Chapter II - The Category Of Form Considered By Way Of Dual Attributes

This and the following italicised headings are quoted from the table of contents, § 585, etc. — atthi rupam upada, and again, atthi rupam no upada. The ablative resembles our idiom 'qua derived' — form as derived. In § 584 and in § 597, etc. the gerund up ad ay a is employed. Depending on, not released from, is the paraphrase (Asl. BOO, 305). 'Grounded in' were an approximate rendering, the literal meaning being 'taking hold of'.

Ayatanam. The word means (see my Introduction) simply 'field', locus, range, Gebiet.

Lit. body. The Upanishads use 'skin'. Cf. our modern term 'skinsensibility', in extension of 'touch', 'tactile sense'. The corresponding objective 'sphere of the tangible' is classed among things wnderived. See § 647.

Cakkhu, which stands for vision, sense of sight and eye. 'Eye', however, is always in the present work to be understood as the seeing faculty or visual sense, and not as the physical organ or 'eye of flesh' (mamsa-cakkhu). The Cy. gives an account of the eye, of which the following is the substance: First the aggregate organism (sasambhara-cakkhu). A ball of flesh fixed in a cavity, bound by the socket-bone beneath and by the bone of the eyebrow above, by the angles of the eye at the sides, by the brain within and by the eyelashes without.

There are fourteen constituents:

• the four elements,
• the six attributes dependent on them, viz., colour, odour, taste, sap of life, form (santhanam), and collocation (sambhavo);
• vitality,
• nature,
• bodysensibility (kayappasado)
• and the visual sentient organ.

The last four have their source in karma.

When 'the world', seeing an obvious extended white object fancies it perceives the eye, it only perceives the basis (or seat — vatthu) of the eye. And this ball of flesh, bound to the brain by nerve-fibres, is white, black and red, and contains the solid, the liquid, the lambent and the gaseous. It is white by superfluity of humour, black by superfluity of bile, red by superfluity of blood, rigid by superfluity of the solid, exuding by superfluity of the liquid, inflamed by superfluity of the lambent, quivering by superfluity of the gaseous. But that sentient organ (pas ado) which is there bound, inherent, derived from the four great principles — this is the visual sense (pasadacakkhu).

Placed in the midst and in the front of the black disc of the composite eye, the white disc surrounding it (note that the iris is either not distinguished or is itself the 'black disc') and in the circle of vision, in the region where the forms of adjacent bodies come to appear (tfiere seems here some omission in the text), it permeates the seven ocular membranes as sprinkled oil will permeate seven cotton wicks. And so it stands, aided by the four elements, sustaining, binding, maturing, moving (samudiranarn) — like an infant prince and his four nurses, feeding, bathing, dressing and fanning him — maintained by nutriment both physical (utu) and mental, protected by the (normal) span of life, invested with colour, smell, taste and so forth, in size the measure of a louse's head — stands duly constituting itself the door of the seat of visual cognitions, etc.

For as it has been said by the Commander of the Doctrine (Sariputta):

The visual sense by which he beholds forms
Is small and delicate, comparable to a louse's head.

The elaborate architectonics of this paragraph in the original is a fine effort of the Commentator's style. I am not clear to what the 'etc' after 'cognitions' alludes. But the expression occurs in the description of each sense. Cf. the description in Hardy, 'Man. of Buddhism', p. 419.

Pasado. By selecting this term, continues the Cy., he (the Buddha) rejects the other (physical) eye. So far as I know, the as yet unidentified verses quoted in the previous note are the only early instance of the word p a s a d o, meaning literally clearness, brightness, serenity, faith, being used to denote the receptive reacting sense-agency. It is not easy to divine exactly how the Buddhists came to use the word in this connexion. It is used co-ordinately for all the other senses, hence the sensuous signification had nothing to do with the specific nature of sight (unless this was made the Type of all other sensation). Taken causatively it may conceivably have meant either that which makes clear — a revealer, as it were {cf. Bothl. and Koth — prasadana), or that which gratifies or satisfies {Beruhigen), both meanings emphasizing psychological process, rather than 'product' or 'seat'.

Attabhava-pariyapanno.

'The body and the five skandhas are here termed nature of the self, after the usage of foolish folk who say,

"This is myself"'

(Asl. 308).

Thus the usage of attabhavO was a concession on the part of the Great Teacher to animistic phraseology.

'i.e., impact and reaction are set up in the eye'

(ihid.).

Paraphrased by ayam satto, any given individual (ibid.).

This and the following similes will be quotations of metaphors applied to the senses in the Sutta Pitaka. E.g., that of the 'empty village' occurs in S. iv. 174

— Sunno gamo ti kho, bhikkhave, channam ajjhattikanam [? ayatananam] adhivacanam.

That of a 'door', which in the age of the Commentaries was the regular term for sense-organ, is, I believe, seldom used in the Sutta Pitaka, and then only as a poetical figure, not as a technical term.

Cf., e.g., indriyesuguttadvaro (D I., 63, 250).

