and disappearing, cannot be included in (antar√bhū) or assigned to anything, i.e., it has no objective substratum at all to be based on; for it can be based neither on the object nor on the cognition–because the object cannot arise and disappear according to a person’s desire (īhāvaśena) and it does not have the nature of the subjective conceptualization. Moreover, the cognition might occur, being imperceptible according to the opponent, but it could not become manifest, even if it occurs as conceptual awareness; the object is manifest, but it does not occur like the subjective cognition. To conclude, Jitāri says, if the cognition were imperceptible, there would be no conceptual awareness consisting in the experience of a cognition in concordance with the verbal designation of the object at all, but in reality it is not so.[22]

Now, Jitāri turns to treat the problem of the reason’s inconclusiveness (anaikāntikatā), which he defines as the occurrence of reason in the dissimilar cases (vipakṣavṛttikatā).

He argues that this occurrence is impossible in this case, because the proving factor, being established by valid means of cognition, leaves no room for deviation; he emphasizes also that this occurrence can never be suspected so long as there is a necessary concomitance between the nature of self-manifestation and the things that become manifest, which he expresses with a formal reasoning:

Everything that does not possess the nature of self-manifestation does not become manifest, just like something that never appears. And [a sensory object] like a blue thing does not have the nature of self-manifestation, if it is not cognition. This is [the reason of] non-perception of a pervading factor.[23]

Here, it is worth noting that this is just a repetition in the negative form of the first formal reasoning given at the beginning of the work when Jitāri starts his refutation.[24] The only difference is that the word “cognition” (jñāna) is here replaced with “possessing the nature of self-manifestation” (svaprakāśasvabhāva), which Jitāri treats as synonym. This demonstrates clearly that Jitāri sets forth the discussion from the Yogācāra point of view, regarding the nature of self-manifestation as a conditio sine qua non for the arising of the object’s manifestation in the cognition as the cognitive content.

The opponent does not accept the theory of self-manifestation, holding that a thing, although not attaining (anu√bhū)[25] the nature of self-manifestation, can still become manifest, for instance, a blue thing, etc., not having the nature of manifestation of itself, when placed (adhīna) near a lamp, etc., can still be manifest, and thus, the nature of self-manifestation is not a necessary condition for the state of being manifest.[26] Jitāri’s reason consequently still remains inconclusive. Jitāri replies to this by simply pointing out that manifestation never takes place in any other form than self-manifestation,[27] so his reason cannot be inconclusive.

In the next section, to refute the objection against the Yogācāra’s position of self-manifestation, he examines the relationship between the cognitive manifestation and the object that becomes manifest in cognition, with the conclusion that his own initially presented reason is not inconclusive.

3. Examining the relationship between the “making manifest” (prakāśana) and the object

From the Yogācāra’s point of view, a cognitive event of “manifestation” refers, of course, to the fact that the cognition is manifest, so the question is raised why it is said that an object is made manifest by cognition. According to the externalist opponent, however, that statement means simply the fact that the “making manifest” (prakāśana) of an external object is performed by its cognition.[28] To refute this idea, Jitāri embarks on a rather lengthy discussion to examine the relationship between the making manifest, which the opponent alleges to be created by cognition, and the external object (artha). He uses an argument in the form of “four alternative proposition” (catuṣkoti), a Buddhist favorite dialectical apparatus: He lists at first exhaustively all conceivable relations between the making manifest and the object, and then negates them all one by one: the manifestation is a different thing than the object-referent (1), it is a non-different thing than the object-referent (2), it is both different and non-different (3), it is neither different nor non-different (4).

Jitāri argues at first that the so-called “making manifest,” which is made by cognition, cannot be a different entity (padārtha) than the object-referent, because in that case it cannot be said that it is the object-referent that is made manifest by cognition. He explains: The object-referent cannot become manifest as itself, since this is contradictory to the thesis of other-manifestation, i.e., becomes manifest as a different thing. Moreover, the “other” cannot operate to add a different nature to the object to make it manifest, since in that case the “other” becomes identical with the object, i.e., one ends up with the second option.[29] Further, in that case, since the object-referent does not undergo any change while the manifestation arises as a different entity, it would not become manifest; and a future thing, inasmuch as it is not appearing in the manifestation, cannot be distinguished from the thing itself (svarūpa) and thus cannot become manifest.[30] To avoid this difficulty, the opponent may argue that the object-referent, without change, becomes manifest with the same manifestation. However, according to Jitāri, the manifestation is a temporal process, i.e., the object undergoes the changes from the state of not being manifest to being manifest; so Jitāri points out, this opponent’s argument does not hold, because in that case also this unchanging manifestation is useless when the object has already its effecting means (karaṇa)[31] of a different manifestation, i.e., the effecting means of making a change; also because in that case an infinite regress would result, i.e., an endless arising of manifestation, when this manifestation can never be (anupapatti) in the state of being currently manifest because of its not being distinct from its previous form, i.e., the unmanifest form, and undergoes (upagama) nevertheless the action of producing a manifestation other than that manifestation.[32] That means, in that case, the manifestation would not be a momentary phenomenon, rather a never-stopping process.

Jitāri then turns to refute the second option, i.e., that the making manifest is non-different from the object, i.e., identical with object. He argues that the identity between them cannot be possible, for in that case, when, through cognition, the object-referent has the effecting means of making manifest (prakāśanakaraṇa) that is identical to itself, it itself becomes the effecting means of making manifest, and thus the action (kriyā) of making manifest becomes impossible, because it is already accomplished before by the object-referent itself.[33] If the action of making manifest takes a form that is different from what is accomplished by another cause (kāraṇa), then only this different form is created, since it has not been accomplished, but this form cannot be identical with the object-referent (tadātmabhūta).[34] And thus, if the object-referent ceased to exist in its previous form and arises in another form, its appeared form (vyaktarūpa) must arise from cognition, and these two must be momentary, because by accepting a different form, it follows necessarily that it exists with each action (pratikṛti) [of making manifest].[35] According to Jitāri, this is the idea stated in Dharmakīrti’s PV 3.464–465ab, which he quoted.[36]

Jitāri points out further that a momentary instance of an object-referent (arthakṣaṇa) cannot be made manifest by the cognition, for in that case the cognition needs to be either simultaneously existent or pre-existent, but both cases are impossible: When the cognition is simultaneous with the object, no causality is possible, just like between the left and right horns of a cow; again, a verse from Dharmakīrti’s PV is quoted, which argues that all causes must exist before their results.[37] On the other hand, when cognition exists before, the object-referent arising from cognition with its independent nature of manifestation (prakāśasvabhāva) would become manifest to all people, since it is common to all. Moreover, the idea is also incorrect (asaṅgata) that the object-referent has the independent nature of manifestation only for the person through whose cognition such manifest form (tādṛśa) is produced, but not for the others; because the object-referents do not have a different nature (ātmabheda) for each different person (pratipuruṣa), since otherwise it would follow that they do not possess their own nature (nairātmya) on account of the absence of a fixed nature (ātmasthiti).[38]

For the third and fourth alternatives, i.e., that the manifestation is both different and non-different, as well as neither different nor non-different from the object-referent, Jitāri says merely that they have already been refuted through the refutation of the first two alternatives, so it is useless to exert the labor (piṣṭapeṣaṇa) of a separate refutation. He quotes two verses from the 29th chapter of Arcaṭa’s Hetubinduṭīkā, “Refutation of Non-absolutism” (dravyaparyāyānekāntavādakhaṇḍanam),[39] and concludes that, of things with mutually contradictory nature, negating the one implies (nāntarīyaka) affirming the other, and one cannot affirm and negate the same nature in respect to the same thing. The opponents therefore cannot defend themselves by taking this position.[40]

After negating all possible alternative interpretations of the relationship between the cognition’s making manifest and the object, Jitāri says that, since it is not the case that one thing can be made manifest by the other thing, the conclusion must be as follows: “What becomes manifest is [cognition] itself, what is not [cognition] itself [, i.e., anything other than cognition], does not have its manifestation at all.”[41] If we compare this conclusion with his first formal reasoning,[42] it becomes clear that here he just repeats the idea of the pervasion (vyāpti) stated in that reasoning. In the remaining part of the text, Jitāri replies to several objections against this conclusion.