Buddhaghosa simply paraphrases the various metaphors —

• 'world', by reason of wasting and decay;
• 'door', by reason of customary resort;
• 'ocean', by reason of its insatiableness;
• 'lucent', by reason of its purity;
• 'field', by reason of the springing up (growth) of contact, etc.;
• 'base', by reason of its fixed seat;
• 'guide', 'guidance', by reason of its leading the nature-of-the-self showing agreements and differences;
• 'hither shore', by reason of its being included in the 'body of this life' (or individuality, sakkayam);
• 'empty village', because it is common to many, because there is no headman (i.e., Ego or soul. 'Many' must mean the individual considered as an aggregate of constituents.)

The metaphors, it will be seen, are applied equally, with the sole exception of 'guide' and 'guidance', to each remaining sense. By the explanation of these two figures given in the Cy., they should have been left to stand for each sense. Buddhaghosa, however, is of course not responsible for the expressions used in the Pitakas. Yet it is slightly disappointing that he makes no effort to account for an omission which is not without psychological justification.

In this answer, according to the Cy. (p. 309), involuntary visual sensation is described, as when lightning flashes on the sight of one not looking for it.

Here (Asl. 309) we have voluntary sense-impression described — the process in the case of one

'who, by his own desire, seeking to look at some object, concentrates his vision'.

Cakkhum nissaya, rupam arabbha.

Here there should be in the text ... pe ... as in the corresponding passage for the other four senses. Cf. note 4. In K. it is also inadvertently omitted here.

Cakkhuvinfianani here replaces the fourth mode of consciousness, c it tarn, or thought, in the series invariably stated as aroused by 'contact' in connexion with the Eight Types of Thought given in Book I, chap. i. Thinking (cetana) may stand for a train of ideas set going by the sensation having no special reference to the visible object as such. Visual cognition, on the other hand, would take special account of the thing seen. Or possibly the two are to be considered as corresponding approximately to process and product. Cf. what has been said above on both terms, p. 8, n. 1.

Judging by the corresponding passages in § § 604, 608, 612, 616, by K. and by the comments of Buddhaghosa, I find that the following passage has been erroneously omitted in the text before the words cakkhum p'etam:

— ... pe ... yam cakkhum nissaya ruparammano cakkhusamphasso uppajji va uppajjati va uppajjissati va uppajje va, yam cakkhum nissaya ruparammana cakkhusamphassaja vedana ... pe ... sanna ... pe ... cetana ... pe ... cakkhuvinnanam uppajji va uppajjati va uppajji va uppajje va.

Cf. also § 620.

According to the Cy. (310), this reply, when rehearsed in full, reveals ten distinct answers, each commencing with the refrain:

'The eye, that is to say',

etc., to

'self, invisible and reacting'.

They may be summarized and generalized thus:

(i.) Sense impression or contact, as conditioned by sense-organ and sense-stiimdus.
(ii.) Eesultant feeling.
(iii. -v.) Kesultant intellectual states,
(vi.) Sense-impression or contact, as conditioned by senseorgan and idea of sense-object,
(vii.-x.) Eesultant states as in
(ii.-v). What was precisely the difference between the processies named as
(i.) and
(vi.) it is not yet easy to determine with certainty.

This, situated within the cavity of the aggregate organism of the ear, and w^ell furnished with fine reddish hairs, is in shape like a little finger-stall (anguli-vethanaka). (Asl. 310.) Cf. Hardy, loc. ci7.

On the omission of 'a guide', etc., see p. 175, n. 4.

This is situated 'inside the cavity of the aggregate nasal organism, in appearance like a goat's hoof'. (Asl. 310). Cf. Hardy, loc. cit. Probably the hoof is imagined as regarded from below.

This is situated 'above the middle of the aggregate gustatory organism, in appearance like the upper side of the leaf of a lotus'. (Asl., ibid.) Cf. Hardy, loc. cit. The palate apparently was not included in the gustatory apparatus.

The sphere of kayo— so runs the comment (AsL 311) — is diffused over the whole bodily form just as oil pervades an entire cotton rag. With the exception of this quality of relatively undifferentiated organ, the sense is co-ordinate with the other senses. To the objection that, if the sensitive surface be indeed so general it would convey confused impressions, it is counter-asserted that, if it were not so general, tactile impressions could not be adequately differentiated. Strictly speaking the bodysense is both everywhere and not everywhere. Not everywhere to the extent of being in things as seen or as tasted.

We cannot segregate and analyze sensations as we can grains of sand, and hence qualities are said to coalesce in the object. Nevertheless each mode of sense conveys its specific messages.

— Such seems to me the substance of what I have clothed to a slight extent in terms of Western psychology. The Commentary is of course tentative and groping, as elsewhere in its theory of sense; yet it must not be forgotten that it was not till about fifty years ago that Ernst Weber's 'Der Tastsinn und das Gemeingefiihl' appeared, containing the positive results of a comparison of different skin-areas from the standpoint of their varying ability to convey clear or vague tactile impressions.

Literally, body-contact.

Literally, cognition of body, so rendered in § 443 seq.

Sappatigham, here paraphrased as producing (janakam) reaction and impact. Asl. 317.