4. Replies to the objections against the thesis of self-manifestation

The first objection is directly directed against the above-mentioned pervasion, arguing that a blue thing, etc., can be both not cognition (i.e., external) and self-manifestation in its nature; so Jitāri’s reason is not established. Jitāri replies to this simply by indicating the self-contradiction of this argument. He explains: For a cognition, the nature of being cognition is nothing but the nature of being self-manifestation; so, by admitting the fact that the blue, etc., are self-manifestation, one admits also that they are cognition.[43] The opponent is not satisfied with this reply, asserting that being cognition does not equal being reflexive manifestation (ātmaprakāśatva), rather it means simply being an agent of the action of making manifest (prakāśayitṛ). This is refuted by pointing out the fact that cognition’s being the agent of making manifest is dependent upon the object it makes manifest (prakāśya), and since that object-referent outside of cognition cannot be proved as the object to be made manifest by cognition, also cognition cannot be the agent of making manifest.[44]

The opponent now introduces the grammatical notion of an “object of action” (karman) to prove that the object of action is separated from the agent. According to the opponent, Jitāri’s above argument might be applicable to cases where the object of action is the “object to be created” (kārya) or the “object to be modified” (vikārya). In the grammatical tradition, the object of action is divided into three types: The object to be produced, the object to be modified and the object to be attained.[45] The opponent argues that the object made manifest by cognition could be “the object to be attained” (prāpya), which is neither the object to be produced or effected (kārya) nor the object to be modified (vikārya), like “village” in the sentence “he goes to the village” (grāmaṅ gacchatīti); so it is not contradictory to say that what is attained is made manifest, and is neither produced nor changed.[46]

This is refuted by Jitāri based on the following reasons:

(1) Other than being cognition no attaining (prāpti) is possible, and without attaining no object-referent can be attained;

(2) the cognition cannot be characterized as attaining, since [in the opponent’s system] the action (kriyā) and its causal factor (kāraka) cannot be the same thing;[47]

(3) In the case that the cognition is an agent of action and acts with respect to itself (ātmakartṛkakriyārūpa), since the cognition does not operate (upayoga) on the [external] object-thing, the latter cannot become the object of action of that cognition.

(4) If the object-thing becomes the object of action (karmatve) merely due to its presence at the time when the action arises, it would follow that everything at that moment (tadātana) would be the object. If it becomes the object of action due to being a cause, then the visual sense, etc., would also come to be the object of action.[48]

The opponent argues further for the separation between the agent of making manifest and the object to be made manifest, saying that a thing that becomes manifest can be an object of action of making manifest when the agent of making manifest occurs, i.e., when there is a causal relationship between them. Jitāri replies that an external object-referent cannot become manifest as itself, nor can it have a different nature, i.e., manifestation produced by cognition. Thus, it is just nonsense to apply the formula of causality which in this case could be expressed as: “When that occurs, this becomes manifest.”[49]

After negating that the relationship between object and cognition is one between object of action and agent of action, Jitāri adds that, through this negation, also Kumārila’s statement in ŚVK, Pratyakṣasūtra 54–55, is refuted. There Kumārila explains the word “birth” in the definition of “perception” in Mīmāṃsāsūtra 1.1.4: “Perception is the birth of cognition when a person’s sense faculties are connected with an existent object,”[50] saying that the operation of causes is known as additional (atireka) to their birth. The word “birth” used there is intended to mean that it should not be so also in the case of valid means of cognition, and the latter cannot last even for a moment, nor is it to be produced as invalid cognition (apramā), so that the causes should operate later in apprehending of the object-thing like sense faculty, etc.[51] Jitāri explains that this is refuted because with respect to an external thing, a cognition that does nothing upon that thing cannot be valid, and that thing cannot be the object of valid cognition; also because, if cognition is valid only upon its birth, an over-excessive consequence would result (atiprasaṅga).[52] This probably means that if a cognition were a valid cognition merely by arising, then all cognitions, or perhaps all things, would be valid cognitions merely by arising.

In the final section of the treatise, Jitāri also refutes some opponents from within the Buddhist tradition. The first opponent is probably the Sautrāntika, whose general opinion on the topic under discussion is that a cognition cognizes its object without taking any action upon the object, just by assuming the image of the object that caused it.[53] The objection claims that a cognition can be that which makes its object-referent manifest (prakāśaka), even without doing anything; and the object-referent can be made manifest (prakāśya) even without any change made by cognition. That is to say, there can be a relationship between a manifest-maker and an object even without any action. The idea of “action-less-ness” of a cognitive event is shared by the Yogācāra, so Jitāri agrees with this completely. However, he points out that, if two things are determined as having such relationship due to an action taken by the one upon the other, then this relationship would be broken in the absence of such action; on the other hand, for a thing that is not causally connected nothing can be made in the case of the non-existence of this action.[54] This means of course that the theory of non-activity cannot be applied in the case of an external object. According to Jitāri, in that case, in the absence of any action, the relationship between cognition and object-referent as the manifest-maker and the object to be made manifest cannot exist; and further, the external object is not connected with cognition, so without action nothing can be made. That is to say, the cognition can make the object manifest only in the case that the object is internal to or inside of cognition–that is, cognition can make only itself manifest. The opponent argues against this, saying that, if cognition would make itself manifest, two things would become the manifest-maker and the object to be made manifest without separate auxiliary means (upakāra), and everything would be the manifest-maker and the object to be made manifest with respect to everything else. Jitāri replies to this by simply pointing out that the object-subject relationship is restrained through their causal relationship, so the over-excessive consequence mentioned by the opponent would not occur.[55]

The topic of discussion then turns to the causal relationship. An opponent from the Vaibhāṣika system argues that both cognition and object-thing, which arise from their respective collection (kalāpa) of causes in the preceding moment, will have the form of the manifest-maker and the object to be made manifest respectively. This is actually the opinion of Śubhagupta (720–780).[56] A verse is quoted from his BSK, which says: “The causal complex in immediately preceding moment should produce the momentary instance of object-field together with cognition (sajñāna), just like a visible matter together with its light; for that reason, they should be perceived together.”[57] The conclusion of this objection is that, since the manifestation of the object-thing occurs even in the absence of the nature of self-manifestation, so long as the invalidation of this occurrence is not conclusive, the reason used by Jitāri is not conclusive.[58] Jitāri replies: If the object-referent produced by the collection of its own causes as something with the form to be made manifest (prakāśyarūpa), then for this object only what is to be made manifest is attained (āpanna), but not the coexistent cognition; but (ca) it is to be propounded by the opponent that the object is made manifest by the cognition. Thus, Jitāri says, whoever claims that the object is produced exclusively from its own cause as being made manifest contradicts the thesis he proposed.[59] Here, “produced from its own cause” refers of course to the external object that is independent of the cognition.

Now, the opponent argues that the object-referent is produced by its own cause as having the additional quality (atiśaya) of something whose nature is born from cognition, so that it could of course be made manifest by the cognition.[60] The main points of Jitāri’s refutation consists in an examination of the relation between the object and the cognition from the temporal point of view. The opponent’s position that the object possesses an extra characteristic, i.e., the manifestation, given by cognition, while it arises from its own cause, implies necessarily the simultaneity between the object and cognition. This simultaneity is actually completely acceptable for the Yogācāra in the theoretical framework of self-awareness. But for the opponent who is an externalist, as Jitāri points out, the simultaneity is problematic. Jitāri says that, for two things that arise simultaneously, a relationship as supporting and supported factor is impossible;[61] if they are not related in this manner, but merely simultaneous, it would follow that also other things born at the same time were made manifest.[62]

The opponent has now resource to causality: being connected to the same causal complex distinguishes the object-reference from other things.[63] But, Jitāri replies, the cognition, too, being dependent on its object, must belong to the same causal complex (tadbhāva). The opponent still tries to defend himself, saying that the object has to be made manifest by something else, i.e., the cognition, since it itself is not the manifest-maker. Jitāri then replies, as a coup de grâce, that the cognition, doing nothing, cannot be the manifest-maker; and if cognition, being simultaneous with and sharing the same causal complex with the object-referent, could the manifest-maker of the object-referent, the object-referent would also be manifest-maker of the cognition.[64] Jitāri quotes also statements of Dharmakīrti (PV 3.417b–418a and 3.479’cd) to support his arguments.[65]

The conclusion is that the fundamental reason (maula), i.e., “becoming manifest,” cannot be inconclusive, since the manifestation never occurs in any other way; and the thesis that is ascertained through the reason free from the three fallacies like the “non-establishment [of the locus]” should be accepted.[66]

5. Conclusion

In this short treatise, Jitāri tries to establish the Yogācāra thesis that merely the cognitive representation exists by means of the reasoning proving the thesis that anything that becomes manifest is exclusively cognition itself. In doing so, he refutes various objections against this reasoning and its conclusion. Through these objections, opponents try to demonstrate that the reasoning is invalid and thereby defend their thesis that cognition and object are separate things, as, respectively, what makes manifest and what is to be made manifest. Like many other of Jitāri’s works, the VMS has clear polemical traits. He categorizes his opponents mainly as belonging to the nirākārajñānavāda-branch of the bāhyārthavāda, which includes representatives of non-Buddhist systems as well as Buddhists.