Compared to the ummapuppham, or flax-blossom. Cf. my remark on nilam above, under § 246. Here the term is illustrated by an azure flower, such as we ourselves might quote as a type of blue. And yet even here the wide range and indefiniteness of the word find expression. For according to Bothl. and Eoth, on the authority of Hemachandra, uma is applied to night.

Like the blossom of Pterospermum acerifolium and Pentapetro phoenicea respectively (ibid.). I give these on Childers' authority.

Like the morning star and charcoal respectively (ibid.).

Like the reddish buds of the Vitex negiuido and kanavira trees (ibid.).

Hari, omitted in the text, but given in K. and the Cy. (ibid.).

'Whereas, in the verse Harittacahemavannam kamam sumukkhapakama, hari is spoken of as golden (suvannam), by its being elsewhere taken in conjunction with coined gold (jatarupam), it is here meant as dark (samam)'

(ibid.).

Cf. Jat. V. 216, sama ti suvanna-sama.

The colour of green grass (ibid.).

K. and the Cy. read ambankuravannam.

See my Introduction, on 'long', short, as only indirectly objects of sight.

'The foregoing seven visibles are set forth without reference to any base (vatthu); the following according to common usage'

(ibid.).

Paraphrased as cloudy and as him am — which may be frosty, snowy or dewy — respectively. As the allusion is only to lustre-contrast, the sparkle of hoar-frost is probably implied.

The following terms, says the Cy. (ibid.), illustrate varieties of lustre. A little gratuitous astronomy is then thrown in. The orb of the moon, viz., the mansion of the moon-god, is 49 yojanas in extent, is made of gold and roofed with silver. That of the sun is 50 yojanas, is made of gold and roofed with crystal. The constellations, the mansions of different gods, are 7, 8, or 10 yojanas in extent, and are made of the seven jewels. Between the moon below and the sun above is 1 yojana. The constellations take two years in their orbit. They and the sun go (sic) swiftly, the moon slowly. At times the moon leads, at times she is behind.

Is of bronze (Asl. 318).

Is not a gem; is the colour of the bamboo (ibid.).

'The Master's colour'

(ibid,).

Under kahapano, i.e., silver coin, masakas of copper, wood, and lac are to be included (ibid.). Quoted from Vin. iii. 238.

In this and the next two answers, according to K., the list of typical forms given in § 617 is to be rehearsed each time in full.

In the printed text, for ruparammanam read ruparammano, and, two lines later, ruparammana. So for the other senses, § 624, etc. I follow the reading in K., making the word adjectival to sakkhusamphassajo. and then to vedana, sanna, etc. Cf. the analogous passage in § 600 (in the passage I have restored to the text), in § 604, and so on.

I confess I do not see what is gained by shifting cakkhum nissaya, so that by K.'s reading it is sandwiched between adjective and noun, beyond the symmetry in these sense-object answers, of giving precedence everywhere to the object. But this does not invalidate the reading in K. Aram ma nam is a term of mental procedure, not of bare sense-function, such as is indicated by the relation of rupam: cakkhu.

I.e., the sound of lutes and other stringed instruments (Asl. 319).

E.g., of gongs and castanets (ibid.).

I.e., of hand-clapping (ibid.).

I.e., of a crowd when words and syllables have become indistinguishable (ibid.).

I.e., of trees rubbing against each other, or of the knocking of blocks (ibid.). Vin. Texts, iii. 213, n.

I.e., of wind as wind (ibid.).

I.e., either of beaten or flowing water (ibid.).

I.e., of splitting reeds, tearing cloth, and the like (ibid.).

Continue as for visible forms in § 620.

Sugandho, duggandho — these, says Buddhaghosa, namely, desired odour and undesired odour, exhaust all odour. He predicates the same of good and bad tastes (sadu, asadu, § 629). In § 648 we find, classed among the tangibles, pleasant contact and painful contact. But we do not find the commentator making the same comprehensive claim for hedonistic values in touches as in odours and tastes. Nor, as we have seen, does the text predicate anything hedonistically of sight or touch.

This is interesting as bringing the psychology of Buddhism, with its acute if incipient intuition, in 'touch' with our modern psychology. For we say that the more our knowledge of the external world is built up by a given sense, the more is that sense connected with neutral feeling. And it is precisely sight, touch, and hearing that give us most of that knowledge.

Aristotle remarks, with reference to the sense of smell only, that our never discriminating an odour without associating therewith an impression of something painful or pleasant, seems to reveal the imperfection of this sense in humans. Imperfect, i.e., in delicacy of discrimination, touch being herein the most perfect sense (De. An. II. ix.).

See § 624, note.

Buttermilk (takkambilam) is given as a typical sour sapid, ghee from cow's milk (gosappi) as the type of a sweet sapid. But, adds the Cy., sweet added to astringent (kasavam) and kept standing will lose all its sweetness, and so with raw sugar and alkaline substance. Ghee, however, kept standing, while it loses colour and smell, does not lose its taste. It therefore is the absolute sweet (ekanta-madhuram) (Asl. 320).

E.g., as nimb-tree fruit (ibid.).

E.g., as ginger and pepper (ibid.).