Through the presentation in previous sections, I hope that I was able to outline the most important points of Jitāri’s arguments in this treatise. Although it seems to me that Jitāri does not offer many innovative ideas, the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi should still occupy an important place in the history of Yogācāra philosophical literature, as it summarizes the most important points of the Yogācāra position with regard to the topic of the cognitive image of the object, and reports various opponents’ ideas. It thus enriches our knowledge about later development of the Yogācāra system and its interaction with various Buddhist and non-Buddhist opponents.

References and abbreviations

AKBh Vasubandhu, Abhidharmakośabhāṣya: Abhidharmakośabhāṣya of Vasubandhu, ed. P. Pradhan. Revised second edition with introduction and indices etc. by Aruna Haldar. Patna 1975.

AKV Yaśomittrā, Abhidharmakośavyākhyā: The Abhidharmakośa and Bhāṣya of Ācārya Vasubandhu with Sphuṭārthā Commentary of Ācārya Yaśomittrā. 2 vols., ed. S. D. Śāstrī. Varanasi 1998.

BSK Śubhagupta, Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā: Phil rol gyi don grub pa zhes bya ba’i tshig le’ur byas pa. D 4244, vol. ZHE, 189b3–196b1.

Chu 2006 [2008] J. Chu, On Dignāga’s theory of the object of cognition as presented in PS(V) 1. Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 29.2 (2006 [2008]) 211–254.

Chu and Franco 2012 J. Chu and E. Franco, Rare Manuscripts of Works by Jitāri. China Tibetology 1 (2012) 17–32. (Revised and enlarged version in Sanskrit manuscripts in China III: proceedings of a panel at the 2016 Beijing Seminar on Tibetan Studies, August 1-4, Beijing, forthcoming.)

D Derge edition of Tibetan Tripiṭaka: sDe dge Tibetan tripiṭaka, bstan’gyur–preserved at the Faculty of Letters, University of Tokyo. Tokyo 1981.

Dasgupta 1975 S. Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy. 5 vols. Delhi 1975.

Dhammajoti 2007 B. K. L. Dhammajoti, Abhidharma Doctrine and Controversy on Per-ception. Hong Kong 2007.

Dhammajoti 2009 B. K. L. Dhammajoti, Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma. Hong Kong 2009.

Dreyfus 1997 G. B. J. Dreyfus, Recognizing Reality: Dharmakīrtis Philosophy and Its Tibetan Interpretations. Albany 1997.

Frauwallner 1954 E. Frauwallner, Die Reihenfolge und Entstehung der Werke Dharma-kīrtis. In: Asiatica. Festschrift Friedrich Weller. Leipzig 1954, 142–154. [Reprinted in Frauwallner 1982: 677–689.]

Frauwallner 1961 E. Frauwallner, Landmarks in the History of Indian Logic. Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd-und Südostasiens 5 (1961) 125–148. [Reprinted in Frauwallner 1982: 847–870.]

Frauwallner 1968 E. Frauwallner, Materialien zur ältesten Erkenntnislehre der Karma-mīmāṃsā. Wien 1968.

Frauwallner 1982 E. Frauwallner, Kleine Schriften, ed. G. Oberhammer and E. Steinkell-ner. Wiesbaden 1982.

Funayama 2007 T. Funayama, Kamalaśīla’s Distinction between the Two Sub-Schools of Yogācāra. A Provisional Survey. In: Pramāṇakīrti. Papers Dedicated to Ernst Steinkellner on the Occasion of his 70th birthday, ed. H. Krasser et al. Wien 2007, 187–202.

Hattori 1968 M. Hattori, Dignāga, On Perception, being the Pratyakṣapariccheda of Dignāgas Pramāṇasamuccaya; from the Sanskrit fragments and the Tibetan versions. Translated and annotated. Cambridge, Massachusetts 1968.

Hayes and Gillon 1991 R. P. Hayes and B. S. Gillon, Introduction to Dharmakīrti’s Theory of Inference as Presented in Pramāṇavārttika Svopajñavṛtti 1–10. Journal of Indian Philosophy 19 (1991) 1–73.

HB Dharmakīrti, Hetubindu: Dharmakīrtis Hetubinduḥ. Teil I: Tibetischer Text und rekonstruierter Sanskrit Text, ed. E. Steinkellner. Wien 1967.

HBṬ Bhaṭṭa Arcaṭa, Hetubinduṭīkā: Hetubinduṭīkā of Bhaṭṭa Arcaṭa with the Sub-Commentary Entitled Āloka of Durveka Miśra, ed. Sukhlalji Sanghavi and Muni Shri Jinavijayaji. Baroda 1949.

HBṬĀ Durvekamiśra, Hetubinduṭīkāloka. See HBṬ.

JNĀ Jñānaśrīmitranibandhāvaliḥ (Buddhist Philosophical Works of Jñānaśrīmitra), ed.

Thakur. Patna 1987.

Kajiyama 1965 Y. Kajiyama, Controversy between the sākāra-and nirākāra-vādins of the yogācāra school–some materials. Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies XIV.1 (1965) 418–429. [Reprinted in Y. Kajiyama, Studies in Buddhist Philosophy (Selected Papers). Kyoto 1989, 389–400.]

Kajiyama 1998 Y. Kajiyama, An Introduction to Buddhist Philosophy, an Annotated Translation of the Tarkabhāṣa of Mokṣākaragupta, Reprint with Corrections in the Authors Hand. Wien 1998.

Kato 1989 J. Kato [加藤純章],『経量部の研究』 (Kyōryōbu no kenkyū; *A study of Sautrāntika). Tokyo 1989.

KV Jayāditya-Vāmana, Kāśikāvṛtti: Kāśikavṛtti of Jayāditya-Vāmana (Along with Com-mentaries of VivaraṇapañcikāNyāsa of Jinendrabuddhi and Padamañjarī of Hara-datta Miśra), ed. Śrīnārāyaṇa Miśra. Varaṇasi 1985.

KVP Jinendrabuddhi, Kāśikāvivaraṇapañcikā. See KV.

Matilal 1985 B. K. Matilal, Logic, Language & Reality, Indian Philosophy and Contem-porary Issues. Delhi 1985.

Mookerjee and Nagasaki 1964 S. Mookerjee and H. Nagasaki, The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti. An English Translation of the First Chapter with the Autocommentary and with Elaborate Comments [kārikās I–LI]. Patna 1964.

MS Jaimini, Mīmāṃsāsūtra: The Mīmāṃsā Darśana. 2 vols, ed. Mahamahopadhyaya Mahesachandra Nyayaratna. Calcutta 1889.

MSBh Śabarasvāmī, Mīmāṃsāsūtrabhāṣyam ad Jaimini’s Mīmāṃsāsūtra 1,1.1–5. See Frauwallner 1968: 10–61.

NR Pārthasārathimiśra, Nyāyaratnākara: Ślokavārttika of Śrī Kumārila Bhaṭṭa with The Commentary Nyāyaratnākara of Śrī Pārthasārathi Miśra, ed. and rev. Ganga Sagar Rai. Varanasi 1993.

Pāṇ Pāṇini, Aṣṭādhyāyī: The Aṣṭādhyāyī of Pāṇini. 2 vols., ed. and trans. Śrīśa Chandra Vasu. Delhi 1891–1893.

PSṬ 1 Jinendrabuddhi, Viśālāmalavatī Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā, Chapter 1, Part 1: Criti-cal Edition, ed. E. Steinkellner, H. Krasser, and H. Lasic. Beijing/Vienna 2005.