E.g., as sea-salt (ibid.).

E.g., as the egg-plant (vatinganakatiram), or as green palm sprouts (cocoanut cabbage) (ibid.).

E.g., as the jujube, or the Feronia elejphantum, etc. (ibid.).

E.g., as the yellow myrobalan (haritakam). I am, as before, indebted to Childers' Dictionary for all this botanical knowledge.

Sadu asadu. See § 625, n. 1.

See § 624, n.

For the sphere of the tangible, see below, § 648.

Literally the in driyam — the faculty, potentiality of the female. Under 'appearance', which the Cy. (321) rules to be here the import of lingam ( = santhanam, cf. Mil. 133, 134), he indicates the physical proportions in which the woman, generally speaking, differs from the man — smaller hands, feet, and face, upper trunk less broad, lower trunk broader. Characteristics (nimittam) are that by which she is recognisable (sanj ananam), both external bodily marks (no beard, e.g., nor tusks, which would seem to include certain animals) and modes of dressing.

Under 'occupation' (kuttam = kiriya) there is an allusion to girls' distinctive amusements— playing with baskets, pestles [and mortars], and dolls (? literally, little daughters, dhitalikaya kllanti), and spinning thread with a mattikavakam, whatever that may be.

Under 'deportment', the 'absence of breadth' (a visadam) in women's walking, standing, sitting, lying, and eating is specified, all these being done more mincingly, less assertively by women. If a man so deport himself, it is said of him, 'He goes like a woman !'

The 'condition and being' of the female, constituting her essential nature, are 'born of karma, and take their source at conception'.

The other female characteristics are evolved by her 'potentiality' in the course of existence, just as the tree with all its appurtenances is evolved in time from the seed. This 'indriyam' is discernible, not by the eye, but by the mind (mano. It is an abstract idea). And it is not to the one sex just what the faculties of sight and so forth are to the other.

The priority of place given to the female is a form of statement as characteristically Buddhist (not to say Indian) as that of saying 'moon and sun'. Both no doubt have their source very deep in the history, or prehistory, of humanity. The Commentator gives the correlative opposites in describing male characteristics, down to the 'swash-buckling and martial air', which if a woman affect she is said to 'go like a man'.

Boys are said to occupy themselves with their characteristic games of playing at carriages and ploughs, and at making sand-banks round puddles and calling them reservoirs.

He then remarks that these sexual distinctions have been evolved during the course of life in primeval ages; since when, originating by way of conception and, some of them, in the individual life, it happens that they get interchanged. He then quotes cases of hermaphroditism, said to have occurred in the members of the Order.

He is mindful also, as we might expect, to appreciate the sex to which he belongs, and makes a curious application to it of the doctrine of karma.

'Of the two, the male sex-marks are superior (uttamam), those of the female inferior (hinam).'

Therefore the former disappear by means of a very bad karma, while the latter are established by a karma indifferently good. The latter, on the other hand, disappear by means of a karma indifferently bad, while the former are established by means of a very good karma. 'Thus, both disappear by badness and are acquired by goodness'.

Thus, our Commentator approximates more to Plato's position than to that of the typical religious celibate, finding woman not stronger to do evil, but rather the weaker in heaping up either good or evil.

'What there is to say, has been said already in connexion with the faculty of vitality as related to incorporeal (formless) states'

(Ask 323. See § 19).

Kayo is said to =sariram; possibly to distinguish it from kayo as used for 'bodysensibility', or the tactile sense (Asl. 324), or again from sense-experience generally (p. 43, n. 3).

Kayavinfiatti is analyzed in a somewhat rambling style by the Commentator. The gist of his remarks amounts, I gather, to the following: In any communication effected by bodily action (which includes communications from animals to men, and vice versa) that which is made known is one's condition (bhavo) at the time, one's self (sayam), and one's intention (adhippayo); in other words, the how, the who or what and the what for. And this is wrought by a bodily suffusion (vipphandanena).

He then classifies the kinds of thoughts which tend to 'produce an intimation', no others having this tendency.

They are —

• The eight good thoughts relating to the sensuous universe (§§ 1-159), and the thought concerning intuition (abhinila cittam).
• The twelve bad thoughts (§§ 365-430).
• The eight great kiriya-thoughts, the two limited kiriya-thoughts, the one kiriya-thought relating to the universe of form which has attained to intuition, making eleven indeterminate thoughts.

Finally he refers us to his theory of 'Doors' (dvarakatha). See my Introduction. (Asl. 323-4.)

Vacivinnatti is dealt with verbatim as bodily intimation was, 'vocal noise' being substituted for 'bodily suffusion'. 'Making noises' is to be understood as making -a noise in a variety of ways. 'Articulate speech' [lit., broken-up speech) is no mere jangle (bhango), but is vocal utterance so divided as to serve for communication (Asl. 325).

It is interesting to note in connexion with the problem as to whether communication or registration of thought is the historically prior function of language, that Buddhaghosa, for all his aptness to draw distinctions, does not make any allusion here to intimation by language forming only one of the functions of speech.

Still more curious, as being more germane to this specific aspect of language, is it that he does not take into account the oral communication of the registered ideas of the race.

Buddhaghosa's etymology (Asl. 325) derives akaso from 'unploughed' — what may not be ploughed, cut, or broken — which recalls Homer's ατρνγετος αιθηρ ατρνγετη θαλασσα as well as the ακαρπιστα πεδια of Euripides (Asl. 326). 'Sky' he connects with striking — agham, a-ghattaniyam — what is not strikable.

Akaso, he continues, is that which delimitates, or sets bounds to forms, environing them and making them manifest. Through it, in forms thus bounded, we get the notions — hence above, hence below, hence across.

Asamphuttham catuhi mahabhutehi. Although space is in this work treated of apart from the four elements, and does not, as a rule, count as a fifth element, in the Pitakas, yet, in the Maha Eilhulovada Sutta (M. i. 423), when Gotama is discoursing to his son of the distribution of the elements in the composition of the human body, he co-ordinates akasadhatu with the four other dhatus, to all appearance as though it should rank as a fifth element. In the older Upanishads it is usually coordinated with the four elements, though not, as such, in a closed list.

In the Taittiriya Up., however, it appears as the one immediate derivative from the Atman; wind, fire, water, earth, plants, etc., proceeding, the first from akaca, the rest, taken in order, from each other.

The word asamphuttham is paraphrased by nijjatakam (or nissatam), and may mean that space does not commingle with the four elements as they with each other.

'Belongs to' is, in the Pali, -gatam.

Cf, above, §§ 42-47, with this and the two following answers. Supremely well-dressed hide is given as an illustration of the plasticity of matter (Asl. 326).

Gold which is suddhanta (? sudhanta, well-blown) is given as typically 'wieldy' material (ibid).

Buddhaghosa evidently reads so rupassa upacayo here (for yo), and in the next section sa rupassa (for ya) (Asl. 827). This is only adopted by the text in §§ 732, 733. K. reads so and sa.

This and the following section formularize the coming into being of things. Integration is paraphrased (Asl. 327) as the cumulative effect of the spheres (ayatananam acayo) as they are reproduced over and over again. The import of the term is v add hi, fulness of growth. Acayo, or nibbatti, is to upacayo or vaddhi as the welling up of water in a reservoir by a river's bank is to the brimming over of the water, while santati or pavatti (subsistence or persistence) is as the overflow and running of the water.

All are expressions for the phenomenon of birth and growth (jatirupassa).

This is a stock formula, and occurs at M. i. 49; S. ii. 2, and 42. The Cy. points out (Asl. 328) that the three terms, 'decrepitude', etc., show the phenomena that must take place in the lapse of time; the last two show the inference that is to be drawn from them. For just as a flood or a forest fire can be traced by the appearance of the grass and trees in its track, so can we infer respecting our life and faculties by the appearance of teeth, hair and skin.

This and the preceding section formularize the waning and passing away of things. Birth-and-growth, decay and death are by the Commentator likened to three enemies of mankind, the first of whom leads him astray into a pit, the second of whom throws him down, the third of whom cuts off his head (Asl. 329).

Literally, morsel made food. 'Bodily' (or solid) suffices to distinguish it from the three immaterial nutriments. See p. 30.

Under these come roots and fruits. Asl. 330.

On this section, where 'form' is considered under the aspect of sustaining growth, etc., the Commentator gives a brief dissertation where an adumbration of physiological truth is humorously illustrated. Whereas, he says (Asl. 330-332), food is here first set out in terms of its embodiment, in oja we have the evolved essence of it. Now whereas the former removes risk, the latter is a preservative.

And the risk is this, that when no food is taken, the karma-born heat within feeds on the walls of the belly, making the owner cry out,

'I am hungry; give me something to eat !'

and only setting his intestines free when it can get external food. The internal heat is likened to a shadow-demon who, having got the entry into a man's shadow, bites his head when hungry so that he cries out.

When other men come to help, the demon, quitting his hold, preys on them.

In the case of coarse food, e.g., kudrusa grain, oja is said to be weak and sustains but a short time, while if a man drink ghee and the like he wants no other meal the whole day. Living beings are then classified in an order of increasing fineness in the food they live on, beginning with crocodiles, who, they say, swallow pebbles, continuing with peacocks, hyenas, and elephants, later with other birds, then with borderers, town-dwellers, kings, and ending with the Yama and Paranimmitavasavatti gods, who enjoy food of supreme delicacy.

'Just as derived form is derived in such and such a way and in no other, so, to say it is not derived, is equivalent to saying it is not derivable'.

Asl. 333.

Possibly the form of negative here employed (no upada) is a technical mark of the relatively unethical nature of this aspect of r up am. An up a da, on the other hand, is used with a philosophical import.

Cf. D. i. 17 with M. i. 148 — anupada vimutto and anupada parinibbanattham.

See also below, §§ 1210 and 1213.

In keeping with the general psychological standpoint of the present work, the things which are not derived jrom (have no foothold or support in) other things are considered under the aspect of sense-percepts. They are tangibles or intangibles. Element (dhatu) is now substituted for the collective term used above, namely, great phenomena or beings (mahabhutani, § 584 et seq. Both terms occur together in A. i. 222.