PS(V) Dignāga, Pramāṇasamuccaya: Dignāgas Pramāṇasamuccaya, Chapter 1, A hypo-thetical reconstruction of the Sanskrit text with the help of the two Tibetan translations on the basis of the hitherto known Sanskrit fragments and the linguistic materials gained from Jinendrabuddhis Ṭīkā, ed. E. Steinkellner. 2005. at/fileadmin/Institute/IKGA/PDF/forschung/buddhismuskunde/dignaga_PS_1.pdf, last visited 09-08-2019.

PV 1 Dharmakīrti, Pramāṇavārttika, Chapter 1: R. Gnoli, The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dhar-makīrti, the First Chapter with the Autocommentary. Text and Critical Notes. Roma 1960.

PV 3 Dharmakīrti, Pramāṇavārttika, Chapter 3. See Tosaki 1979.

PVA Prajñākaragupta, Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra: Pramāṇavārtikabhāshyam or Vārtikāla-ṅkāraḥ of Prajñākaragupta (Being a commentary on Dharmakīrtis Pramāṇavārti-kam), ed. R. Sāṅkṛityāyana. Patna 1953.

PVin 1 Dharmakīrti, Pramāṇaviniścaya: Dharmakīrtis Pramāṇaviniścayaḥ, Chapter 1 and 2. Critically edited by E. Steinkellner. Beijing/Vienna 2007.

PVV Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti: Dharmakīrtis Pramāṇavārttika with a commentary by Mano-rathanandin, ed. R. Sāṅkṛtyāyana. Appendix to Journal of Bihar and Orissa Research Society, vols. XXIV, XXV, XXVI. Patna 1938–1940.

RNĀ Ratnakīrti, Nibandhāvali: Ratnakīrti-Nibandhāvaliḥ (Buddhist Nyāya Works of Ratnakīrti), deciphered and edited by Prof. Anantalal Thakur. Patna 1975.

Shirasaki 1981 K. Shirasaki [白崎顕成]: Jitāri,人と思想 (Jitāri, hito to shisō; *Jitāri: life and thought). In:『僧伝の研究:木村武夫教授古稀記念』(Sōden no kenkyū: Kimura Takeo kyōjū koki kinen). Kyoto 1981, 1–29.

Steinkellner 1967 E. Steinkellner, Dharmakīrtis Hetubinduḥ. Teil II. Übersetzung und Anmerkungen. Wien 1967.

Steinkellner 2008 [2009] E. Steinkellner, Further Remarks on the Compound avinābhā-vaniyama in the Early Dharmakīrti. Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens 51/52 (2008 [2009]) 193–205.

Steinkellner 2013 E. Steinkellner, Dharmakīrtis frühe Logik, Annotierte Übersetzung der logischen Teile von Pramāṇavārttika 1 mit der Vṛtti, I. Introduction, Übersetzung, Analyse, II. Introduction, Anmerkungen, Anhänge etc. Tokyo 2013.

ŚVK Kumārila, Ślokavārttika. See NR.

Taber 2005 J. Taber, A Hindu Critique of Buddhist Epistemology: Kumārila on Perception: TheDetermination of PerceptionChapter of Kumārila Bhaṭṭas Ślokavārttika, Translation and Commentary. London/New York 2005.

TBh Tarkabhāṣā: Tarkabhāṣā and Vādasthāna of Mokṣākaragupta and Jitāripāda, ed. H.R. Rangaswami Iyengar. Mysore 1952.

Tosaki 1979 H. Tosaki (戸崎宏正),『仏教認識論の研究–法称著『ブァマーナ·ヴァールティカ』の現量論–上巻』(Bukkyō ninshikiron no kenkyū–hōshōchō “Pramāṇavārttika” no genryōron, jokan; *Studies in Buddhist epistemology: Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttika, pratyakṣa chapter, vol. 1). Tokyo 1979.

TS Śāntarakṣita, Tattvasaṅgraha: Tattvasaṅgraha of Śāntarakṣita with the Commentary of Kamalashīla. 2 vols., ed. E. Krishnamacharya. Baroda 1984.

TSP Kamalaśīla, Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā. See TS.

TSP (Ś) Kamalaśīla, Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā: Tattvasaṅgraha of Ācārya Śāntarakṣita with the CommentaryPañjikāof Ācārya (Srī ) Kamalashīla. 2 vols., ed. Swāmī Dwārikādās Śāstrī. Varanasi 1997.

Tucci [1930] 1971 G. Tucci, The Jātinirākṛti of Jitāri. In: Opera Minora. Part I. Roma 1971, 249–254.

Vetter 1966 T. Vetter, Dharmakīrtis Pramāṇaviniścayaḥ, 1. Kapitel: Pratyakṣam. Ein-leitung, Text der tibetischen Übersetzung, Sanskritfragmente, deutsche Übersetzung. Wien 1966.

VMS Jitāri, Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi: Jitāris Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi (Sanskrit Text), critically edited by J. Chu. Forthcoming.

VMS(R) Ratnākaraśānti, Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi: Rnam par rig pa tsam nyid du grub pa. In: sDe dge Tibetan tripiṭaka, bstan’gyur–preserved at the Faculty of Letters, University of Tokyo. Tokyo 1981, no. 4259, vol. ZHE, folios 306b4–309b3.

Footnotes and references:


Cf. Chu and Franco 2012.


Cf. Tucci [1930] 1971: 249. Shirasaki (1981: 342) estimates Jitāri’s dates as 960–1040.


In manuscript A the VMS ranges from folios 14b4 to 20ab, in manuscript B from 49a1 to 55b2. A critical edition of the text based on the two manuscripts is being prepared by the present author and will be published separately. All quotations of VMS in this paper are based on this forthcoming critical edition. In the following, two sets of folio-numbers and the line-number separated by forward slash (for instance, “14b5–6/49a1–2”) refer to manuscript A and manuscript B respectively; however, editorial notes from the critical apparatus, including the reports of the variant readings in one of the two manuscripts, are omitted here. I will not describe the physical condition and the philological character of these manuscripts here, which will be made in the critical edition. For the detailed information of the two manuscripts of the works attributed to Jitāri, as a whole, cf. Chu and Franco 2012.


I prefer to use the terms “externalism/externalist” (bahirarthavāda/bahirarthavādin) instead of “realism/realist” to refer to the system/person which/who asserts that object of cognition exists outside of or independent of cognition, because these terms can easily remind us of its Sanskrit equivalent.


VMS 14b5–6/49a1–2: jñānam evedaṃ sitagītasurabhimadhurakarkaśākāram bhāsate, bāhyaḥ* punar artho jñānakāryavyatirekamātravyavasthāpitaśarīro na svena rūpeṇa cakāsti. *Both manuscripts clearly read bāhyam. However, since bāhyaḥ appears in related passages quoted below in n. 7 and n. 9, the text should be emended to bāhyaḥ.


Cf. a frequently quoted statement clarifying the Sautrāntika position, as e.g. in TBh 63,17–18: sautrāntikānāṃ matamjñānam evedaṃ sarvaṃ nīlādyākāreṇa pratibhāsate, na bāhyo’rthaḥ, jaḍasya prakāśāyogāt. Cf. Kajiyama 1965: 428ff.; Kajiyama 1998: 139–140; Dhammajoti 2007: 171ff., 174ff.; Dhammajoti 2009: 241ff., 269ff., and 274ff.


VMS 14b6–15a1/49a2–3: nirākārā no buddhiḥ, ākāravān bāhyo’rthaḥ, pratyakṣaś ca, sa hi bahirdeśasambaddhaḥ pratyakṣeṇopalabhyate. In the TSP, we can find a similar outline of the nirākāravāda: “Cognition is devoid of the image; however, the external thing has the image, and it is perceived distinctly as connected to the external world. In this manner, the image of cognition is rejected by us.” (TSP 313,4–6 ad TS 980: nirākārā buddhiḥ, ākāravān bāhyo’rthaḥ, sa ca bahirdeśasambanddho vispaṣṭam upalabhyata ity evam asmābhir jñānākāro niṣiddhaḥ.)


Cf. MSBh 28,17–18: nirākārā tu no buddhiḥ, ākāravān bāhyo’rthaḥ, sa hi bahirdeśasambaddhaḥ pratyakṣam upalabhyate. Cf. also TSP 101,14–15 ad TS 252: kiṃ ca bhavato mīmāṃsakasya mate yo bhāsamānaḥ sa ākāro na buddheḥ. kiṃ tv asau bāhyārthasvabhāvo varṇyate, ākāravān bāhyo’rtho nirākārā buddhir iti vacanāt. “Further, in your Mīmāṃsaka system, it is explained that it is not the image of cognition that appears; rather, it is the nature of the external object, since it is said: ‘the external object possesses the image, the cognition is devoid of the image.’”


Cf. Kajiyama 1965: 421ff.


Cf. VMS 15a1/49a3: parisamāpitasakalavyavahārayogābhāvān mithyābhiniveśaleśād ṛte nātiśerata iti.


VMS 15a2–3/49a4–5: yat prakāśate tat jñānaṃ yathā nīlavikalpaḥ, prakāśate cedaṃ rūpādikam iti svabhāvahetuḥ.


Dharmakīrti does not directly offer a separate definition of the pseudo-reason (hetvābhāsa). Rather, in PV 1.1 he defines the threefold valid reason and then adds at the end of the verse that reasons other than this are “pseudo-reasons” (pakṣadharmas tadaṃśena vyāpto hetus tridhaiva saḥ / avinābhāvaniyamād dhetvābhāsās tatopare //). The verse is translated in Mookerjee and Nagasaki 1964: 6; Hayes and Gillon 1991: 2f.; and Steinkellner 2008 [2009]: 195, 2013: 4; for further discussion see Frauwallner 1954: 145; Steinkellner 1967: 82f., 2008 [2009]: 195, 2013: 16; and PVin 3.91–131,5 (kārikā 67–68).


Cf. VMS 15a3/49a5: atra prayoge na sādhanāsiddhir adhyakṣasiddhatvād dharmiṇi prakāśamānatāyāḥ.


Cf. VMS 15a5–6/49b2–4: ayam evārūpādivyāvṛttiviśiṣṭo dharmī , bāhyatvābāhyatve tasya vivādāspade vyāvṛttyantare, na ca tayor asiddhiṃ dharmiṇo ākarṣati, tasyādhyakṣasiddhatvenāśakyāpahnavatvāt, na ca kvacid anumāne vimatyadhikaraṇadharmaviśiṣṭo dṛṣṭo dharmī yenaivam asiddhicodanālāmbī syāt.


A similar definition of the contradictory reason can be found in RNĀ 33,21–22: tathā hi yo vipakṣa eva vartate sa khalu sādhyaviparyayavyāpteḥ sādhyaviruddhaṃ sādhayan viruddho’bhidhīyate.


Cf. VMS 15b1–2/49b4–5: nāpi viruddhatvaṃ sapakṣe bhāvāt. sādhyaviparyayavyāptaṃ hi sādhanaṃ viruddhaṃ bhavati, na ca vyāpyaṃ vyāpakam antareṇa syāt tadabhāvaprasaṅgād iti sati viruddhatve na sapakṣe vartate.


Cf. VMS 15b2/49b5–50a1: nanu ca prakāśanaṃ nāma nāsty eva sapakṣe jñānasya sarvasya parokṣatvāt. na hi kaścid ajñāte’rthe buddhim upalabhate, jñāte tv anumānād avagacchati.


Cf. MSBh 7,25–29: na hi kaścid ajñāte’rthe buddhim upalabhate, jñāte tv anumānād avagacchati.


Cf. PV 3.460ab: api cādhyakṣatābhāve dhiyaḥ syāl liṅgato gatiḥ / “Further, cognition should be known through an inferential sign, insofar as it is not perceptible.” Cf. PV 3.447: etenānātmavitpakṣe sarvārthādarśanena ye / apratyakṣāṃ dhiyaṃ prāhus te’pi nirvarṇitottarāḥ // “Through [the unwanted consequence explained above] that there is no perception of any kind of object in the thesis of non-self-awareness the reply is given to those who say that cognition is non-perceptible.” The opponent who advocates this theory is at PVV 251,17 labelled as Jaiminīya: ye jaiminīyā apratyakṣāṃ dhiyam arthāpattigamyām āhuḥ te’pi nirvarṇitottarā dattottarā boddhavyāḥ.


Cf. PS(V) 1.6ab: mānasaṃ cārtharāgādisvasaṃvittir akalpikā / mānasam api rūpādiviṣayālambanam avikalpakam anubhavākārapravṛttam, rāgādiṣu ca svasaṃvedanam indriyānapekṣatvān mānasaṃ pra-tyakṣam. “And the mental [perception], [i.e.,] awareness of an object-referent and self[-awareness] of desire, etc., is free from conceptual construction. Mental [awareness], too, taking the object-field like a visible matter, etc., as its object-support, [and] occurring with image of direct experience [of that visible matter], is non-conceptual [and thus can be regarded as perception]; and self-awareness in respect to the desire, etc., is [also a kind of] mental perception, because it is independent of sense faculties.” And PS(V) 1.9ab: svasaṃvittiḥ phalaṃ vātra dvyābhāsaṃ hi jñānam utpadyate svābhāsaṃ viṣayābhāsaṃ ca. tasyobhayābhāsasya yat svasaṃvedanaṃ tat phalam. “Or with regard to this [per-ception mentioned above as a type of perception] (cf. PSṬ 1 69,6–7: atreti pūrvokte pratyakṣe) the self-awareness is the result. (9a) Cognition arises actually with two appearances, self-appearance and object-appearance. The self-awareness of this [cognition] possessing both appearances is the result.”


Cf. TS 1555: na nāma rūpaṃ vastūnāṃ yat tasyāgrahaṇe sati / parijñātātmatattvānām apy avijñātatā bhavet //


Cf. VMS 15b4–16a1/50a3–6: yadi hi jñānānubhavo nāma nāsty eva, tadā yo’yaṃ ghaṭādivikalpaḥ saṃvidita upayann āpayaṃś ca kvāntarbhāvyatām, arthe buddhau vā. na tāvad arthe, tasyehāvaśeno-dayāstamayāyogāt, asya cānevaṃrūpatvāt. buddhir atra vivarteta, sā cāpratyakṣā vivṛttāpi satī vaḥ na prakāśeta, na ca prakāśo’rthas tathāvṛttir ity abhāva evārthābhilāpānukāriṇo’anubhavātmano vikalpasya jñānaparokṣapakṣe prasajyeta. na caivam. This is in fact an adaptation of the argument presented in Dharmakīrti’s PVin 1 14,14–15,7. Cf. the German translation of the Tibetan version in Vetter 1966: 53.


Cf. VMS 16a1–3/50a6–b2: anaikāntikatāpy asya na sambhavinī . sā hi bhavantī dṛśyamānavipakṣavṛ-ttikatayā vā sambhavet sambhāvyamānavipakṣavṛttikatayā vā. tatra na tāvad agrimo grāhyaḥ pakṣaḥ, pramāṇasiddhasya vyabhicāragocarasya kasyacid abhāvāt. nāpi paścimo vipaścitām paritoṣāya. yadi viparyaye bādhakaṃ pramāṇaṃ na bhavet, asya syād vipakṣapracārāśaṅkā, yāvat tad asti—yad yat svaprakāśasvabhāvaṃ na bhavati tat tan na prakāśate. yathā kiñcit kadācid apratibhāsamānam. na bhavati ca svaprakāśasvabhāvam asati jñānatve nīlādikam iti vyāpakānupalabdhiḥ.


Cf. the quotation above in n. 12.


As pointed out by Funayama (2007: 194, n. 35), the subject of the verb anu-√bhū can also be a thing, and then it does not mean “to experience …” as when it is used with a human being as its subject; he translates the phrase sattām anubhavati in a passage quoted from TSP 1123,6–8 as “directly manifests itself” (but, I think, in that case, the phrase could be simply translated as something like “is connected to/attains its existence”). He gives some other examples of the same expression found in TSP. Actually, examples for this use of the verb in other contexts can also be found in TSP and other texts, for instance, cf. TSP 604,12–14: sa vāyur niṣkramaṃs tālvādeḥ saṃyogavibhāgāv anubhavati. gacchaṃś ca na sa yāvad ākāśam abhigacchati. kiṃ tarhi. yāvad vegam … “It, i.e., wind, when blowing out, attains connection or disjunction with the palate, etc., and it does not continue to move as long as there is space, but as long as the impetus (vega) [continues].” (Notably, here, the word anurudhyate in TS 2177 is paraphrased as anubhavati).