The latter term may be used to denote great or wondrous derivatives of the four elements, great either physically or ethically, as when (Vin. ii. 240) the ocean and its 'great creatures' serve to illustrate the Dhamma and those wondrous phenomena, the human beings who by way of it are seeking or have attained Nirvana. Dhatu, on the other hand, as the Cy. with unflagging 'mindfulness' once more points out, indicates absence of substratum or soul. Asl. 332.

On the essential characters of the four elements, see below, §§ 962-965, also the following note.

The first two and last of these four pairs are so many aspects or modes of the earth-element (Asl. 332), and are paraphrased respectively as rigid and non-rigid, polished and jagged (saw-like), weighty and nonweighty. These correspond almost exactly to our modern view of the modes of resistance, i.e., of active touch, or of skin-sensibility with a co-efficient of muscular sense. The Buddhist view lacks, as all but recent psychology has lacked, insight into the presence of the muscular factor; on the other hand, it is logically more symmetrical in giving 'lightness' where Dr. Bain, e.g., gives 'pressure' — another positive.

Pleasant contact is defined as a tangible which is desired on account of pleasant feeling; the opposite, in the case of painful contact. Each of the three elements furnishes instances of either: In connexion with solidity there is the pleasant contact felt when a soft-palmed attendant is doing massage to one's feet, and the opposite when his hands are hard. Erom 'caloric', or the flame-element, we may get the pleasure of a warming-pan in winter, or the reverse, if it is applied in summer.

From the aerial element, we may get the pleasure of fanning in summer, or the discomfort of it in winter. Asl. 332, 333.

The Cy. here discusses a point of attention in senseperception which is interesting as adumbrating modern European theories respecting consciousness and subconsciousness (Asl. 333). In a concrete object of sense, the three modes of the tangible, i.e., the three elements (solid, hot, airy), may all of them be present.

Now do they all come 'at one stroke' into the field of consciousness (apatham)?
They do.

Thus come, do they impinge on the bodysense?
They do.

When it has thus made them a (mental) object, does cognition of body arise at one blow?
It does not.

Why?
Thus: Mental objects are made either by deliberate sensing or by intrusion. (The latter term — ussado — is more literally extrusion, or prominence, but either word shows that involuntary, as contrasted with voluntary attention is meant.)

Now when one is deliberately testing the hardness or softness of a ball of boiled rice by pressure, heat and vapour are present, but it is the solid to which one gives attention.

If hot water be tested by the hand, though there is solid and vaporous (matter), it is heat that occupies the attention. If one lets the breeze blow on the body at the window in hot weather, solid and heat are present, but it is the aerial element that is attended to.

Or take involuntary impressions: If you stumble, or knock your head against, a tree, or bite on a pebble, heat and wind are present, but the intrusive object is solid matter.

So analogously for walking on something hot, or being deafened by a hurricane. The three elements are not apprehended as such at the same instant. And with regard to the extended surface of the body-sentience, cognition of body arises only in that spot where the sentient surface is impinged upon, e.g., when a shoulderwound is bathed (? dressed; cf. Vin. ii. 115 and Transl.) with a quill, the kaya-pasado of the shoulder is impinged upon, or intensified, and there cognition arises.

And where the pasado is most powerfully impressed, there cognition arises first.

Buddhaghosa goes on, with reference to the senses generally, to give a psychological account of the passing from one group of sensations or 'object of thought' to another in terms not far removed from what would now be used to describe the 'movement of attention' (Asl. 334).

We pass from one object to another

1. from deliberate inclination, or
2. from a sensation of preponderating impressiveness (ajjhasayato va visayadhimattato va).

E.g.,

1. from saluting a shrine, a believer forms the intention of entering to do homage to a statue and contemplate the carvings and paintings,
2. While contemplating some vast tope, a man is struck by the sound of music, and is then affected by flowers and incense brought near.

Literally, oil (sneho). Cf. the description with that of akasadhatu, § 638.

This is the aspect of the moist or liquid element in an object compact of several elements. The one essential 'mark' of apo-dhatu is paggharanam, flowing. See § 963. But 'cohesiveness of form means the cohering condition of some concrete in which there is superfluity of solid' (Asl. 335). For it is by the cohesive force of the fluid element that lumps of iron or what not are made rigid. Similarly in the case of stones, mountains, palms, tusks, horns, etc.

Hence Buddhaghosa passes on to discuss the mutually related spheres of the elements and their apparent approximations to each other, as in viscous things, e.g., or congealed liquid, or boiling water. Corrupt MSS., however, render parts of the disquisition hard to follow. His conclusion is that whereas the elements may vary in their condition as phenomena, their essential mark never alters, however latent it may be.

And he quotes a yet unedited sutta (Atthanaparikappa sutta), but which is repeated in A. i. 222, that it is easier for the four elements to change their essential character, than for the seeker of Nirvana (the Noble Student) to alter his high estate (Asl. 336).

Here follow the remaining pairs of correlated terms, making up the categories of form under the Dual Aspect.