Cf. VMS 16a4–6/50b3–4: svaprakāśasvabhāvatām ananubhavann api nīlādiḥ prakāśata iti na kiñcid anupapannaṃ nāma. ko hy atra niyamo yat svaprakāśasvabhāvenaiva kevalaṃ prakāśitavyam iti, paraprakāśyatve’pi prakāśopapatteḥ, svayam aprakāśātmanām api nīlādīnāṃ dīpādisannidhānādhīna-prakāśarūpatopalambhāt.


Cf. VMS 16a6–16b1/50b5: bhaved ayam anaikāntiko hetuḥ, yady anyathāpi prakāśo ghaṭate, kiṃ tu svaprakāśatām antareṇa prakārāntareṇa prakāśo nopapadyate.


Cf. VMS 16b1–3/15a1–2: nanu jñānaprakāśatve’pi prakāśo yujyata eva, idam eva kim uktaṃ bhavati jñānenārthaḥ prakāśyata iti. kim atra praṣṭavyam, jñānena tasya prakāśanaṃ kriyata ity ayam artho’nenābhidhīyata iti.


Cf. VMS 16b3–5/51a2–5: tatra yadi jñānena prakāśānākhyaṃ kim api padārthāntaraṃ kṛtam, kathaṃ tenārthaḥ prakāśito nāma. na hy asau svayam eva prakāśate, tathātve paraprakāśatvāyogāt. tad api param asya svarūpaviśeṣādhāne na vyāpriyate, dvitīyavikalpaprasaṅgāt, tasya ca vicārayiṣyamāṇatvāt.


Cf. VMS 16b4–5/51a4–5: tathā ca yathābhūto’sau prakāśānudaye, tathābhūta eva prakāśodayasamayepīti kathaṃ prakāśeta. aprakāśadṛśā bhāvinaḥ svarūpān na viśiṣyate prakāśate ceti suvyākṛtam.


In the grammatical sense, karaṇa refers to “the most efficient causal factor.” Cf. Pāṇ 1.4.42: sādhaka-tamaṃ karaṇam. and KV Part I: 557,4–5 (ad loc.): kriyāsiddhau yat prakṛṣṭopakārakaṃ vivakṣitaṃ tat sādhakatamaṃ kārakaṃ karaṇasaṃjñaṃ bhavati. Cf. also Matilal’s discussion on the topic “the doctrine of karaṇa” in 1985: 372–378.


Cf. VMS 16b5–17a1/51a5–51b2: tenaiva prakāśena prakāśyata iti cet. vārttam etat, tasyāpi prakāśāntarakaraṇe bhāve’nupayogāt, tasya ca pūrvarūpāviśeṣāt prakāśamānatānupapattau tasyāpi tadapa-raprakāśakriyopagame paryavasānaśūnyaprakāśaparaṃparotpādakasya purovasthitapadārthaprakā-śamānatāparipanthino’navasthānasya prasaṅgāt.


Cf. VMS 17a1–2/51b2–3: jñānenārthasyātmabhūtaprakāśanakaraṇe tasyaiva karaṇam āpadyeta. yat khalv arthasyātmabhūtam asāv artha eva. tac ca kriyate na cārtha iti riktā vāco yuktiḥ. na cāsya kriyā sambhavinī , prāg eva niṣpannatvāt.


Cf. VMS 17a2–4/51b3–5: yena rūpeṇa sa niṣpanno na tena kriyā, rūpāntareṇa karaṇād iti cet. tad eva tarhi rūpāntaram aniṣpannatvāt kriyata iti prāptam. tac ca tanniṣpattāv aniṣpannaṃ kāraṇāntarataḥ paścād upajāyamānaṃ kathaṃ tadātmabhūtaṃ nāma.


Cf. VMS 17a4–5/51b5–52a1: tasmād yady arthasya pūrvarūpavyayo rūpāntarodayaś ca bhavet, bhaved asya vyaktarūpāntarasya jñānād utpattiḥ, tau cākṣaṇikatve na staḥ, tadupagame pratikṛtīti bhaṅgu-ratvaprasaṅgāt. The phrase pratikṛti (cf. pratijñānaṃ in PV 3.465a quoted below in n. 37) reads in the manuscript B as prakṛtibhaṅguratva°, “perishable in their nature,” however, in this case the phrase loses the connection with PV.


Indeed, Dharmakīrti’s statement aims at the refutation of various opponents’ opinions against the Yogācāra thesis that cognition is cognized by itself (svavedana, cf. PV 3.425ff.). One of them says that cognition is apprehended by inference, i.e., through inferential sign (liṅga). Dharmakīrti refutes this by arguing that, the causal forces for arising of a cognition, like sense faculty, object-referent, mental factor, etc., cannot be established as the inferential sign, because either they could deviate from the causal connection with cognition or they themselves are the cognition that are to be inferred; also the appearance (vyakti) of object-referent, being the cognition, cannot be the inferential sign, because the object-referent, when not being experienced, cannot be ascertained as appearing (cf. PV 3,461’d–463cd: tatra nendriyaṃ vyabhicārataḥ // tathārtho dhīmanaskārau jñānaṃ tau ca na sidhyataḥ / nāprasiddhasya liṅgatvaṃ vyaktir arthasya cen matā // saiva nanu jñānaṃ vyakto’rtho’nena varṇitaḥ / vyaktāv ananubhūtāyāṃ tadvyaktatvāviniścayāt //). Dharmakīrti refutes further the objection against this argument in the next one and a half verses which are quoted by Jitāri: “Now, [the opponent] accepts that the appearance is an [additional] special property (viśeṣa)* of the very object-referent. [But] the object-referent, since it does neither arise nor pass away [according to the externalist opponent], cannot have a special property of any kind. Or, when this [special property] is accepted, it would follow that it decays with each cognition.” (PV 3.464–465ab: athārthasyaiva kaścit sa viśeṣo vyaktir iṣyate / nānutpādavyayavato viśeṣo’rthasya kaścana // tadiṣṭau vā pratijñānaṃ kṣaṇabhaṅgaḥ prasajyate / *In PVV 256,4 viśeṣa is paraphrased as svabhāvaviśeṣa, so it refers to a form that is different from the object-referent in its own nature.) It is interesting to observe that, in Jitāri’s text, the expression “with each action [of making manifest]” (pratikṛti) is actually a referential use of Dharmakīrti’s expression “with each cognition” (pratijñānam). The point here, in Jitāri’s context, is that the process of making manifest is a cognitive product, and therefore it arises and disappears with each cognition, consequently it is not independent of the cognition.


PV 3.246: asataḥ prāg asāmarthyāt paścāc ca na prayogataḥ / prāgbhāvaḥ sarvahetunāṃ nāto’rthaḥ svadhiyā saha // “Because [in the case that the object-referent as the cause and cognition as the effect exist simultaneously, the object-referent], being non-existent before [the arising of the cognition as result], is not efficient [in producing the result], and after [the arising of result] it is useless [since the result has been already produced], all causes exist before [their results]; consequently, an object cannot be simultaneous with its cognition.” The context of this quotation is however not exactly the same as Jitāri’s argument. In the section of PV 3.245–247, Dharmakīrti discusses the problem of the temporal relationship between mental awareness and its object, refuting an objection against the theory that object-referent is an auxiliary factor (sahakārin) for sense faculty in producing mental cognition. The opponent maintains that the object-referent, being active simultaneously with its cognition and thus in a different time than sense faculty, cannot serve the function of auxiliary cause (sahakārin) Cf. PV 3.245: tadatulyakriyākālaḥ kathaṃ svajñānakālikaḥ / sahakārī bhaved artha iti ced akṣacetasaḥ // PV 3.246 is the reply to this objection. Jitāri’s aim of quoting this verse seems to be merely to rule out the possibility of the simultaneous existence of cause and effect. The point here is that, if the object-referent is external, it cannot be simultaneous with cognition. The Sautrāntika, accepting the externally existent object-referent, refutes the Vaibhāṣika doctrine of the co-existent causes (sahabhūhetu). However, as an internalist (antarjñeyavādin), the Yogācāra supports the theory that the object-referent, as a cognitive aspect of cognition, and therefore existent internally, can be co-existent with cognition. Cf. Kato 1989: 309ff., Dhammajoti 2009: 154ff.


Cf. VMS 17b2–3/52a4–5: samasamayasambhavinā vā jñānenārthakṣaṇaḥ prakāśīkriyeta prāgbhāvinā vā. tatra na tāvad ādyo vikalpaḥ. jñānārthakṣaṇayoḥ sahabhuvoḥ savyetaragoviṣāṇayor iva hetuhetumattvāyogāt. yad āha—… [quotation of PV 3.246] dvitīye tu vikalpe jñānād utpannaḥ prakā-śasvabhāvo’rthaḥ sādhāraṇatvāt sarvān prati prakāśet. yasyaiva jñānena sa tādṛśo janitas tam eva prati sa prakāśasvabhāvo nānyaṃ pratīty apy asaṅgatam. na hi pratipuruṣam arthānām ātmabhedaḥ, nairātmyaprasaṅgād ātmasthiter abhāvāt. (A similar form of the last sentence can be found in PVin 1: 3,11–12.)


In that chapter the Jaina’s non-absolutism (anekāntavāda) is systematically refuted, which holds that “substance” (dravya) and “mode” (paryāya) are not contradictory or mutually exclusive; rather, they are in coherence. (For a brief description of this theory, cf. Dasgupta 1975: I 175ff.) Arcaṭa examines the relationship between the “substance” and its “mode,” also using the analytic method of the “four alternatives.” After negating the alternatives that the substance and the mode are “different” and “non-different” individually, he says in the two verses that are quoted by Jitāri that mutually contradictory properties, such as difference and non-difference between substance and mode, cannot occur in one and the same thing, but when they are accepted, the faults mentioned for each case remain, i.e., either “it cannot be a single thing,” or “it cannot have the double form,” still exist, or the faults that are attached to each single case come forth also in the case when these two are together. These faults (or “side-effects,” such as phlegm produced by sugar and bile by ginger in the examples given in HBṬĀ) that come forth in each single case of difference or non-difference between substance and modes cannot cease to exist insofar the quality exists. Cf. HBṬ 29,25 (p. 106,11–12): bhedābhedoktadoṣāś ca tayor iṣṭau kathan na vā / pratyekaṃ ye prasajyante dvayor bhāve kathaṃ na te // and 29,30 (p. 106,21–22): ye bhedābhedoktimātre hi doṣāḥ sambhavinaḥ kathaṃ / tatsambhave pi te na syur iti brūyād vicakṣaṇaḥ // Cf. also HBṬĀ 349,8–15, 350,29, 351,3 (ad loc.).


Cf. VMS 18a1/52b4: anyonyapratiṣedharūpāṇāṃ caikapratiṣedhasyāparavidhināntarīyakatvād ekasya caikatra vidhipratiṣedhayor ayogāt, na tatkalpanānusaraṇaṃ śaraṇaṃ pareṣām.


Cf. VMS 18a2/52b5: tasmād anyasyānyena prakāśyatvānupapatteḥ, yat prakāśate tat svayam eva, yat tu na svayaṃ tasya nāsyaiva prakāśa iti ekāntaḥ.


Cf. above n. 12.


Cf. VMS 18a3–4/53a1–2: ajñānaṃ svaprakāśātmakaṃ ca nīlādikam iti kim atrānupapannam. tad ayam asiddho hetur iti. tad asat, parasparaviruddhatvāt. svaprakāśatvam eva hi jñānasya jñānatvaṃ nānyat kiñcit. tataḥ svaprakāśatvaṃ nīlāder abhyupannayā jñānatvaṃ nīlāder apy upeti.


Cf. VMS 18a5–6/53a2–4: nātmaprakāśatvaṃ jñānatvam, api tu prakāśayitṛtvam iti cet. prakāśyāpekṣayā hi prakāśayitṛtvam. prakāśyatā cārthasyānupapattimatīti jñānasyāpi prakāśayitṛtvaṃ nopapa-dyate.


Cf. KV Part II 540,3 (ad Pāṇ 3.2.1: karmaṇy aṇ): trividhaṃ karma, nirvartyam, vikāryaṃ prāpyaṃ ceti. Cf. also the more detailed explanation in KVP Part II 540,30–541,25: tatra nirvartyaṃ yad asad evopapapadyate*, yathā kumbhaṃ karoti nagaraṃ karotīti, kumbhādikaṃ hy avidyamānam evotpadyata iti nirvartyaṃ karma. vikāryam yasya sata eva kaścid vikāro vidhīyate, tad yathā kāṇḍaṃ lunātīti, sata eva kāṇḍāder lavanena vikrāro vidhīyata iti vikāryaṃ karma. prāpyaṃ nāsata evotpādanaṃ kriyate nāpi sata eva vikārādhānam, kevalaṃ kriyāsambandhamātraṃ pratīyate, tad yathā vedam adhīte carcāṃ pārayatīti. atra hy adhyayanādinā vedādeḥ sambandhamātraṃ pratīyate, na tv asata evotpādanam, nāpi sata evānyathālakṣaṇo vikāra iti prāpyam etat karma. *-upapadyate em.: utpapadyate KVP


Cf. VMS 18b1–2/53a4–53b1: na hi kāryavikārye paraṃ karmaṇī, yenānutpādyam anatiśayaṃ vā na karma syāt. prāpyam api karma, yat prāpyate param, na kriyate nāpi vikriyate. yathā grāmaṅ gacchatīti. prāpyakarma vārthaḥ. tad ayam akriyamāṇo’py avikriyamāno’pi prāpyamāṇaḥ prakāśyata ity aviruddham.


The theory of the non-difference between a causal factor of an action (kāraka) or more precisely, the means of accomplishing the action (karaṇa), and the action (kriyā) as the result is the fundamental principle of the Yogācāra since Dignāga, which is not accepted by the opponents like the Naiyāyika who adheres to the grammatical notion of differentiating the action and its various causal factors. There is evidently a long-lasting debate between Yogācāra and the Naiyāyika on this topic. Cf. PV 3.318–319: kriyākaraṇayor aikyavirodha iti ced asat / dharmabhedābhyupagamād vastv abhinnam itīṣyate // evaṃprakārā sarvaiva kriyākārakasaṃsthitiḥ / bhāvasya* bhinnābhimateṣv apy āropeṇa vṛttitaḥ // (*Following PVA and various Tibetan translations, Tosaki reads bhāveṣu. However, the genitive form is well supported by Manorathanandin: kriyākaraṇabhāvasya.) “[Opponent:] ‘The action [of cognizing with the result (phala)] and the means of action [i.e., the means of cognition (pramāṇa)] are incompatible to be the one and the same thing.’ [Reply:] This is not correct, because they are understood as a difference in property [which is conceptualized in form of exclusion]. It is held that there is no real division. All kinds of determination of the action and the causal factor [as separate] takes that [conceptualized] form, because such relationship occurs also in respect to the existent things which are considered as different [like wood and axe].” The theory that the object of action is not separated from the agent of action can be found already in the Sautrāntika system. Cf. the Sautrāntika’s famous response in the debate on “what perceives?” in AKBh 31,12–15: atra āhuḥ–kim idam ākāśaṃ khādyate. cakṣur hi pratītya rūpāṇi cotpadyate cakṣurvijñānam. tatra kaḥ paśyati, ko vā dṛśyate. nirvyāpāraṃ hīdaṃ dharmamātraṃ hetuphalamātraṃ ca. tatra vyavahārārthaṃ cchandata upacārāḥ kriyante–cakṣuḥ paśyati vijñānaṃ vijānātīti nātrābhiniveṣṭavyam. Cf. Dhammajoti 2007: 87f., Dhammajoti 2009: 263. Here, it is clear, the Sautrāntika tries to desubstantiate the function of perceiving agent and perceived object, reduce them to an interactive “factor” (dharma) that brings about the cognition, cf. AKV 14,22: dharmamātram iti svatantrasya kartuḥ pratiṣedhaṃ karoti. “The [phrase] ‘mere factor’ negates an independent agent.”


Cf. VMS 18b2–4/53b1–3: nāviruddham, jñānasattātirekiṇyāḥ prāpter abhāvāt, prāptim antareṇa cārthasya prāpyamāṇatvāyogāt. jñānasya ca prāptirūpatāyāḥ kriyākārakayor ekatvāyogenāyogāt. ātmakartṛkakriyārūpatve’pi jñānasyārthe’nupayogāt tasya tatkarmatānupapatteḥ, tajjanmakālasa-ttāmātreṇa karmatve sarvasya tadātanasya karmatvaprasaṅgāt, hetutvena tathābhāve cakṣurāder api tathābhāvāpatteḥ.