Literally, 'which has been grasped at' or 'laid hold of'. This and the cognate terms are discussed under the 'Group on Grasping', § 1213 et seq. It is disappointing to find that, with the exception of two items in the list of things 'grasped at', or come into being through the action of karma (the two phrases are approximately equivalent), the Cy. does not discuss the inclusion of any.

One would have liked to hear, e.g., why, of all sense-objects, sounds alone are 'not the issue of grasping' (cf. the heresy concerning sound as result [of karma, K. V. 466], and why the elements of space and of fluidity may and may not be the issue of grasping, or what they have to do with it in any way.)

Concerning the two items above mentioned, how is it, asks the Cy. (337),

'That "decay and impermanence" are classed with respect to what is due, and what is not due to the performance of karma?

They are classed with what is not the issue of grasping.

That which has sprung from conditions other than karma is included under "not due to the performance of karma...."

And as these two forms arise neither from karma, nor from form-producing conditions other than karma, they are therefore not classified with reference to karma. How they are acquired will become evident later.'

For rupasantati, read rupassa santati.

The privative prefixed to the first half of this dvandvacompound does not apply to the latter half. All form is upadaniyam — see § 595 and cf. Dh. S. § 1538. Hence to get, as we do, a positive answer would, if upadaniyam were to be taken negatively, be a very patent infringement of the law of contradiction. The distributed negative is given by anupadinnanupadaniyam as in § 992.

I have elided saddayatanam, and, on the next line, inserted apodhatu, as consistent with § 654. C/. §§ 747, 750, and K.

The answer in § 658 recurs with its elided passage very often, but it is not easy to point out the foregoing answer of which it is an abbreviation. For §§ 653, 655 include 'visible form', 'which is absurd'. And they do not include 'sound', which is invisible. I suggest that § 596 is referred to, with the implication that 'the sphere of visible form' must be omitted. All the other terms in § 596, if understood as strictly abstract sensibility or sensation, or as abstract ideas, are inaccessible to sight.

Even in kabalinkaro aharo, it is only the vatthu, or embodiment of the concept of nutriment, that is visible. And similarly, whereas one's bodily gestures are visible, the 'intimation' given is a matter of inference, a mental construction.

Both terms have been applied in the detailed theory of sense given in § 597 et seq.

Keeping to § 596 as the norm for these abbreviated replies, we may assume that these two (§§ 659 and 660) divide out that answer between them. Impact and reaction, as here understood, belong exclusively to the sphere of sensation. The term patigho has an emotional and moral significance elsewhere in this work, and means repulsion, repugnance. See § 1060.

§ 596 would seem to be divided also and differently by the indriyam sections. What is na indriyarn, not having hvva^i^, are thus the five kinds of sense-objects, intimation, space, the three modes of form, and the course of the evolving rebirth of form as represented in abstract idea.

This pair of relatives coincides with the first pair of attributes taken inversely: forms underived and derived (pp. 172-97).

See above, §§ 636, 637. The abbreviated answer concerning the other relative will presumably be the entire list given in § 596, with the exception of the two modes of intimation.

Cf. below, §§ 1195, 1196, and above, § 636, note.

Here, after being silent over the last ten questions, the Cy. resumes its parable (p. 337), without, however, throwing much light on these to us obscure distinctions. This and the next two pairs of questions and answers refer to form of some kind as brought into relation with an intelligent agent. And the purest instance of this is those groups of phenomena which are brought into play when the agent is expressing himself.

The expression or intimation itself, it says, does not spring directly from thought, but it is said nevertheless to have its source in thought because those phenomena (of gesture and speech) on which the intimation depends are immediately prompted by thought, just as we say that old age and death 'are' impermanence (in virtue of their forming part of the content of that idea). While there is thought, there is also expression of thought.

But the concomitance stated in § 669 is not to be understood like that arising between thought and feeling and other mental processes. He is probably referring to the mental complex indicated above in § 1 and the like.

See below, §§ 1044, 1045. It will already have been noted (p. 59, n. J.), that ajjhattam, ajjhattikam does not run on all fours with our modern psychological term 'subjective', or that which belongs to the conscious experience of the individual. It connotes anything belonging to an individual organism, physical or mental.

Hence, too, the word 'self' must here be understood in no narrow metaphysical, or even psychological sense, but as equivalent to the concrete person or attabhavo (see above, p. 175, n. 1).

It is used in the sense of all but the last of the four constituents into which Professor W. Jamesdivides the Self, viz.,

the material Self (body, clothes, family, home, property: the Buddhist would only admit the first item, I fancy),
the social Self (recognition from others),
and the spiritual Self (psychic faculties or dispositions).

('Principles of Psychology', 1892, i. 292-296.)

Only the fourth constituent, the 'pure Ego', was rejected by Buddhism, as it was, twenty-two centuries later, by Hume. Cf., however, the apparently more 'subjective' use in §§ 161 and 1207.

I have felt equal reluctance to foist the (relatively) modern counterpart 'objective' on to bahiram or bahiddha(see § 1045).

Read in full, this should coincide with the latter part of § 596, beginning at 'the spheres of visible form'.

The Cy., paraphrasing olarikam by thulam, explains that this has reference to the material embodiment of sense-objects and to the fact of sensuous impact, sukhumam connoting the contrary. Under the latter class we have, according to my assumption (p. 203, n. 3), the indriyas of sex and vitality, intimation, space, the modes of form and the nutritive principle in food. The force of this effort at dichotomy is, to the modern Western mind, curious and not obvious.

It is suggestive of tradition earlier than the date of the compiling of the Abhidhamma, as early as the earlier Upanishads — of a time when there was no definite antithesis between material and immaterial, extended and unextended.

We have seen that the senses, though 'invisible', were conceived as species of 'form' — nay, that the later Cy. preserved the tradition of their shape and size. And I incline to think that just as, in the older Upanishads, soul was a shadowy, impalpable, but 'physical double of the physical body', and just as 'when an early Greek philosopher speaks of to 6v, he does not mean Being, but Body' (Burnet, 'Early Greek Philosophy', 27), so the items in the list divided out in these two answers are all physical 'forms', whether patent, impressive, and pervading, or latent, fine and mysterious.

Dure, the Cy. explains, refers to that which on account of its being difficult to apprehend or discriminate cannot be discerned by way of the sensuous impact, whether it be literally far or near at hand. Conversely, s an tike refers to things which are patent to sense, even though they may be distant. The content of each division agrees with that of the preceding division, and we see that, whereas the field of sense-perception is pronounced to be a relatively patent, as well as gross concern, the essence of sex, vitality, etc., down to the nutritive principle in food, is found to be as obscure, latent or relatively inaccessible, as it was subtle or minute. Asl. 337.

From § 653 to § 961 the Commentator lapses into silence, dismissing the reader with the remark that in the exposition on 'spheres', etc. (§§ 695-741), the method of treatment is more detailed than it was above, and, further, that the category of triplets (§ 742 et seq.) is easy to understand. To enable the reader to gather with more ease the drift of this part of the catechizing, I have inserted a few headings to indicate whenever there is a change in the aspect under which 'form' is considered.

Thus we have form considered under the aspect of the basis (vatthu) in the subjective procedure of coming-toknow, of the object so apprehended, and so forth.

In all the answers, where lacunae occur, except where otherwise specified, the formula appears to be the answer of § 596, with one or more terms omitted, and with the occasional insertion of 'the sphere of the tangible', according to the sense required by each specific process of dichotomy.

By referring to the standard answer, § 596, it will be seen that the negatives in the present answer include 'visible forms', or the objects of the sense of vision. Now, vatthu means seat, embodiment, or what we might call physical basis. However, then, the process of sense-stimulation was ultimately conceived, the effective result was held to take place in the sense-organ (and heart). The sense-object was defined as the arammanam of the contact. See § 687.

No hiatus appears, in either the English or Siamese edition of the text, between rupam and cakkhuvinnanassa, but by the context the answer is, of course, understood to deal in turn with all four mental processes stated in the question. As usual, only the last term gets an explicit answer. All four processes must also be understood in the lacuna in § 682 and in § 686.

Jivha samphassassa has dropped out of the printed text.

Here, of course, understand the spheres of hearing, smell, and taste, and in the three following lacunae the corresponding forms of contact. Proceed similarly in the next two answers.

I.e., as in § 596, omitting only 'the sphere of visible forms', and inserting, presumably, 'the sphere of the tangible'.

The negative particle must be supplied in the printed text.

The lacunae in this and following sentences must be filled up analogously with those in the preceding group. Thus, in this question, the three other mental processes named in the preceding question are to be understood; the answer will be identical with that in § 596, excluding only 'the sphere of visible forms', but inserting 'the sphere of the tangible'. And so on.

I.e., repeat § 596 (into which 'the sphere of the tangible' does not enter).

The replies given here and to the four questions condensed in § 697 are apparently intended to be those set out in sets of four expounding the current theory of sensereaction, §§ 597-616. Similarly, for the replies to the questions on sense taken objectively (§§ 699, 701), see §§ 617-632, 648-651.

The contradictories seem to be described in all four answers, by a repetition of § 596, with the omission in each case of the specific item named in the question on the corresponding positive term, and, presumably, with the insertion of 'the sphere of the tangible'.

In the printed text read rupam phottabbayatanam. The answer is, of course, the last of the four several replies, the three first being understood.

Here supply the answer in § 596, omitting the first term, and inserting 'the sphere of the tangible'.

Here, of course, supply the spheres of the other three senses.

For the full formula, see § 597.

I.e., answer as in § 596, omitting the first item, and inserting 'the sphere of the tangible'.

See §§ 601, 605, 609, 613.

See §§ 633-635.

[713a] is inadvertently omitted in the printed text.

§§ 713a, 715, and 717 are presumably identical with § 596, with the successive omission of the term excluded by each question, and with the insertion always of 'the sphere of the tangible'.

Again, in these two negative categories, § 596 is presumably followed with corresponding omissions and insertion. See p. 209, note 1.

Cf. with §§ 638, 652.