Cf. VMS 18b4–5/53b3–4: tasmin sati prakāśamānasya karmatvād ayam adoṣa iti cet. sa tāvad artho na svayam eva prakāśate, jñānenāpi nātmāntaram āpādyate. tasmiṃś ca sati prakāśata iti ka etad anunmatto brūyāt.


MS 1.1.4: satsamprayoge puruṣasyendriyāṇāṃ buddhijanma tat pratyakṣam. Cf. Hattori 1968: 161, n. 6.1. For Dignāga’s refutation of this definition, cf. Hattori 1968: 63ff.; Frauwallner 1968: 62ff.; for a comprehensive discussion of Kumārila’s interpretation of this definition, cf. Taber 2005: 44f.


ŚVK, Pratyakṣasūtra 54–55 (NR: 109,14–22; Taber 2005: 153; quoted in TS 2923–2924): vyāpāraḥ kāraṇānāṃ hi dṛṣṭo janmātirekataḥ / pramāṇe pi tathā mā bhūd iti janma vivakṣyate // na hi tat kṣaṇam apy āste jāyate vā’pramātmakaṃ / yenārthagrahaṇe paścād vyāpriyetendriyādivat // *kārāṇāṃ appears also in the quotation in TS 1922a; however, in ŚVK (NR, Taber) it reads: kārakāṇāṃ Cf. the translation in Taber 2005: 67.


VMS 18b6/54a1 etenaitad api nirastam yad āha kumārilaḥ … [Quotation of ŚVK, Pratyakṣasūtra 54–55] arthe kiṃcid akurvatas tatra prāmāṇyāyogāt, tasya ca prameyatvāyogāt, janmamātre ca prāmā-ṇye’tiprasaṅgāt.


On the Sautrāntika’s opinion in this regard which can be found in the Abhidharma sources, cf. Dhammajoti 2007: 87f., Dhammajoti 2009: 263f. (cf. above n. 48). A similar opinion can also be found in PSV ad PS 9cd: yathā yathā hy arthākāro jñāne pratibhāti śubhāśubhāditvena, tattadrūpaḥ sa viṣayaḥ pramīyate. evaṃ jñānasaṃvedanaṃ anekākāram upādāya tathā tathā pramāṇaprameyatvam upacaryate. nirvyāpārās tu sarvadharmāḥ. “The object-field is cognized as this or that form exactly according to the way in which the image of object (arthākāra) appears in the cognition, as being pleasant or unpleasant, etc. In this way, on account of (upādāya) the awareness of cognition in multiple forms [of grasping subject and grasped object] it is metaphorically said that there are means of cognition and the object of cognition in this or that manner, but [in reality] all phenomena are devoid of the activity [, since they are instantaneous].”


Cf. VMS 19a2–4/54a3–4: syān matam—kiñcid akurvad api jñānam arthasya prakāśakam, akriyamāṇaviśeṣo’py arthaḥ prakāśyata iti na kiñcid anucitam. yadi hi kasyacit kriyayā tayos tathābhāvo vyavasthitaḥ syāt, tadā tadabhāve vighaṭeta. anibandhanasya tv asattve na kiñcit kriyate.


Cf. VMS 19a4–5/54a4–5: asaty upakāre prakāśyaprakāśakabhāve sarvaṃ sarvasya prakāśyaṃ prakā-śakaṃ vā bhaved iti cet. na. yadi hīmāv animittāv eva svabhāvāv abhaviṣyatām, aniyamenābhavisyatām. hetunā tu punar etau niyamyamānau katham atiprasajyeyātām.


Cf. Frauwallner 1961: 147.


Cf. VMS 19a6/54b1: pūrvakaiva tu samāgrī sajñānaṃ viṣayakṣaṇam / sālokarūpavat kuryād yena syāt sahavedanam // Quotation from BSK 192b2. The verse is also quoted in JNĀ 23,23–24, 351,17–18; TSP 569,15–17; and VMS(R) 308a2. In the TSP, this verse is quoted together with the verse preceding this one. The preceding verse runs: nānyo’sti grāhako jñānāc cākṣuṣair viṣayair vinā / ataś ca sahasaṃvittir nābhedān nīlataddhiyoḥ // “The grasping subject cannot be other than cognition, nor is it without visual object; for this reason a blue thing and its cognition are apprehended together, not because their being non-different [as the Yogācāra holds].” Here, in these two verses, as an externalist (Dreyfuss 1997: 363 describes him as Vaibhāṣika) and a Nirākāravādin, Śubhagupta does not accept the Yogācāra’s theory of non-separation between cognition and its object. In the first verse, he explains sahavedana from the viewpoint of the subjective aspect; and then in the second verse quoted in our text he explains it again from the viewpoint of the objective aspect. So, in the second verse the central word must be viṣaya, not jñāna; consequently, sajñānaṃ viṣayakṣaṇam must be the correct form. However, remarkably, in the Tibetan translation of the BSK, pāda b appears to be shes pa yul bcas skad cig ste (in the quotation of VMS(R) 308a2 it has the form: shes dang yul bcas skad cig ma), somewhat like saviṣayaṃ jñānakṣaṇam. This seems to me not correct. yul bcas or yul dang bcas pa is usually used as the translation of saviṣaya. Probably the Tibetan translator (or the scribe of the Sanskrit manuscript which the Tibetan translator used) misread saviṣayaṃ jñānaṃ (cf. the phrase used in in Dignāga’s PSV ad PS 1.9b, cf. Chu 2006 [2008]: 239). In the Tibetan translation of the TSP, the phrase is correctly translated as shes bcas yul gyi skad cig. Thus, both forms prajñānaṃ and tajjñānaṃ in the editions TSP and TSP (Ś), respectively, should be corrected to sajñānaṃ, since it is not only supported by the Tibetan translation of the TSP, but also by the two quotations in JNĀ, and now, additionally by our text.


Cf. VMS 19a6–19b1/54b2: tasmāt svaprakāśasvabhāvābhāve’pi prakāśopapatter bādhakasyānaikāntikatāyāṃ maulasyāpi hetor anaikāntikateti.


Cf. VMS 19b3/54b3–4: yady asāv arthaḥ svakāraṇakalāpena prakāśyarūpo janitaḥ, tasyaiva tarhi prakāśyo’yam āpannḥ. na punaḥ sahabhuvo jñānasya. tatprakāśyatā cāsya pareṇa pratipādyā. tad ayaṃ prastutavastuvirodhinī svahetor evārthasya prakāśyatopapattis varṇayann…


Cf. VMS 19b5/55a1: atha jñānajanyasvabhāvātiśaya evāsau svahetunā janitaḥ, tenāsya tatprakāśyatā syād eva.


Cf. VMS 19b5–20a1/55a2–3: …upakāryopakārakayoḥ sahotpannayos tadbhāvāyogāt.


Cf. VMS 20a1/55a3: na, samānakālabhāvinām anyeṣām apy aviśeṣeṇa prakāśyatvaprasaṅgāt.


Cf. VMS 20a1/55a4: ekasāmagrīpratibandho niyāmaka iti cet.


Cf. VMS. 20a2f./55a4f.: arthasyāprakāśakasvabhāvatvān naiṣa doṣa iti cet. jñānasyāpy akiñcitkarasya kim idaṃ prakāśakatvaṃ nāma. tasmād yathārthena samānakālaṃ samānasāmagrīkaṃ vā jñānaṃ tatprakāśakam, tathārtho’pi teneti so’py asya prakāśakaḥ prasajyata eva.


Cf. PV 3.417b–418a: anyasyānupakāriṇaḥ / vyaktau vyajyeta sarvo’rthaḥ taddhetor niyamo yadi // naiṣāpi kalpanā jñāne. “When some other thing that does not offer support [in producing cognition] has appearance [in cognition], [then] all things could be caused to appear. If a restriction [is assumed] on account of their [simultaneity with cognition], this assumption, too, is not possible with respect to cognition.” PV 3.479’cd: anyathā tulyadharmā viṣayo’pi dhiyā saha // “Otherwise, the object-field sharing the same property with the cognition [would also make the cognition manifest].”


Cf. VMS 20a5–6/55b1–2: tasmād anyathā prakāśāyogād bādhakasyānaikāntikatāvirahān maulasya kuto’naikāntikatā. tad anenāsiddhyādidoṣatrayaviyoginā hetunā yan niścitaṃ vipaścitā tu upādeyam iti. Junjie Chu 17

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